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Abstract 
Both national and local governments in parts of the global South have started to realise the 
importance of the informal economy in poverty alleviation. In these countries there is a growing 
government desire to develop informal trading policy frameworks and strategies that will not hinder 
the potential of the informal economy for economic growth. This is, however, often let down by 
varying implementation challenges. This research has focused on one specific pilot model for 
managing street trading around Park Station Inner city Johannesburg, a model in the making in its 
principles and implementation process, to investigate the extent through which its principles can be 
said to be progressive. This pilot model, Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM), 
is set up by an alliance between a business coalition, the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP), 
and a street trading organisation, South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA). This 
research has documented principles and a principle renegotiation process of the PSSTMM through 
interviews, action research and observation that involved different stakeholders of the PSSTMM. 
Furthermore, as part of action research investigation of what is currently happening in the area of 
study in relation to street trading which were done for this research  were used in the principle 
renegotiation process. Through this investigation the PSSTMM has shifted from only accommodating 
SANTRA members, a principle that existed prior to the principle renegotiation process, to 
accommodating all existing traders, if it happens that a design plan allow this to happen. The 
PSSTMM also provide support in a form cleaning and security. This is good for traders as it means 
more potential customers will visit the area because of improved safety and cleanliness. The 
PSSTMM is progressive in allowing traders, amongst other stakeholders, to be part of the policy 
formulation process. In this process, involved stakeholders through compromises have developed a 
plan agreed to by all. These principles are recognised in this research as progressive because they 
respond to the concepts of “inclusive” and “developmental”, which in this research are 
acknowledged as determining a progressive management model. However, the fee asked from 
street traders undermines this and I have argued that the PSSTMM to be progressive in this 
principle, participants of the PSSTMM need to focus on improving this principle by looking at other 
innovative ways. This could be done through street trader’s participation, in cleaning amongst 
others, to compliment the efforts of the City or of the private sector and consequently reducing the 
expected fee. 
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Chapter one: Introducing the research 
1.1. Introduction and Background 
This research focuses on one specific pilot model for managing street trading around Park Station 
Inner city Johannesburg, a model in the making in its principles and implementation process, to 
investigate the extent through its principles can be said to be progressive. This pilot model, Park 
Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM), is set up by an alliance between a business 
coalition, the Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP), and a street trading organisation, South 
African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA). This topic - models of managing street trading- 
according to the Centre for Urbanism and Built Environment Studies (CUBES) website1 was also 
identified as part of a broader research within CUBES on street trading. CUBES is a platform for 
urban research, learning, and civic engagement located in the School of Architecture and Planning, 
University of the Witwatersrand (ibid). To CUBES this topic is an attempt to respond to the lack of 
documentation of inclusive (or progressive) street management models. Furthermore, it was partly 
to feed in the Alternative Formalities, Transnationalism and Xenophobia in the City of Johannesburg 
(AFTraX), a project contracted between Wits University and the City of Johannesburg to find ways 
forward in the governance of informal economies in Johannesburg2 and partly to respond to a 
request by SANTRA3.  
This research is taking place in the aftermath of Operation Clean Sweep (OCS), where the City of 
Johannesburg (CoJ) in October 2013 unilaterally (and unconstitutionally) decided to chase about 
6000 street traders from the CBD, as a reaction to its incapacity to manage the sector (Constitutional 
court 2013). Skinner (2008a) note that existing research suggests there are two main responses by 
the state, to unmanaged street trading. This includes the sporadic, large scale evictions of street 
traders and lower-level ongoing harassment of traders (ibid). OCS carried out by the CoJ can be 
characterised as falling under the former. OCS is evidence that the City was acknowledging that it 
has failed to manage street trading in an effective way. In a statement made by the CoJ, it was said 
the initiative came as a result of numerous site visits where conclusions about ‘lawlessness’ were 
made (Moyo 2013). The CoJ’s Department of Development Planning (DDP) led by Rosslyn Greeff, a 
                                                          
1
http://www.wits.ac.za/academic/ebe/archplan/cubes/research%20projects/streettradingandurbangovernanc
e/24129/street_trading_and_urban_governance.html. Accessed on 25 September 2014 
2
 The AFTraX project is further discussed under methodology chapter where the position of this research and 
links with AFTraX project will be also discussed. 
3
 CUBES was approached by SANTRA to assist in preparing a more informed position from which to negotiate 
with City authorities. Two key issues were considered: where should there be street trade in the inner city? 
and what management model(s) for street trading could be implemented? This discussed further in below 
sections.   
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member of the Mayoral Committee in the CoJ, identified illegal trading, illegal dumping, and illegal 
littering, land and building invasions as the main challenges which they claimed needed urgent 
attention (ibid). DDP according to the City of Johannesburg’s website4 is responsible for effective and 
efficient management of the urban environment with commitments to combat urban decay and the 
regeneration of stagnant areas with an aim to stimulate economic growth, and safe built 
environment. These site visits and subsequent meetings according to Moyo (2013) led to the OCS 
through which the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD), an agency responsible for 
enforcing bylaws of the City, was tasked to remove all street traders from the Inner city.   
Parks Tau, the mayor of the City who also paid a visit in the Inner city, noted in support to OCS, that 
a “well governed city is one whose environment is not only habitable and safe, but conducive for 
growth and development for all its inhabitants, investors and all relevant stakeholders” (Moyo 2013: 
2). Here, the statement made by the mayor came out as a way to show that the illegalities practised 
by street traders were not respecting the rights given to other city users. However the City’s 
response to this was also not respecting the rights held by traders to trade, and it was not in line to 
its own policies. The City confessed in the Constitutional court that it had not followed the 
procedures as prescribed in section 6A(2) of the Business Act of 1991, amended in 1993 to prohibit 
traders which it gave permission to trade in the Inner city (Constitutional Court 2014 ). Section 6A (2) 
of the Business Act of 1991 state that the City has authority to “declare any place in its area of 
jurisdiction to be an area in which the carrying out of street trading” may be restricted or prohibited. 
However, before such actions the “local authority shall have regard to the effect of the presence of a 
large number of street traders in that area and shall consider: 
 Whether more effective supervision or control in that area, including negotiations with any 
person carrying on in that area the business of street trading or their representatives, will 
make a declaration unnecessary and,  
 The intended restriction or prohibition will drive out of business a substantial number of 
street vendors, pedlars or hawkers” (Business Act 1991).  
The City did not follow this procedure before chasing both traders who they gave permission to 
trade and those which were not given.   
The Constitutional court case came because of failed attempt in the High Court as the court thought 
the matter was not urgent (Constitutional court 2013). Here, traders were requesting for an urgent 
interim relief that was to see them going back to their trading sites while the city was still sorting a 
                                                          
4
 http://joburg.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=544&Itemid=9&limitstart=1. Accessed 
on 15 September 2014 
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‘proper’ way of managing (Constitutional court 2013). In parallel to this street traders told Business 
report (2013) that they admit the claims of illegalities identified by the CoJ and those which were 
made by the mayor of not respecting the rights provided to other users. While admitting their 
contribution to the problem, SANTRA approached CJP asking to form an alliance that is to work in a 
specific project, PSSTMM, as a way to demonstrate that traders want to be part of the solution, to 
prove they can be responsible (Steffny, CJP director interviewed on 22/04/2014). The alliance 
between CJP and SANTRA according to Elias, SANTRA spokesperson (interviewed on 24/03/2014) 
and Steffny (interviewed on 22/04/2014) was a result of a ‘good’ relationship that emerged between 
the two, through previous initiatives of managing street trading, in particular in the Retail 
Improvement District (RID) in Johannesburg (see also Malemagoba et al 2012 and Bénit-Gbaffou 
2014b). “This solution was to see traders managing themselves but initially management will be 
incubated by CJP, handed over when institution, capacity, skills are sustainable” (Steffny interviewed 
on 22/04/2014).  
Although, traders have demonstrated their willingness to work with the City in managing street 
trading, Anonymous (2014) noted that the CoJ, especially the Department of Economic Development 
(DED) which is responsible for setting policies, strategies and by-laws on the management of street 
trading has been reluctant in engaging people outside the department in executing its responsibility. 
This has been worsened by the court case for traders, as it has placed both the DED and traders in 
positions where they are ‘enemies’ of each other (ibid). On the other hand flawed management of 
street trading by DED which has resulted in the City being dragged to Court has attracted much 
attention within and outside (including media) the City. Here, Central Strategic Unit, located under 
the mayor’s office, has asked Wits University to find way forward in the governance of informal 
economies in Johannesburg. This approach by CSU demonstrates that different groups within the 
CoJ exist, with one being sympathetic to street traders (contracting Wits that they know will support 
progressive and inclusive policies) and another being not sympathetic (that ran OCS).  
1.2. Main stakeholders of the Park Station street trading management model  
The PSSTMM has come to involve many different stakeholders including CUBES, as a facilitator and 
advocating for certain principles discussed in chapter five and six. However, at the core, the 
initiators/establishers of this street trader management model are SANTRA and CJP which the 
following section seeks to present them. The following section start by presenting CJP, the 
background with regards to when it was established and the purpose. Furthermore, the main 
concept that has come to capture the imagination of this stakeholder is also presented with a 
specific attention on the role of this stakeholder. Immediately after this, there will be a presentation 
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on SANTRA, explaining the role of this stakeholder, background and what it stands for. This part also 
attempts to present SANTRA in comparison to other street trader organisations and this will be 
based on the work of Tissington (2009), Matjmane (2013) and my own experience.  
1.2.1. Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP)   
The Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) was established in 1992 after the private sector in 
Johannesburg mobilised and organised itself to find solutions to an Inner city that was declining and 
consequently having negative impact on their property values (Ngwabi 2009). Ngwabi (2009) state 
that this organisation led by Neil Fraser as its Chief Execute Officer (CEO) was also tasked with 
researching the causes of and possible solutions to urban decay. The CJP identified six major issues 
that needed urgent attention, namely safety and security, informal trading, cleaning and 
maintenance of public spaces, revitalisation of residential accommodation, transportation and taxis 
management and urban planning, and marketing (ibid). In an attempt to find solutions to the above 
issues the CJP used the experience of North America of combating urban decay (ibid). The CJP 
learned about this experience through a series of events including study tours to the United State of 
America (USA) (ibid). Tissington (2009: 40) state that this cumulated to the development of this 
organisation in 1998 as “a private, non-profit company dedicated to urban renewal and the 
revitalisation” of urban areas not only in the traditional CJP operating area of the Johannesburg 
Inner City rather in Johannesburg as whole and throughout the African continent.  
The City Improvement Districts (CIDs) concept is what captured the renewal strategy of CJP and later 
became a tangible legacy of the organisation (Peyroux 2008). City Improvement Districts according 
to the CJP (2001) cited in Peyroux (2008: 139) is definition as a “geographic area within which 
property owners and/or tenants agree to pay for certain services supplementary to those supplied 
by the Local Authority and which will enhance the physical and social environment of the area”. 
Miraftab (2007) argue that Cape Town and Johannesburg’s renewal strategy of the private sector, 
particular of CJP in the case of Johannesburg, adopted the whole City Improvement Districts (CIDs) 
package used in the United States of America to combat urban degeneration which had a “zero-
tolerance” approach to informal trading. Consequently, CJP through CIDs advocated for a “zero-
tolerance” approach on informal trading and law-breakers (Tissington 2009). In 1997 CJP assisted 
the provincial government in drafting the Gauteng City Improvement District Act of 1997 which 
provided a formal legal framework for the establishment and management of CIDs (ibid). This Act, 
amongst other important things, provided that a CID can only be established once a petition for its 
establishment, approved by no less than fifty one percent (51%) of property owners, has been 
received and approved by the municipality concerned (Beall et al 2002).    
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Tissington (2009) note that in some parts of Johannesburg Inner city the responsibility of the City to 
manage street trading management is given to property owners or private sector companies with 
two processes taking place in this regard. The first is the leasing of sidewalks by the City to property 
owners who manages street trading in front of their buildings (ibid). The second is the CID process 
where property owners, by agreeing to provide additional funding for the provision of extra services 
of cleaning and security to those provided by the City, also manage street trading (ibid). According to 
CJP (2014a) this came as it became very difficult for these additional services to be provided in an 
efficient manner without getting involved in informal trading management. The CJP entered into a 
Joint Venture with the City in 2000 to manage informal trading in all Inner city CIDs and this joint 
venture was later renewed in 2005 (ibid). This process of managing street trading was a 
responsibility of CJP prior to giving it to Urban Genesis Management (UGM) which used to be known 
as Kagiso Urban Management (KUM). The CJP and UGM “serve corporate business – their primary 
client – with exceptional quality as well as forging a close working relationship with the City”. UGM 
was formed to take the administrative role of CIDs from CJP and to be a for profit company, as a 
service provider, while CJP remained to be a no for profit lobby group to the City for CIDs and as a 
platform from which CID’s which are made of different board members could share information, 
follow and build on international trends and better work together with all levels of government to 
the benefit of all involved in urban management partnerships (CJP 2014).   
1.2.2. South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA) 
The South African National Traders Retail Alliance (SANTRA) was established in 2006 and its 
executive committee was then selected (Elias 2012 cited in Matjomane 2013). In its website5 the 
role of the organisation is to “fight for the rights of informal traders” and its main “objective is to 
integrate micro trading with urban renewal initiatives in an orderly and structured manner”. This 
organisation according Tissington (2009) is one of the active and most vocal organisations in the 
informal trading sector. Elias (2012) cited in Matjomane (2013) state that when the organisation 
started, it had about 5000 members but since then this number has declined to about 1700 
members. Moreover, in a conversation with the current SANTRA chairperson, Livingston Mantanga, 
he said now the organisation has over 3600 members in the Inner city. This shows the instability in 
the number of members they have and according Elias in Tissington (2009) the decline experienced 
by the organisation was a result of restrictions imposed to street trading which pushed other 
members out of the sector. Furthermore he notes that another reason was that the organisation 
was failing to recruit new members and some of its members left the organisation because of 
                                                          
5
 http://santra.wozaonline.co.za/. Accessed on the 10th August 2014 
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disappointment with their President who was involved in an unclear mismanagement of the 
membership fees and disappeared to Eastern Cape some years ago (Matjomane 2013).   
While street traders’ organisations in six countries (Kenya, Cote D’ivoire, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda 
and South Africa) studied by Mitullah (2003: 13) shows that most street trader organisations “are 
issue driven, they appear, disappear and reappear depending on a felt need”. Elias (2012) cited in 
Matjomane (2013) state that SANTRA is a stable organisation, going nowhere, which is not necessary 
based on membership but is focusing on advocating for existing traders. SANTRA, different from 
other street trader organisation in Johannesburg such as One Voice of All hawkers Association 
(OVOAHA), does not only focus on influencing implementation of informal trading policy, they push 
to influence informal trading policies so as they can be “developmental and inclusive” (Matjomane 
2013). SANTRA believes that a genuine engagement on policy direction and implementation of 
policies, between street traders and policy makers can resolve some of the problems of urban 
management (ibid). SANTRA hold a view that some of the strategies used by the CoJ and that of the 
private sector, particular CIDs, are not favourable to the development of street trading (Tissington 
2009). This organisation feels that the CoJ does not convene a genuine engagement, rather, a divide 
and rule tactic (Matjomane 2013). However, SANTRA use this level of government so as to prevent 
leaders of other organisations who have personal and clientelist relations with the municipal agents 
from taking over the platform (ibid). 
Similar to South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF), a street trader organisation, SANTRA also 
aims at influencing provincial and national levels of government. This according to Matjomane 
(2013: 121) could be seen as a “strategy to play at the heterogeneity of the state where this 
particular organisation of street traders goes to the higher level of government to complain about 
the ill treatment of street traders by the local level of government and appealing to the premier to 
do something about this”. For example, Livingston Mantanga in a workshop held on the 25 
September 2014 mentioned that SANTRA went to the provincial government to complain about the 
actions of the CoJ, which evicted their members in the Inner City Johannesburg. This workshop 
forms a series of workshops organised by CUBES as way of providing research support to street 
traders’ organisations as asked by SANTRA, but with all other street traders being invited to discuss 
various issues affecting the sector. In addition, SANTRA has adopted a number of strategies to get 
the attention of government and influence decision making to their advantage. These strategies 
include “applications to the public protector; court applications; forging relations with the media and 
using social networking to publicise issues street traders are faced with; garnering support from the 
general public and in the process shaming government” (Matjomane 2013: 121).  
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1.3. The Park Station Street Trading Management Model 
The model remains to be something that the two organisations (SANTRA and CJP) talk about which 
has never been presented, nor, arguably, conceptualised in full. It is one of the objectives of this 
research to investigate the details of this management model. The proposal6 submitted to the CoJ by 
CJP on the 03 January 2014 highlights the affected areas, stakeholders, what is to be regulated and 
costs to management. This document is not explicit about the working relationship or partnership 
between SANTRA and CJP but what is visible and talked about is the fact that SANTRA is only 
mentioned as a member of CJP, and the name - logo used in the proposal only represent CJP. 
Furthermore, Interviews with Edmund (interviewed on 24/03/2014), Anne (interviewed on 
22/04/2014) revealed that both CJP and SANTRA are involved in the PSSTMM, CJP as a manager, 
SANTRA as the main organisation on the ground, and relatively happy of CJP management as 
opposed to the City’s management approach. This management model adopts most principles from 
a street trading management model experienced in the Retail Improvement District (RID) and the 
location of the RID is depicted in Map 1.1 (see Malemagoba et al 2012 and Bénit-Gbaffou 2014b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1.1 (above): done by the author depict the location of the RID and of where the model is set to 
be implemented. The map also depicts some of the major public places that contribute in drawing 
people into the area.  
                                                          
6
 Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP), 2014a, Informal Traders Amended Sustainable Management 
Proposal relating to some trading areas within the Johannesburg Inner City. Proposal sent to the City of 
Johannesburg, 03 January, communicated by CJP.  
Lande 2014 
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These principles include the establishment of a precinct management board or committee, raising of 
monthly levies to fund cleaning and security, appointing a service provider that is to report to the 
precinct management board and regulating the number of traders (CUBES 2014a). Table 1.1 below, 
however, demonstrates the main difference that exists between the Retail Improvement District 
model and the Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM). 
Table 1.1 (below) adopted from CUBES (2014a) and (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014b) shows the main 
differences that exists between the RID and PSSTMM 
Retail Improvement District model Park Station Management Model 
Centred around property owners Centred around street traders 
Property  owners pay levy  for security and 
cleaning services 
Street traders are to pay for cleaning and 
security services and other costs 
 
This model need to be considered as work in progress as a result it has opened negotiations which 
are being facilitated by CUBES and the role played CUBES here is further discussed below. These 
negotiations have resulted into a quite strange alliance between business (CJP), traders (SANTRA) 
and academia (CUBES). This is an uneasy alliance to a great extent, where some interests are 
common such as admitting by coming together that they need each other for the different interest 
they have, but there are also many divergences. For example, CUBES, not very sympathetic to 
private management of street trading or to supporting CIDs and CJP as central broker between 
traders and the state. CUBES have compromised its position by giving legitimacy to what is described 
elsewhere as a form of neoliberal governance (Peyroux 2007).  
CJP have in the past adopted a “zero tolerance” position towards street trading, they have not only 
prevented street traders from participating in management of CIDs but they have also lobbied the 
City Council to extend street trading prohibition to the City Improvement Districts. Moreover, they 
have supported the City’s intentions of locating all street traders in markets (or later linear market) 
and prohibiting the use of pavements for trading (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014a). In these negotiations, CJP is 
compromising on their position and Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) note that its members might have 
possibly been divided on this issue. SANTRA, similar to CUBES have (in the past) been very critical to 
the work of CJP that advocated for the prohibition of street trading in many part of Inner city 
Johannesburg (Tissington 2009). Here both SANTRA and CUBES, and possible CJP, have placed 
themselves in an uncomfortable positions here. The fact that we believe there is no alternative in 
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sight, we support this engagement and we believe it is worth experimenting as an alternative to 
repressive City solutions.  
1.4. The role played by CUBES in the negotiations  
According to the CUBES' website7, this platform for urban research, learning, and civic engagement 
considers street trading through research and advocacy and this derives from its Yeoville Studio 
project in 2010-2011 where different activities focused on street trading in the neighbourhood of 
Yeoville were conducted. This according to the CUBES’s website, above, includes attempts by CUBES 
together with local stakeholders to develop a pilot project for integrated trading on its main street, 
Rockey Raleigh’. Through this attempt, although it never took off, expertise and relationships were 
established between CUBES, street traders and street trader organisations, particularly with South 
African National Traders and Retailers Alliance (SANTRA) (ibid). Since this studio, CUBES remained 
committed to supporting street traders, their families and communities whose livelihoods rely on 
street trading (ibid). Support has come in a form of advocating for fair and participatory 
governmental processes through which street trading can be managed in Johannesburg (ibid). 
CUBES does this through research on models for effective management of street trading and 
proposals on spatial organisation of street trading (ibid). Furthermore, it is noted in the CUBES’s 
website that a research group that has been going on for several years on informal trading involving 
staff and student’s research projects in the School of Architecture and Planning, Wits University 
exists.   
A turn to CUBES’s approach of supporting street traders came in October 2013, when the CoJ 
through OCS removed about 6000 (licenced and unlicensed) traders in Johannesburg Inner city. The 
first reaction to this by CUBES was through a letter protesting OCS, and in February 2014, CUBES was 
approached by SANTRA and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a trade union 
federation that was also trying to unite street traders. The request was for CUBES to assist in 
preparing a more informed position from which to negotiate with City authorities. Two key issues 
were considered:  
 Where should traders trade in the Inner city (and where should they not)? 
 What are models of street trading management that work? 
Since then more and more street trader organisations have joined the engagement. This includes the 
South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF), Nigerian Union Traders (NUT), Ethiopian Street trader 
                                                          
7
http://www.wits.ac.za/academic/ebe/archplan/cubes/research%20projects/streettradingandurbangovernanc
e/24129/street_trading_and_urban_governance.html. Accessed on 30 September 2014 
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Organisation (ESTO), One Voice of All Hawkers Association (OVOAHA), African Cooperative for 
Hawkers & Informal Businesses (ACHIB). This engagement between these different organisations 
facilitated by CUBES are held through a series of workshops which I had a privilege to be part of the 
group that organised them.   
More particularly, separate from the workshops held between the above discussed organisations, 
SANTRA has asked CUBES to help refine the pilot management model for Park Station. The role that 
is being played by CUBES with regards to the PSSTMM is to provide its research expertise to propose 
ideas for discussion aiming at improving the model to be more progressive and sustainable. 
Furthermore, CUBES have played the role of facilitating the renegotiations of the PSSTMM and as a 
facilitator, CUBES also draft minutes of these negotiations, consolidates documents as outcomes of 
discussions and agreements, and circulate them to stakeholders for comments and as archives. 
These negotiations have resulted in other groupings being involved in the development of this 
model. This include the eThekwini expects who were asked to share their experience on precinct 
based street trading management and their comment on the PSSTMM. Urban Genesis Management 
(UGM) has also been involved as a possible service provider. UGM, according to their website8 “is a 
multi-disciplinary advisory and management service company specialising in consulting, urban 
management and place management services”.  
1.5. Where is the Park Station Street Trading Management Model going to be 
implemented? 
The PSSTMM is set to be implemented adjacent to Park Station in the Inner city, Johannesburg. This 
area is one of the busiest and most ‘chaotic’ areas in Johannesburg as it serves as a primary public 
transport interchange in the CoJ and a host to various other economic activities (CJP 2013). 
Specifically, as demonstrated in map 1.2 below, areas that are to be affected include: Hoek Street 
between Park Station and De Villiers Street, Noord Street between Park Station and Wanderers 
Street., Wanderers Street between De Villiers Street and Wolmarans Street. In proximity to Park 
station, metropolitan functions such as the Joubert Park, the Hillbrow health precinct, Wanderers 
Taxi Rank, Jack Mincer Park, Johannesburg Art Gallery, Johannesburg Polytech Institute and the 
Metropolitan centre are found. Furthermore, the national health laboratory service, Gautrain station 
also form part of major land uses/activities that contribute in attracting people in the site.  
                                                          
8
 http://www.urbangenesis.co.za/.  Accessed on 05 June 2014  
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Map 1.2 (above): done by the author depict a zoomed version of the area of study as shown in map 
1.1 above. 
According to the JDA website9, Transit-oriented development strategies are at the heart of the 
Johannesburg’s 2011 Growth Development Strategy (GDS), the long term plan of the CoJ. This 
according to the website above is prompting the City to prioritise public transport. This site is an 
intervention focus of the GDS as the primary transit interchange in the City and a number of 
interventions are proposed and some are currently being implemented. This includes the Inner City 
Commuter Links project, and the 2010 public transportation plan by Johannesburg Development 
Agency (JDA). JDA is an agency of the CoJ which functions as project designer and facilitation unit, 
structuring a range of urban environment upgrade and social and economic development projects 
(Nkokoto 2005). Inner City Commuter Links project is referred to by the 2012 JDA annual report as a 
project that is to create a pedestrian friendly and walkable urban environment through setting up a 
network of public spaces, easy circulation around formal taxi, bus and rail facilities. Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2014a) note that the 2010 Inner City Transport and Traffic Study is explicitly calling for a CID around 
Park Station to better manage heavy pedestrian and transportation flows as well as street trading. 
Furthermore, CJP has also been calling for this site to be regulated because of its proximity to RID 
territory (see map 1.1) and affecting it (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014d).  
 
                                                          
9
 http://www.jda.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1414&Itemid=219. Accessed on 13 
August 2014 
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1.6. Problem statement 
A street should be understood as a terrain where the state always sort to assert and display its 
dominance and power by managing various rights given to numerous actors (Brown 2005). Here, 
power is understood as the action upon the actions of other people as opposed to simply defining 
power as an ability to act. This is to say power is the ‘government of conduct’ and it dictates or 
structures how other people exercise their power or actions. It is significant to understand power 
from this perspective especially in a street where government always exercise it by creating by-laws, 
policies that define what is right or wrong through which other actors are forced to conform to and 
exercise their power based on. This is true to a place such as Johannesburg and the OCS discussed 
above is one example through which the local state has proven who has power over who on a street. 
This form of power (OCS) according to Kamete (2012) is exercised in contexts where government 
lacks resources to monitor its by-laws in an effective way regularly. Furthermore, Kamete (2012) 
state that this form of power becomes violent especially to the urban poor so as to compensate for 
the period through which it was absent. In addition, ongoing harassment by city officials to traders 
and small scale eviction in Johannesburg is also part of enforcing bylaws as suggested by SANTRA 
and SAITF speaking in a meeting convened by the Gauteng MEC for Economic development 
Lebogang Maile reported by Times Lives (2014).    
David et al (2012) studying practices and approaches of local government towards the informal 
economy in five different African countries (Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, South Africa and Tanzania) argue 
that in the last decade, both national and some local governments in these countries have started 
realising the importance of the informal economy in poverty alleviation. In these countries, there is a 
growing government desire to develop informal trading policy frameworks and strategies that will 
not hinder the potential of the informal economy for economic growth (ibid). The support for street 
trading is increasingly being recognised in many policies of the CoJ, however, these policies fail to 
adequately respond the City’s dual and often contradictory mandate to alleviate poverty and 
manage dense and congested streets (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014a). Bénit and Gervais-Lambony (2005) 
argue that the CoJ is caught between the imperatives of poverty alleviation which also include 
encouraging informal trading as a sector that offers significant jobs and income generation 
opportunities to those who have not been absorbed by the formal economy, and the desire to attain 
a ‘world class city’ status. The imperatives of poverty alleviation are also a national/provincial 
priority (Matjomane 2013); and one could see the CoJ, according to internal CUBES discussion on our 
understanding of City politics, as divided into departments that encourage more progressive ways of 
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managing street trading as a way of alleviating poverty and departments which are restrictive on 
street trading as their priority is to have clean and ordered streets.  
1.7. Rationale  
Whilst the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (Durban) is widely recognised for its pioneering 
work in South Africa through which a progressive approach to the management of street was 
adopted for some time (Skinner 2008b), it remains a research problem that very limited literature 
exists which documents such kinds of street trading management model (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014a). 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a), however, further notes that the presentation and analysis of the 
‘management model’ of the eThekwini Municipality and its principles, at least from a municipal 
management perspective is difficult to find. She suggests that this might be the case because of 
“complex institutional and political history, with roots in the municipal transitional period” (ibid: 37). 
A Management Model according to Bénit-Gbaffou (2014: 5a) refers to “management principles, 
rules, arrangements, practices as a more or less consistent system”. This system of possibly formal 
and informal rules can be imitated and adopted elsewhere, although it might yield different results 
in different political settings and contexts (ibid). Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) further suggest that it is 
important never to detach this system of rules to their “local political meanings, their adaptation and 
side-lining, the process of their definition and formalization, their contestation or lack thereof” 
because what works in one context does not mean it will work to another (ibid: 5). A street trading 
management model can therefore be examined along the following specific lines:  
 Structure and lines of accountability  
o The partnership model (amongst the ‘implementers’) 
o Stakeholders ( including ‘implementers’ and the people it is being implemented for, 
who might also be part of the implementers): their roles, meeting regularities) 
 The things that it regulates, for example: 
o Cleanliness 
o Security  
o Traders issues (conflicts) 
 The financial model (monthly costs, number of traders, cleaner, security ambassadors; how 
the funds are raised and how they are managed and accounted for) 
 The implementation processes, which also includes the processes of asking traders to pay a 
fee, negotiating prices with service providers, convincing the City to tolerate the model. 
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Malemagoba et al (2012) and Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b) have documented the RID management model, 
however the RID model raises questions, in terms of being progressive, as it give more power to 
property owners and less to traders to decide on issues that affect them. This research is necessary 
since it attempts to document something that appears to have hardly been documented before 
which is a street trader centred model of street trading management.   
1.8. Aim of this research 
This research is about understanding principles of the Park Station street trading management 
model. The model is currently being negotiated and in a project such as this I have learned that 
principles and the implementation process cannot be explored separately. This is the case because 
they in fact constantly influence each other. For example, initially one of the principles was that the 
CoJ was to become part of the stakeholders that are to implement the model, with hopes that it can 
also contribute financially by subcontracting and paying CJP to manage the model. However along 
the course of developing the PSSTMM the City has been reluctant in participating and this has 
changed the principles to include an attempt that would ask traders and possible property owners to 
join as they are also affected (Edmund interviewed on 24/03/2014). Moreover, chapter five of this 
research will reveal that the fee required from traders to finance the PSSTMM has resulted in 
contestations in the renegotiations of the PSSTMM and this might not only change this principle but 
also the principle of the number of traders to be accommodated. Chapter five reveals that there 
were suggestions discussed in the PSSTMM renegotiations which suggested that by increasing the 
number of traders to be accommodated will decrease the amount required from each trader that 
was initially accommodated in the first proposal of PSSTMM. This change can happen either way, in 
that the principles can also influence the implementation process and the process vice versa. 
1. 9. Research question 
To what extent does the Park Station Street Trading Management model bring about a progressive 
approach to the management of street trading in the Inner city, Johannesburg? 
1.9.1. Research Sub-questions 
1. What are the principles of the Park Station Street trading Management model? 
2. How are the principles of the Park Station Street Trading Management Model being defined, 
negotiated, and justified?  
3. What are the conditions of the area of study , Park station, in relation street trading  
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4. To what extent and in which dimensions can the model and its implementation be said to be 
progressive? 
1.10. How is progressive understood in this research?     
According to Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a), in paper titled In quest for sustainable models of street trading 
management, a progressive management model is both “developmental” and “inclusive”. She 
understands developmental as attempts to support street traders in their endeavors to make a 
living. She state that this support to street traders can fall anywhere from the range between non-
restrictive environment to a supportive one. One side of this range relate to the extent in which a 
management model is open to new entrants with limited capital, this include removing repressive 
regulation. The second side is more concerned about support structures and services to traders so as 
they can sustain their trade (ibid). Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) extends her explanation to consider if this 
support attends to specific needs of different traders by asking two questions. The first being “is 
different/ specific support measures given to survivalist as well as to entrepreneurial street traders? 
The second being is there a diversity of trading sites options, in order to accommodate different 
types of street traders?   
The concept of inclusive is understood by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) to mean two things. The first 
relates to the idea of allowing new entrants to trade by  giving permission to all street traders in a 
management model to trade and not only a minority of traders. She advises that we should look at 
the proportion of existing traders that a management model has given permission to trade and, at 
principles that prevents traders an opportunity to trade, for example the amount of the fee (if any) 
requested for trading, to tell  if a management is inclusive or not. Inclusive is also understood by 
Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) to mean the inclusion of street traders in the policy and decisions making 
process that affect them through relevant institutions in charge of making those decisions. She 
writes that it is important to understand the role of these institutions in actual policy and 
implementation decisions, and the specific support given to them.  
In this research the concept progressive has been chosen to capture the very aspects of 
developmental alluded to by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) which is about supporting traders. The reason 
why developmental alone was not chosen over progressive is the fact that this concepts covers a 
wide range of sub-concepts such as life expectancy, education, and income indices (which need to 
be considered when studying this concept), and in this research I am not interested in them. I am 
more interested to the concept as attempts to support traders by accommodating all of them and 
the provision of services and infrastructure that suits their trading. The way in which inclusive is 
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understood by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a), does also explain how inclusive is captured by how 
progressive is understood in this research. The involvement of street traders, amongst other 
stakeholders brings a significant contribution to the management of street trading. As a result, I am 
more interested to this concept, as part of progressive along the lines of attempting to 
accommodate all existing street traders and allowing traders to be part of the decision making 
process.     
 1.11. Literature review 
The literature review which is chapter two of this research has taken two directions; one is about 
street trading management in the cities of the South, followed by a section which talks about 
Johannesburg and street trading policy and regulation in post-apartheid.  Here, attempts are made 
to debate the various concepts and positions taken by different entities and writers with regards to 
how they think street trading should be managed. The first section has covered debates around 
informality, dual economy, understanding arguments for and against street trading and street trader 
organisations in spaces of participation in Johannesburg. Here, it has been suggested that it is 
necessary to diagnose or to completely understand a phenomena if you are to develop solutions 
that will fix the problems because if you are not then it becomes possible for one to develop a very 
good solutions but for a wrong problem. The second section has touched on policies, Acts, by-laws 
and various strategies or initiatives that have been undertaken in the Inner city which have had an 
impact on street trading. Here, it is evident that, although some progressive policies exist, initiatives 
which most were supported as a tool to regenerate the Inner city have happened at the expense of 
street trading.    
1.12. Research methodology  
The methodology adopted in this research which is further discussed in chapter three is based on a 
qualitative approach that includes interviews, documentation and observation. In this research a 
quantitative survey is also used in understand the character of the area of study in relation to street 
trading management. Furthermore, as I wish to explore a model in the making in its principles, its 
politics and implementation, direct observations only are not sufficient in understanding principles 
which are changing with implementation/negotiations. Consequently, this research will also adopt 
action research which according to Creswell (2009) is the study that places the subject of research as 
an integral part of the design with an aim to empower participants. Given that the model is being 
conceptualised and implemented right now, this present an opportunity for me to participate. 
However, as a student I have decided to take the role of being an observer which allows me to learn, 
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with regards to the negotiations between SANTRA, CJP and CUBES, with Claire Bénit-Gbaffou, 
representing CUBES being directly involved in facilitating negotiations, with me participating by 
supporting the process with research. This has made this research challenging as it provides less 
distance to critically examine everything. Moreover another challenge experienced in this research 
has been the changes that have occurred which made it hard to predict or plan the trajectory of this 
research. 
 1.13. Ethical considerations 
This research is to proceed in a context where people (street traders) were and are still emotionally 
abused and vulnerable as a result of the City of Johannesburg’s clean sweep campaign that took 
place in October 2013 through which their livelihood were threatened. In a statement made in the 
constitutional court on the 04th April 2014 it was said the action of the City through OCS have 
caused “irreparable harm that undermined their fundamental rights to trade and dignity”. This 
statement revealed that traders are in a state where they feel humiliated and degraded to their 
families and to society as a whole, with those who have dependents feeling that they have let them 
down. The Operation Clean Sweep did not only take traders’ dignity, it also left traders in a state 
where they fear for eviction; it also destroyed many of their trading stalls, one key asset for their 
business. This I have come to observe from a site visit on the 02 May 2014, where I sensed that 
some of the traders were frightened by my presence as I was recording my observations and some 
we keeping on asking me whether I was there to chase them or what? So what do you conclude in 
terms of ethics, and how do you attempt to respond to that? 
Notwithstanding the cooperative relationship between government officials and street trader 
organisations which in some cases is based on corruption (see Matjomane 2013), the relationship 
between traders and government is one which place each group as an enemy of the other.  I have 
come to observe this from the research group meeting held on the 13th March 2014 at Wits which 
included street trader’s organisations and academics. Here, traders verbally express that the City 
does not want to accommodate all of them in the inner city and to engage with them on 
management issues as a result traders cannot be friends with the City. In this context I think it will be 
very difficult to talk with both government and some of the traders as they all do not trust people 
who they do not know as they fear that they might attempt to fragment or destroy agendas which 
they want to advance. A solution would be to use the relationships that I have already established 
with the implementers as discussed above to try and establish more relationships with other 
stakeholders. For example, I can ask Edmund to introduce me to other street traders with this 
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approach it becomes easy for traders to trust me because I have been introduced by someone who 
they trust.   
This research is to use interviews and emails that were exchanged between different stakeholders. 
The use of this information has ethical implication as it can bring prejudice to certain people. In this 
research some of the quotes which are to be used are to be made anonymous as to prevent this. 
Furthermore, this information is to be carefully selected as to avoid compromising or damaging any 
particular individual.  
1.14. Chapter outline 
This research is made up of six chapters the first being an introduction to the research, the second 
chapter is the literature review, Chapter 3 provides the approach taken to conduct this research. 
Chapter four has focused on the study area, investigating the history in relation to street trading, 
literature on the status quo about the area and proposed initiatives by City. Chapter five discusses 
the findings, it start by presenting the management model, the processes of implementing the 
model, how these two are affecting each other and how are they negotiated. Moreover, this Chapter 
will conclude by presenting whether this management model is progressive. The extent to which the 
management model can be extended elsewhere will also be argued in the conclusion. The final 
Chapter six conclude by looking at the role of a planner (CUBES) in intervening to better make the 
model progressive, indicate the extent through which it has been made progressive and 
investigating how this role is defined in planning.   
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Chapter two: Contextualising the research question 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In South Africa urban spaces, particularly Metropolitan cities are faced with rapid urbanisation 
coupled by higher rate of unemployment in the formal sector. Despite this, Metropolitan 
cities/urban areas  continue to be a destination, not only of South Africans coming from rural areas 
but also of people from all around the world who come to such urban centres with hopes of  finding 
better economic opportunities. Street trading serves as a significant sector that accommodates 
those who have not been absorbed by the formal economy and those who have been retrenched 
from the formal economy. This activity also serves as a vital bottom rung in the ladder of upward 
economic mobility and some street traders have gone from street trading to building successful off-
street businesses (Sello 2012). In his global review of street vending and public policy,  Bromley 
(2000) notes, amongst other justifications of street trading discussed further in this chapter, that the 
existence of street trading offers the government a respite from expanding the welfare, police, court 
or prison systems as it provides employment and a safety net to the traders and their dependents.  
The presence of this craft in public spaces, however, has long been an emotive issue due to the 
debates around its legitimacy and the universal challenge of managing urban spaces from which they 
work (Dewar 2005). In the past the craft has been viewed as a sign of developmental backwardness. 
Consequently, informal workers were largely excluded from mainstream processes such as 
government planning; allocation of budgets for infrastructure; economic development and social 
support (Quazi 2011). Nonetheless, the work of David et al (2012) demonstrates that there has been 
a change in attitude towards the management of street trading, with both national and local 
governments recognising the significance of this craft with regard to poverty alleviation. A fair 
amount of national and local policies in South Africa have begun reflecting on this position. This 
recognition in national and local policy is, however, often let down by varying implementation 
challenges (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014a). This includes the challenge to find precedents on progressive 
management approaches, as most documented approaches which are criticised in literature on 
street trading are those of municipal repression (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014a).  
This chapter expands on this debate where various positions and arguments that attempt to discuss 
how and what should be managed in relation to street trading are to be critically examined. This is 
an endeavour to understand various thoughts and practices which have been presented as way to 
position the research question in literature and consolidating arguments that will help in analysing 
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findings of this research. Particularly, this chapter is divided into two sections. The first is street 
trading management in the cities of the South and the second is street trading policy and regulations 
in the post-apartheid Johannesburg. The first section argues that management approaches to street 
trading have been shaped to a certain extent by how the informal economy is understood. For 
example, on the one hand, many African countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and Uganda 
governments have viewed the sector as a site of ‘marginalisation’. Consequently, governments have 
imposed restrictive measures as a way of discouraging traders with the aim of taking them out this 
‘marginalisation’. On the other hand, there have been local governments such as the eThekwini 
(Durban) Municipality, that have realised that the informal economy has become a crucial factor in 
economic development, and that it offers significant job and income generation opportunities. 
Therefore, they have attempted to develop policy frameworks and strategies aimed at growing the 
informal sector.  
The second component attempts to discuss street trading policy and regulations in the post-
apartheid Johannesburg. It is imperative to specifically dwell on these regulations and policy as they 
forms what Kamete (2012) identify as ‘government of conduct’, meaning they become a reference 
point through which other actions are forced to comply with. This was briefly discussed in the 
previous chapter where it was noted that in cases where city actors do not comply with the 
‘government of conduct’ and in cases where government lack resources to monitor its compliance, 
governments sporadically apply sovereign form of power (ibid). This form of power becomes violent 
and is similar to Operation Clean Sweep. Because of the significant implications that it has I believe it 
is important to understand the debate that goes with it.  
2.2. Street trading management in the cities of the South 
This section of the chapter begins by providing definitions to some of the important concepts used in 
this research such as the informal economy, management, management model and progressive 
management model. The definition for street trading management is extended to search why there 
is a need for street trading to be managed. This is followed by a discussion around the debates on 
the legitimacy of street trading and the challenge of managing urban spaces from which traders 
conduct their businesses. In this section, arguments for and against street trading are presented with 
an argument that suggests that instead of focussing on who is to blame there should be a focus on 
developing innovative ways of managing street trading. This chapter will also go on to highlight some 
of the key findings on regressive management of street trading, literature that Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2014a) argues is well documented. Lastly, although very limited literature on progressive 
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management of street trading exists, this section talks about one of the cases where a progressive 
approach was adopted at some point, the case of eThekwini (Durban) Municipality.  
2.2.1. Defining the informal economy 
The term informal economy was first introduced by Keith Hart through his pioneering work on 
economic activities of the urban poor in Accra, Ghana in 1973. Hart identified the informal sector as 
a zone between formal employment and unemployment, a site where the labour force works and 
creates a livelihood outside the formal labour market. The concept has developed to be elusive to 
define as various scholars and organisation began to adopt and apply it to explain the 
heterogeneous phenomena. However, in 1993 it was decided at the 15th International Conference 
of Labour Statisticians (CLS) that the standards of defining the informal economy were to be based 
on the nature of the enterprise (International Labour Organization 1993). The definition which 
emerged from this conference broadly characterised the informal sector “as consisting of units 
engaged in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of generating 
employment and incomes to the persons concerned” (David et al 2012). Moreover, the definition 
recognised that these units typically operate at a low level of organisation on a small scale, with little 
or no division between labour and capital (ibid). Labour relations, in cases where they exist, are 
based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social relations rather than contractual 
arrangements with formal guarantees (International Labour Organization, 1993).     
This has begun to change since the 2002 International Labour Conference where it was decided that 
there should be a move towards an employment based definition due to the increasing 
informalisation and casualisation of formal work, and distorting of the formal-informal economy 
divide (David et al 2012). Here, there was also a shift on the conceptualisation of the informal 
economy from a “traditional economy that will wither away and die with modern, industrial 
growth”, to: “an integrated part of the economy, which is expanding with modern, industrial 
growth” (ibid: 11). This was an acknowledgement that the informal economy is here to stay and 
policy developers should start to rethink how they develop policy towards this economy. In 2003 the 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) released a definition for informal trading 
which can be broadly understood as “involving activities and labour force that operates outside the 
regulatory framework” (Chen 2012). This expanded definition of the informal economy captures the 
size of employees not only employed in the informal enterprises but also those working within 
formal enterprises on an informal basis (ibid). This definition extends the focus from enterprises that 
are not legally regulated to include employment relationships that are not legally regulated or 
socially protected. Because of this it was decided that the informal sector should be referred to as 
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the informal economy as to also capture those who are self-employed in the informal economy and 
those who are employed informally in the formal economy (ibid).  
2.2.2. Understanding the reason, and what street trading management, management model 
means  
Various case studies that attempt to talk about management of street trading provide a very useful 
overall argument, which suggests that management cannot be understood sufficiently by assuming 
that it is the act that only involves authorities and traders. Meneses-Reyes and Caballero-Juárez 
(2013) also agree with this statement by arguing that the management of street trading arises when 
the activities of street trading negatively affect the rights of third parties who use the street. This 
argument portrays the street as a site where a number of rights are provided to numerous actors 
and street trading is the manifestation of a set of rights that are being provided in a street. Harvey 
(2008) refers to this right as a right far more than the liberty to be physical present in the city but 
rather as a right to change ourselves by changing the city. For street trading this right means traders 
have the right to be physically present in the city and use their presence to sustain their livelihood. 
Traders change the city spatially and economically as they provide something which is not provided.  
The right to work from the side of street traders is documented in several international documents 
and constitutional texts. In South Africa section 22 of the constitution recognises this right, in India 
article 19(1), of the constitution and in Mexico article 5 of the constitution also recognises this right 
to work (Meneses-Reyes and Caballero-Juárez 2013). From international documents article 6 to 7 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights acknowledges this right, with 
article 6 guaranteeing everyone the right to work so as they can sustain their lives (ibid). Article 7 
advocate for street traders to be given benefits that are similar to those found in the formal sector 
(ibid). Nonetheless,   Simone (2005) reminds us that street trading is not the only right provided on 
streets but other rights as well are provided such as walking. The spatiality of street trading is often 
recognised as the source of conflict to right of other actors, for example some traders tend to locate 
on road corners, decreasing visibility for cars to see cars coming from different directions (Meneses-
Reyes and Caballero-Juárez 2013). In other cases pedestrians complain about the difficulties to 
navigate around urban environments because of crowded street trading activities.  
Consequently one aspect of understanding street trading management is the act of managing street 
trading as to ensure that it does not violate the rights of other actors to use the street. This does not 
mean other rights should be priorities over the rights of traders, but it is an explanation suggesting 
that the rights of all actors in the street should be managed as to ensure that they do not violate the 
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rights of other actors. For example, a shop owner might want to extend his/her restaurant by placing 
tables and chairs on the street and he/she might feel that he/she is entitled to such a right.  
However, though such initiatives might be allowed there is a need for them to be managed so as to 
protect the rights of other street users. It is of great significance to understand a street as a terrain 
of contestation between various rights and a place where the state always seeks to assert and 
display its dominance and power through management. Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) further notes that 
management can also be understood to refer to principles, arrangements, rules, processes, 
practices, roles and functions that define how street trading (in this case) is to be conducted in a 
particular terrain.  
Whereas a management model is an understanding of these components as a consistent system that 
can therefore be possibly exported and replicated in a different context, although with possibility 
that it can yield different results (Malemagoba et al 2012). Malemagoba et al (2012) further suggests 
that when a management model is exported or replicated elsewhere it is important that attempts 
are made to link it to the context of that area as to enhance chances for the model yielding positive 
results. This understanding about management and management model has motivated the 
examination of the Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM) along the lines such 
as: what the model attempts to manage and regulate primarily, who are the role players/ 
organisations or institutions involved and their specific roles? What are the costs of management of 
street trading and how/ by whom are these costs funded? What are the rules and agreements 
(formal and informal) shaping the form and location of trading sites, the nature of goods sold? 
Chapter one has talked about how a progressive management of street treading can be understood. 
In this section it was   noted that a progressive management model is both ‘inclusive’ and 
‘developmental’. However, inclusive as understood in this research does not extend to an extent of 
ensuring that street traders are included in the policies and decisions that affect them as suggested 
by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a). It has been argued in that a street trading management model does 
require the involvement of street traders for it to be progressive. Furthermore, by including street 
traders in the process the model gains from contextual intelligence that only street traders possess.  
Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) talks about the other dimension of inclusiveness as that which attempts to 
accommodate the majority (if not all) existing street traders in the management model and not only 
a minority. With regards to developmental goals she states that a management model has to 
support street traders in their endeavors to make a living and this support could range from a non-
restrictive environment to a supportive one, where services and other supporting structures are 
provided to traders so as they can sustain their craft (ibid).  
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2.2.2. The source of the ‘problem’ on management issues 
Dewar (2005) argues that the presence of informal traders in public spaces has long been an emotive 
issue due to the debates around their legitimacy and the universal challenge of managing the urban 
spaces from which they work. He further notes that some view the informal economy as a positive 
phenomenon which allows an opportunity to those who have been rejected by the formal economy 
to sustain their livelihood. Moreover, others according to Dewar (2005) identify the informal 
economy as backwardness, a ‘problem’ which needs to be eliminated by taking people out of it. 
Consequently, informal workers in most parts of the Global South remain largely excluded from 
mainstream processes such as government planning; allocation of budgets for infrastructure; 
economic development and social support (Quazi 2011). In her “global review of street trading and 
public policy”, Bromley (2000) elaborates on arguments that have considered the sector 
problematic. This includes arguments in relation to public health (the sale of unhygienic foodstuffs); 
public safety (fire and traffic hazards); conflict (pedestrian and traffic circulation); unreasonable 
nuisance (noise, smell, litter); negative impacts of the public spatial environment (unsightly 
structures); unfair competition (blocking entrances to formal trading areas), and the lack of balance 
between formal and informal operators that leads to declining confidence in specific areas. van 
Schilfgaarde (2013) notes that because of these issues street trading is viewed as the main source of 
the ‘problem’ in ‘modern’ cities.   
Quazi (2011) acknowledges that compounding the above urban management issues, local 
governments are experiencing capacity constraints on providing services and adequate management 
in most cities in the South. Quazi (2011) further notes that the urban space that informal traders 
occupy was not designed to accommodate their needs and this contributes to the urban 
management issues talked about above such as congestion. In these urban spaces the number of 
people which the spaces were designed to accommodate has increased enormously due to the fall 
away of colonial and apartheid regulation to some parts of the South. The presence of traders 
amongst other activities and people which were not accommodated, coupled with inadequate and 
less innovative management can be recognised as playing a factor, according to Quazi (2011). She 
argues that it is not sufficient or correct to assume that street traders are the source of the problem 
but rather urban spaces and government’s inadequacy in managing street trading is what pushes 
traders to be associated with some of the urban management issues. In the South, many 
governments have misdiagnosed/taken shortcuts to urban management issues by assuming that by 
reducing the number of traders in their Cities it will fix problems created by their own inadequate 
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management (van Schilfgaarde 2013). Despite this action, the consistent growth and widespread 
across the world has demanded more attention.  
van Schilfgaarde (2013) advises that instead of continuing to focus on how street trading may 
devalue a city’s modern status, inclusive urban management would be ideal. van Schilfgaarde (2013) 
further blames management against street trading and argues that it is this management which 
prevents cities from benefiting from the positives brought by street trading and if street trading is 
‘properly’ managed it would not contribute to urban management issues. Bromley (2000) notes that 
these benefits include a relief to government from expanding on welfare, police, court or prison 
systems as street trading provides employment and a safety net to the traders and their 
dependents. She goes on to view street trading as a laboratory where people can learn 
entrepreneurial skills that are not only applicable to street trading but to other businesses as well. 
She suggests that street trading can also serve as a vital bottom rung in the ladder of upward 
economic mobility and some street traders can go on to build successful off-street business. Bromley 
(2000) argues that street traders bring vitality, life and public surveillance to the street as a result 
traders hold a potential to witness and report crime. Their help to pedestrians extends to helping 
those who seek for directions and those who seek for someone to look after their belongings whilst 
doing other things.   
2.2.3. Regressive approach to street trading management 
In literature, Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) says regressive municipal policies and practices of street trading 
management are well documented with very limited literature on examples of progressive practices 
of street trading management. Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) notes that one of the convincing reasons for 
the absence of progressive and sustainable examples of street trading management in literature is 
perhaps that such street trading management approaches are difficult to find across the world, for 
reasons such as the lack of political imagination. This literature which is well documented 
“illuminates the regressive effect the have on criminalising the poor, generating corruption, violence 
and mismanagement within the state, and informal arrangements amongst the poor” (Bénit-Gbaffou 
2014a: 3). Regressive street trading management approaches according to Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) 
have forced/pushed street traders to collectively and individually resist the status quo using 
different methods. The Park Station Management Model (PSSTMM) can be seen as one of the 
methods by traders to defend their existence in the City. Some of the key findings of regressive 
management of street trading include attempts to reduce the number of trading licenses given to 
traders. Moreover, another is that which completely replace street trading with markets or markets, 
a place where research has shown that it led to a loss of income for relocated traders in the short 
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term (Rice 2006). This section will expand to discuss some of the key findings on regressive street 
trading management.  
During his 2003 State of the Nation address, former president Thabo Mbeki subscribed to the former 
understanding of informal economy, by arguing that South Africa is a dual economy. He believed our 
economy is made of first and second economies that are structurally disconnected from one 
another. Reynolds and van Zyl (2006) have attempted to provide an interesting depiction of what 
the former president understood the South African economy to be. They present the first and the 
second economies as a double storey house. In this double storey house they say the top floor is 
occupied by the rich, living well, formal employees and employers. Moreover, they note that stuck in 
the bottom floor, with no ladders to access the top floor, are the poorest of the poor. Tissington 
(2009: 23) notes that this group “is characterised by marginalisation, poverty, under-development, 
little contribution to GDP and unemployment”. The former president believed a solution to this 
double storey ‘problem’ was to develop a ‘ladder’ by investing more on delivery, education and 
skills, in economic infrastructure and other means that are capable of taking people out of 
‘marginalisation’. This ladder was aimed at shrinking the second economy to an extent where they 
will be no one on the bottom floor by seeking for ways that will enable the poor to join the rich on 
the top floor.  
The so called second economy or the informal sector was not only diagnosed to be a ‘problem’ by 
the former president but also by state presidents and governments before, who have deemed this 
economy as something that should be eliminated. Mitullah (2003) in a paper titled Street vending in 
African cities: a synthesis of empirical findings from Kenya, Cote D’ivoire, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda 
and South Africa argues that some local governments in Africa have (and still) tend to manage the 
informal economy in a way that destroys it intentionally. She notes that this approach is based on an 
inherently restrictive view of the ‘problem’ of the informal sector. She argues most authorities have 
failed to come up with developmental solutions to solve the ‘problem’ and what they did was to go 
back and use out-dated restrictive policies, by-laws and regulations of the colonial government. 
These by-laws and regulations were originally intended to control and regulate the growth of 
indigenous enterprises (ibid). Moreover, these regulations made street trading “principally illegal, 
and saw  traders as responsible for making cities dirty, obstructing traffic and therefore a public 
nuisance” (Mitullah 2003: 10). Mitullah (2003) uses the case of Uganda to emphasise this point 
where an act, local government Act of 1997 was passed giving local authorities powers to enforce 
laws and by-laws. This act does not call for any review of these bylaws which were developed during 
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the colonial era rather it asks the local authority to apply them in consistent with the national 
framework (ibid).   
Street traders have found it hard to comply with restrictive bylaws, consequently this is why 
unmanaged street trading characterise most cities in the South according to Pezzano (2011) cited in 
Matjomane (2013). Skinner (2008a) reviewing street trading in Africa argue that existing research 
suggests that there are two main responses by the state, to unmanaged street trading or street 
trading that fails to adhere to restrictive bylaws. This includes the sporadic, large scale evictions of 
street traders and lower-level ongoing harassment of traders. The 2005 Operation Murambatsvina in 
Zimbabwe can be seen as a response taking place on larger scale according to her. Here, “Street 
traders and those living in informal housing were targeted, with about 700,000 people in cities 
across the country losing their homes, their source of livelihood, or both” (ibid). This according to 
Tibaijuka cited in Skinner (2008a) resulted in one in every five people in Zimbabwe being affected by 
this directly or indirectly. The second response, ongoing and low level harassment, Skinner (2008a) 
argues that it tends to be persistent across African cities. She uses Bissau, the capital of Guinea to 
demonstrate that municipal agents have essentially remained unsympathetic to informal traders in 
enforcing by-laws. In a survey that she did in Bissau she found that street traders complain about the 
oppressiveness of public agents which includes applying harassment in enforcing by-laws where  
they are often required to bribe their way out to this.  
The idea to replace street trading by markets in Johannesburg is identified in the work of Rice (2006) 
as being another form of regressive management to some traders. Rice (2006) starts by 
acknowledging that markets clearly represent an improvement in the physical environment in spaces 
of trading, before arguing that  they are  not sufficient (alone) in growing the businesses of traders -. 
This critic towards markets is also based on international experience. His research was based on 82 
interviews with street traders who were trading in the street but then moved to markets, 41 traded 
at the Metro Mall, 28 in the Yeoville market and 13 in the Hillbrow market. In his findings he 
revealed that a clean environment, a fixed space, shelter from the rain and sun and security are 
important to almost all the traders he interviewed to run their business. The markets which they 
were moved into provided some level of this and they are an improvement compared to streets in 
this regard. However, nearly 65 percent of his interviewees who traded on the street before moving 
into the market confirmed that few people pass their trading site compared to when they were on 
the streets. Moreover, they confirmed that markets provide no flexibility in terms of movement by 
traders as to ensure that they reach to potential customers, where as in the street, traders were able 
to reach out to potential customers and advertise their goods or services. His research also reveals 
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that few (31.3%) of these traders make more profit in the market than on the street. The latter 
issues are very important in the business of street trading and physical environment improvement 
alone cannot ensure that all traders make profit thus improving their livelihood.    
2.2.4. EThekwini (Durban) Municipality: The case of Warwick Junction 
David et al (2012) note that over the past ten years, some governments have started to realise the 
importance of the informal economy in both social and economic development. Therefore, some of 
these governments have attempted to develop policy frameworks and strategies aimed at growing 
and embracing the informal economy (ibid). In South Africa (and probably in Africa as a whole) the 
eThekwini municipality street trading management approach experienced from 1996 to 2004 is 
widely identified as the most progressive approach to street trading (Skinner 2008a). This approach 
according to Skinner (2008b) was particularly adopted in the Inner-city, in Warwick Junction, the 
main transport node in the City (ibid). This area is made of at least 5000 traders who sell their 
services and goods to 460,000 commuters on an average day (ibid). Skinner (2008a) states that this 
approach matured in 1996 when an area-based urban renewal initiative was launched in Warwick 
Junction by the City council. The project found its location directly under the council and it was made 
up of one overarching project team and three core teams which one was responsible of planning, 
the other implementation and the last responsible of operation (Dobson and Skinner 2009). These 
teams drew staff from various city departments including politicians but not traders (ibid). Dobson 
and Skinner (2009) further note a key to the success of this initiative was the commitment to 
participation and consultation from every stakeholder involved. 
Communication is important since it allows different ‘experts’ to come with different knowledge in 
developing a solution. Dobson and Skinner 2009 believe that better solutions that benefit everyone 
can be achieved if the expertise of officials is used which may include their skills to mediate between 
different interests are respected. Furthermore, the expertise of street traders which include their 
skills to determine places are suitable for trading should also be respected. These different types of 
expertise amongst others are important to respect and allow them to engage in a dialogue where 
compromises are made for progress by all stakeholders. One Street trader leader explains:  
The most important thing is communication. The council doesn’t come and tell us what to do – at 
least not in the area I trade. We talk about things. When I raise issues the council respects that (cited 
in Dobson and Skinner 2009). 
In the Warwick Junction project communication proved to be a significant tool when infrastructure 
for traders was established. In communication with traders they were accommodated with 
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infrastructure that suits their trading (ibid). For example, corn-on-the-cob sellers and those cooking 
and selling the Zulu delicacy bovine heads were provided with tailor-made facilities (Skinner 2008b). 
This type of infrastructure came from a concern by traders that they cannot be provided with similar 
infrastructure as their different types of trading differ in their needs (Dobson and Skinner 2009). In 
addition to the infrastructure above a new market was built for nearly 1,000 traditional medicine 
traders (ibid). 
In parallel with infrastructure development in Warwick Junction, there was also a focus on improving 
management of the area (ibid). This included the establishment of different operational teams by an 
area-based team that was to monitor and drive public space management in the area. These teams 
are different from the overarching project team talked about above. These teams dealt with issues 
such as cleaning, crime, looking after facilities, child-care facilities and pavement sleeping (ibid). 
Dobson and Skinner (2009) state this was a cooperative effort which included traders and officials. In 
tackling crime urban designers contributed with design interventions including improving street 
lighting and reducing concealed spaces. A community police forum (Traders against Crime) that 
operated in the area prior to this initiative was incorporated in managing crime with strong links 
with South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Durban Metropolitan Police (van Schilfgaarde 
2013). Skinner (2009) adds that alongside project cleaning initiatives, a group of traders volunteered 
their time to clean streets. According to Skinner (2009) their motives for doing this were that it is 
good for business and that they are proud of their city and concerned about its image.  
The volunteer participation by traders to compliment efforts of the eThekwini municipality resulted 
in improved environmental conditions for everyone than the conditions the City used to achieve on 
its own in the area (van Schilfgaarde 2013). Thus, based on how ‘progressive’ is understood in this 
research, this management approach shifts to better conditions that people have benefited from as 
a result it is understood to be progressive in this research. However, this progressive approach was a 
‘moment’ according to Pat Horn, Streetnet International coordinator who made this remark in 
workshop hosted by CUBES from the 11 to 13 August 2014. Streetnet International is an 
international federation located in Durban established to focus on promoting solidarity between 
street trader organisations amongst other objectives. Pat Horn says this progressive lasted for few 
years and now things in Durban are back to what they used to be, with repressive approaches now 
being applied.  
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2.3. Street trading policy and regulation in post-apartheid Johannesburg 
This section serves as a background and seeks to trace back initiatives around the management of 
street trading in Johannesburg, since the advent of democracy, which serves as a legacy to street 
trading management today.  It commences by looking at the first legislative initiative in this era 
which was the passing of the 1991 Business Act (later amended in 1993), with a discussion on urban 
management issues that were experienced subsequent to this Act. Furthermore this section  
discusses the financial crisis that emerged in 1997 under the Greater Johannesburg Metro Council 
(GJMC), which together with Inner city decay as argued by Peyroux (2008),motivated the support for 
City Improvements Districts a(discussed in detail in this section). This is followed by a discussion 
around the Inner city urban renewal strategy, which looks at the CoJ’s own response to inner city 
decay. The Inner City Regeneration Charter 2007 is also considered in this section where it is 
unpacked based on the idea of ‘balancing the needs of all affected stakeholders’ to use the street. 
Both the long term and short to medium term policies such as GDS 2040 are also considered to 
understand their position on street trading. Lastly this section  looks at the latest major 
developments, consultation process on restricting trading areas and designation of New trading 
Areas, on street trading management in the City of Johannesburg,  
2.3.1. The 1991 Business Act, the first initiative in South Africa towards progressive management 
of street trading  
Historically, in South Africa the management of street trading was subjected to restrictive 
regulations that were motivated by apartheid motives aimed at controlling and regulating the 
growth of indigenous enterprises (Tissington 2009).  This restrictive approach was motivated by 
town planning justifications of maintaining order and control in urban areas amongst other reasons 
(ibid). At this time it was very difficult for traders to obtain licenses that permit trading especially in 
Central Business Districts (CBD) and traders were forced to continuously relocate, which led to them 
losing their customer base in the process (ibid). The adoption of the Business Act of 1991 marked a 
new era in street trading management that brought about a drastic turn away from regulations that 
were restrictive and viewed the activity as ‘problematic’. The Business Act of 1991 was introduced as 
a national law that attempted to reduce the powers of local government in developing and 
implementing laws that were too restrictive to informal trading. This piece of legislation is 
recognised as the most progressive tool of managing street trading in South Africa to date (Skinner 
1999). Moreover, the Business Act of 1991 was an indication of a shift in national government 
thinking about street trading, a shift that recognises the significance of street trading in poverty 
alleviation (ibid). It acknowledged street traders as business people with a vital contribution to the 
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economy and livelihood, therefore restrictions such the limitations on allocation of trading spaces 
fell away (Tissington 2009). 
The period after 1991 experienced a rapid increase in street trading within business centres and 
difficulties in managing urban areas from the side of City officials (Skinner, 1999). Local government 
complained that the national government through the Business Act of 1991 did not give them any 
space to manage street trading as a result they argued that the uncontrollability of street trading 
was not their fault (ibid). Amendments were made in 1993 to the Business Act which gave powers to 
local government authorities to regulate street trading while not necessarily preventing it. This 
prompted the development of bylaws and regulations that were to suggest where and how street 
trading should take place, albeit the restrictive approaches in management of street trading in 
Johannesburg become more evident (Tissington 2009). These by-laws and regulations are subjected 
to the approval by the administrator which according to the Provincial Government Act, 1986  is a 
person appointed by the president of the country to administrate a province. This started taking 
place in 1995 when the Business Act was devolved to the provincial level and interestingly not to the 
local level as many local authorities would have wanted (ibid). This meant it was now the provincial 
government who have powers to change the act.   
The most contested and arguable one of the important clauses in the Businesses Act is section 6A.  
2(a) of this section states that;  
“a local authority may ... by resolution declare any place in its area of jurisdiction to be an area in 
which the carrying on of the business of street vendors, pedlar or hawker may be restricted or 
prohibited.”  
2(c) of this section goes on to add that;  
“before such a motion is adopted, the local authority shall have regard to the effect of the presence 
of a large number of street traders in that area and shall consider whether more effective 
supervision or control in that area, including negotiations with any person carrying on in that area 
the business of street trading or their representatives, will make a declaration unnecessary and the 
intended restriction or prohibition will drive out of business a substantial number of street vendors, 
pedlars or hawkers”.  
Notwithstanding other matters contained in the Business Act including service delivery issues, this 
section is important because it is a central source of conflict between municipalities and street 
traders according to David et al (2012). This is partly based on how people interpret it. Traders for 
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instance feel negotiations should be about the city discussing trading spaces with traders instead of 
approaching them for negotiations with already ‘taken’ decisions.  
2.3.2. Urban issues in the early years of ‘deregulation’ in Johannesburg Inner city  
In the national sphere, the change of attitude to informal trading cumulated in a climate of 
deregulating previously regulated practices based on discrimination in South Africa. This included 
segregation by race as people were now allowed to move to spaces which they were previously not 
allowed to move to (Tomlinson et al 2003). This resulted to what Skinner (1999) refers to as 
‘Africanisation’ of CBDs, which is the movement of African people into the CBDs of major South 
African cities. Increasingly there was consumer stratification along class lines, which in the case of 
South Africa (especially in the early 1990s), was closely linked to race (ibid). This was coupled by the 
flight of corporate capital to the outskirts of the City (ibid). Although not necessarily linked to 
Africanisation of the Johannesburg CBD, in parallel to the ‘Africanisation’ process, was a process 
which begun much early in Johannesburg, suburbanisation where middle to upper-middle income 
consumers abandoned CBDs in favour of decentralised shopping malls (ibid). The implications of this 
for street traders were that CBDs started to provide increasing business opportunities (ibid).  
Beall et al (2002) provides a very interesting account of the situation at the time. Beall et al (2002) 
cited in Tissington (2009: 27) note that “by 1991, the Inner city of Johannesburg was one of the most 
racially integrated areas in South Africa, with 54 percent of apartments occupied by whites”.  
However, Beall et al (2002: 110) explain that: 
“Underpinning the ubiquitous focus on ‘crime and grime,’ and the degree of hysteria about the 
public health risks of informal street trade and densely occupied buildings, was the ‘race 
question’...the desegregation of the inner city from a predominantly white area to one almost 
entirely inhabited by black Africans has been at the forefront of Johannesburg’s elite public 
consciousness” 
Beall et al (2002) further note that by 1996 there was a drastic change in racial mix revealed by a 
survey done in the same year which demonstrated that the number of white people who were living 
in the Inner City Johannesburg had decreased by 49 percent to that of 1991. Beal et al (2002) 
suggests the desegregation in the Inner city became synonymous with slum living, poverty, crime 
and urban decay. This area became a no go area particular by middle to upper classes from the 
predominantly office node of CBD and Braamfontein to the residential areas of Hillbrow, Berea, 
Joubert Park, Yeoville and Bellevue. Johannesburg’s inner city was labelled by many as an area 
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plagued by general lawlessness. Beal et al (2002) provide the following description as the perceived 
situation at the time: “drug-dealing rackets, street gangs, organised prostitution and large illegal 
immigrant populations are grist for the mill of modern evocations of the Johannesburg inner city, so 
is anti-social behaviour such as public drunkenness and dangerous driving”. This situation, although 
benefiting traders from a customer point of view, paved the way for private sector intervention as 
property owners were losing on property values which were falling at the time (Beall et al 2002).    
2.3.3.  The Johannesburg’s financial crisis and Igoli 2002 as a policy response  
The Greater Johannesburg Metro Council (GJMC) was established after democratic municipal 
elections in 1995 as the first municipality in post-apartheid (van Rooyen 2009). This municipality was 
divided into a two tier structure between GJMC and four substructures (Northern, Western, Eastern 
and Southern municipal sub-structures) (Tomlinson et al 2003). Two years after, in 1997 a looming 
financial crisis was envisioned due to an organised boycott on rates by the residents of the rich 
areas, which were the former white only suburbs, as they complained about the redistribution 
policies of Johannesburg, that were arguing for rich areas to cross subsidise poorer areas of 
Johannesburg (ibid). However, notwithstanding, “rates boycott which cost the City about R220 
million, rates recovery in the richer areas remained significantly above that of previously poor areas” 
(Tissington  2009: 28). Moreover, this was made worse by aggressive and over-ambitious spending 
with low revenue collections and by July 1997 the City owed Eskom 300 million and in October the 
same year the City experienced a negative cash flow of R130 million per month, and this according 
to Beall et al (2002) pressured the City to adopt a more commercial cost-recovery policy model.  
This was manifested in Igoli 2002, which Samson (2012: 8) says is “widely acknowledged as the most 
radical instance of municipal neoliberalisation in South Africa to date”. This was a strategy for 
municipal financial recovery that included the reorganisation of municipal services and the 
establishment of a uni-city municipal structure (Beall et al 2002). Under Igoli 2002, municipal 
services were isolated and corporatised, although each of the utility companies remained 100 
percent publicly owned (with the City as their only shareholder) (Mabin 2006 in Peyroux 2008). This 
“corporatist approach” as referred to by Mabin (2006) in Peyroux (2008: 10) entails key neoliberal 
characteristics observed elsewhere such as bureaucracies replaced by “professionalised quasi-public 
agencies and decisions increasingly driven by cost-benefit calculations”. Beall et al (2002) note that 
the objectives of this plan were to turn the city towards  operating like a business with hopes that 
achieving efficiency will achieve equity between the poor, former black areas and rich former white 
areas. Notwithstanding the detailed reference to financial, administrative and management 
consolidation the Igoli 2002 plans also attempt to revitalise the Inner city, and to re-establish its 
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traditional role of being the central district of business in Johannesburg (Tomlinson et al 2003). 
Tomlinson et al (2003) further argues that the final goal of the plans was the creation of a ‘world 
class city’ that is conducive to private sector investment.  
2.3.4. City Improvement Districts, a solution to the then Inner city urban issues?  
The flight of corporate capital in the Inner city was never absolute, Beall et al (2002) argue. They 
further note, however, that the face of retail did change with banks, shops, markets and stalls all 
catering for a predominantly African trade. This fact according to them challenges the stereotype of 
capital flight, because a significant number of corporate businesses never left the Inner city. These 
are the same businesses which took a lead in initiating the partnerships for regeneration aimed at 
reversing Inner city decay (ibid). An important moment here was the establishment of the Central 
Johannesburg Partnership in 1992, a partnership between the formal business, community and the 
local authority. The City Improvement Districts (CIDs) concept is what captured the imagination of 
this organisation and later it became a tangible legacy of the organisation (Peyroux 2008). In the 
development of this concept the CJP does not reject that the concept is rooted on North American 
experience of responding or combating urban degeneration, as their research solely focused on 
studying this experience (ibid). Interestingly, this experience advocated for ‘zero-tolerance’ to street 
traders (ibid). Consequently, the approach CJP imported to Johannesburg is “based on business 
improvement districts (BIDS) promulgated in the mid-1980s by then New York City Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani” (Tissington 2009: 31). This model became the fashion of the time as it was also adopted by 
many cities in the United States and in Europe for local economic development and urban renewal 
(ibid).  
According to Miraftab (2007) in the developing world, Cape Town and Johannesburg are among the 
few cities that have adopted the entire CID package. City Improvement Districts according to the CJP 
(2001: 4) website’s definition, referred to a CID as “a geographic area within which property owners 
and/or tenants agree to pay for certain services supplementary to those supplied by the Local 
Authority and which will enhance the physical and social environment of the area”. Central 
Johannesburg Partnership (2001) argues that the main aim of the CIDs is to consolidate the vision of 
the municipality and the business sector in the Inner city. Through the collection of voluntary levy, 
property owners and businesses benefit from services that operated exclusively within the 
boundaries of each CID (Miraftab 2007). These services are provided over and above those provided 
by the city, but ran in cooperation and coordination with the city’s services (Beall et al 2002). 
Typically, according to Beall et al (2002) these services include private security officers, who operate 
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in radio contact with a privately financed central control room and with backup from an armed 
response unit, and supervisor who patrolled the district on motorcycle. 
A second level of service offered in CIDs is street-cleaning and basic maintenance, such as repainting 
traffic poles (ibid). The prerequisite for a CID to be adopted according to the Gauteng City 
Improvement District Act of 1997 cited in Ngwabi (2009) is the vote of more than 51 percent of an 
area’s property owners in favour of this initiative and from here, an additional fee to that paid to the 
City, from all owners in a specific jurisdiction is required. Different CIDs comprise of different 
management boards, occupied by property owners and business owners, which take the 
responsibility of ensuring that the CID business plan is adhered to (ibid). These management boards, 
however, do not represent tenants or street traders and according to the CJP (2001), City officials 
can be part of this board but the majority of people involve should be property owners with the 
voting power proportional to the levy paid by them. The responsibility of these boards also includes 
appointing service provider company Urban Genesis Management (UGM) in the case of 
Johannesburg, to manage the day-to-day operations within the CID (ibid). 
Peyroux (2008) says that CIDs were supported by the City of Johannesburg as part of the Inner City 
Regeneration Strategy developed in line with the Joburg 2030 strategy and the Vision for the City as 
“the golden Heartbeat of Africa”. Moreover, Peyroux (2008) note that another reason CIDs gained 
political support in the City of Johannesburg was the result of its continuing fiscal crisis, through 
which private funding of public services was seen as a solution going forward. Beall et al (2002: 115) 
note that: 
“In the case of Johannesburg, where the City had no policing, function zero-tolerance policy could not 
be mimicked. The Council, however, cooperated with business and endorsed an initiative to get the 
by-laws changed in order to prevent unregulated street-vending and to ensure the removal of street 
vendors to formalized markets”. 
The Council’s cooperation with corporate businesses happened as the City was failing to provide 
adequate services on their own in a context a financial crisis. This pushed the City to work with 
corporate businesses in providing services in addition to those provided by the City such as security 
as noted above. Corporate businesses especially property owners engaged to the CID initiative with 
an aim of raising property values in the Inner city and this had negative implication for low income 
tenants and street traders in the Inner City of Johannesburg as talked about in the paragraph below.  
In a paper by Miraftab (2007: 603-604.) titled “Governing post-apartheid spatiality: Implementing 
City Improvement Districts in Cape Town” she refers to CIDs as promoters of “uneven social and 
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spatial development characteristic of neoliberal spatiality”, which result to enclaves of rich where 
the poor are not accommodated to benefit from. CIDs marketise public urban spaces and by doing 
so they challenge the presence of the urban poor, who cannot afford to pay for this requirement, 
particular street traders in the case of this paper. Thus undermining the objectives of transformation 
that advocate for the poor to benefit from the enclaves of rich areas in the city where corporate 
businesses are only benefiting (ibid). One other major imperfection of CIDs is that “they are created 
and governed in a highly undemocratic manner”, with property owners taking the position of 
dictating what should happen (Tissington 2009: 32). For example, the timing of establishing a CID is 
decided by them (property owners) and they become the majority on the boards of managing CIDs, 
this gives them voting power (ibid). Tenants and street traders which work and live in a jurisdiction 
of a CID do not have a say in management of an area they work or leave in. (ibid).  
SANTRA cited in Tissington (2009: 32) have used the Business Act to criticise CIDs, which requires the 
evaluation of the negative Impact on socio-economic development of traders in a specific areas 
before streets are promulgated or prohibition for street trading, to criticise CIDs. They said through 
CIDs this is not adequately done. They say in the “CIDs, particularly in Braamfontein, street trading is 
strictly prohibited and regulated by private security guards and the Metro police”. This according to 
SANTRA had an enormous impact on traders who used to trade in the area as some of them 
struggled for months without any source of income. This position from SANTRA, however, has 
changed in the Retail Improvement District, discussed further below, where private sector or 
property owners have embraced street traders and paying for them to be managed.  
2.3.5. City of Johannesburg’s response to decline: Johannesburg’s Inner city urban renewal 
strategy  
Ngwabi (2009) argue that the beginning of the new post-apartheid era in South Africa saw all tiers of 
government focusing on improving service delivery under the national framework of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). He further notes that at the time there was 
very less attention on the maintenance of Johannesburg Inner city services and infrastructure 
despite being in a poor state. According to Ngwabi (2009) this began to change in 1995 after the first 
democratic local municipal elections where private and public sector in partnerships could develop a 
vision for the Inner city from which an urban regeneration strategy was developed. In 1996 a 
structure known as Johannesburg Inner City Development Forum (JICDF) was established by the 
GJMC to develop this vision, made of business, community and labour organisations and as well as 
provincial and local government (Nkokoto 2005). In 1997, the then deputy president Thabo Mbeki, 
announced the new vision for the Inner city Johannesburg, named “Johannesburg, the Golden 
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Heartbeat of Africa” (Ngwabi 2009). This vision aimed to see the Inner city transformed into a 
“dynamic, liveable, people-centred, accessible place” which would be the “trading hub of Africa, 
thriving through participation, partnerships and the spirit of Ubuntu” (ibid: 135). The vision was 
further complimented by an urban regeneration strategy in 1998 contained in the Spatial and 
Economic Framework for the Inner city (SEFIC) document (Nkokoto 2005).  
JICDF was only given the privilege to develop the vision, subsequent strategies and framework for 
the Inner city but not authority and resources to implement the initiatives that emerged from its 
work (Ngwabi 2009). As a result, after developing the vision, strategies and frameworks it was 
replaced by the Inner city committee, a sub-committee of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 
(ibid). This committee commissioned the International Organisation for Development (IOD) to 
prepare a report on the future of the Inner city and the IOD recommended that an organisation 
responsible for facilitating amongst other things urban regeneration and private sector investment 
in the Inner city be established (ibid). This cumulated in the Inner City Office (ICO) in 1998 and its 
successor Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) in 2001 to achieve the same (Nkokoto 2005). 
These organisations functioned as project designers and facilitation units, structuring a range of 
urban environment upgrade and social and economic development projects (ibid). While the work of 
the JDA and its predecessor ICO is acknowledged as significant in urban regeneration it is often 
criticised for favouring certain powerful private interests and not those of the poor (Ngwabi 2009). 
This is further discussed in the next chapter where the work JDA is considered in relation to future 
projects it aims to implement in the area of study.  
A revised Inner city regeneration strategy (ICRS) was adopted in 2003, directly linked to 
Johannesburg 2030, the long term plan of the City of Johannesburg announced in 2002 (Ngwabi 
2009). The explicit aim of this strategy is to “attract businesses and upper to middle-class residents’ 
back into the Inner city and to raise and sustain private investment leading to a steady rise in 
property values” (Tissington 2009: 30). The strategy assumes the promotion of safety and security in 
the Inner city will contribute in achieving the above. Moreover, in residential areas outside the CBD, 
the strategy is pushing for illegal business to be closed with high street upgrades and creation of 
more open spaces. In the CBD, the strategy calls for the creation of maximum return on industrial 
space, promoting new industries and sectors. Subsequent to this strategy was the Inner City 
Regeneration Strategy Business Plan 2004-2007, aiming to put implement the ICRS. Through this 
business plan specific projects were realised in the Inner city (Nkokoto 2005). This includes the 
developments “at Constitutional Hill, the redevelopment of a cultural hub in Newtown, the Fashion 
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District upgrade, the new Nelson Mandela Bridge, the Metro Mall and the establishment of a City 
Improvement District (CID) in Braamfontein” (Tissington 2009: 30). 
2.3.6. The idea of ‘balancing the needs of all affected stakeholders’ to use the street: The Inner 
City Regeneration Charter (IRC) 2007 
The Inner City Regeneration Charter (ICRC) is the result of eight months of dialogue comprising a 
range of Inner city stakeholders, including property owners, residents and street traders, which 
started in November 2006. This charter attempted to address a number of key issues in the 
regeneration of the Inner city including “disorganised trading”.  Furthermore, commitments and 
deadlines for projects relating to street trading were made in this charter with the City committing 
itself on adopting a developmental (and not simply regulatory) approach, which is repressive to 
street trading, in ensuring that there are no more unmanaged streets beyond 2009 (ibid). The City 
ensured that it will make efforts to avoid repressive or arbitrary actions against street traders in 
enforcing its by-laws relating to street trading (Tissington 2009). The City also announced that one of 
its projects to street trading is to “formalise” street trading by providing employment opportunities 
“through formal market spaces, linear markets, co-operatives, flea markets, mini shops and kiosks, 
manufacturing hives, car guarding, waste recycling, transport services” (ibid: 34).    
Under the heading “Economic Development” in the charter “Street trading/Micro-retailing” is the 
first topic discussed and it begins by mentioning that the CoJ gives much value to street trading. As a 
result the craft is a priority in the context of high unemployment as it plays an important role of 
providing a livelihood to those who have been rejected in the formal sector. However, the charter 
goes on to acknowledge that street trading is not the only priority to the CoJ. The charter talks about 
trade-offs that were taking place in the Inner city between economic and social development:   
 “... while the needs of street traders to sustain a livelihood and explore and exploit future economic 
opportunities is very important, these needs cannot be met at the expense of the needs of 
commuters, pedestrians, formal businesses, residents and other users of Inner City space for clean, 
safe and well-organised public environment” (City of Johannesburg 2007: 25). 
The City of Johannesburg (2007: 29) notes that while the needs of street traders are important to be 
accommodated, they “cannot be met at the expense of the needs of commuters, pedestrians, 
formal businesses, residents and other users” of the Inner City, “who require a City that is clean, safe 
and with a well-organised public environment”. As a result it was concluded that a ‘balanced way’ in 
management of the Inner city should be developed so as different people’s interest are 
39 
 
accommodated (Peyroux 2008).  This thinking developed here played a significant role in the revision 
on the Johannesburg’s informal trading policy in 2009 (ibid).   
2.3.7. The gap between Johannesburg’s informal trading policy, and enforcement/implementation   
Skinner (1999) argues that the development of an informal trading policy is a positive move towards 
progressive management as it is a useful tool in encountering ‘reactive’ environments around street 
trading issues. These environments experience pressure from various stakeholders and as a result 
decisions are made based on who makes the most noise (ibid).  Skinner (1999) notes that in such 
situations policies form a base from which officials can guide their decision making process, and 
which everyone else can debate/resist/ influence the type of management they would prefer. 
However, even if an informal trading policy is adopted it does not guarantee progressive 
management as there are other related processes linked to it such as implementation. Bénit-
Gbaffou (2014a) agrees with this statement by arguing that there exists a gap between 
developmental policies and municipal practices, which are repressive. Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a: 9) 
notes that one of the issues underlying this gap is that supportive frameworks/policy for street 
trading are developed “but fail to address specific municipal issues, such as their dual and often 
contradictory mandates to alleviate poverty/promote economic development, but also to manage 
dense and congested streets”.  
In Johannesburg, the Informal Trading Policy of 2007 was published as to provide the policy outline 
for the management and regulation of informal trading and later revised in 2009, in order to 
facilitate the new policy imperatives outlined in the ICRC (Tissington 2009). This policy acknowledges 
that informal trading contributes towards job creation, as a result absorbing many who have been 
pushed out of the formal economy. Informal trading is supported by this policy for helping in the 
alleviation of poverty like the formal economy. One notable element about the informal trading 
policy is its acknowledgement that informal trading is here to stay, contributing to the development 
of the City as are other forms of activity. Consequently, the policy notes that the mission of the City 
should be to create opportunities in this sector so that people can continue to benefit from the 
City’s economy. This according to the informal trading policy of 2009 should be done through a 
developmental approach that enables access to jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities available 
within the informal sector but also allowing migration of informal traders to the formal sector. The 
policy further aims to build a positive relationship between the formal and informal sector, so that 
both can operate effectively alongside each other in an environment that fosters sustainable 
economic growth (Tisington 2009).  
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On the other hand the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) continues to emphasise on 
enforcement of rules and regulations stipulated in the informal trading by-laws of the CoJ. JMPD was 
established in 2001 with the mandate to perform traffic policing, policing of municipal by-laws and 
regulations, and the prevention of crime in the City of Johannesburg (Charlton and Karam 2003 cited 
in Ngwabi 2009). The City of Johannesburg’s informal trading by-laws were promulgated in 2009 in 
line with the Businesses Act amended in 1993.  Section 9 of the by-laws stipulates areas where street 
trading is not prohibited, including areas where it may obstruct traffic. Moreover, section 10 
provides conduct which is restricted in areas where street trading is permitted, which includes 
restricting traders from creating nuisance, health risk. Tissington (2009) argues that the JMPD 
continues to enforce these by-laws despite the fact that necessary means have not been made 
available for such regulations to be adequately adhered to by street traders. The informal trading 
policy of 2009 suggests that the City must assist in alleviating some of the challenges impeding the 
further development of the sector including limited infrastructure and storage. With this being not 
available it is very hard for traders to live up to the expectation of the City. For example, with no 
access to water, sanitation and refuse removal and litter bins, there are very limited chances that 
nuisance and health risks are not to be created.  
2.3.8. Where does street trading sit in the City’s long term plan? 
In 2002 the Johannesburg City Council launched its long term plan, Joburg 2030 Growth 
Development Strategy (GDS) aiming to reshape the city's economy it into a world-class business 
centre. Rogerson (2005) cited in Peyroux (2007) writes that the aim of the Joburg 2030 Growth 
Development Strategy (GDS) was to transform Johannesburg into a “world-class city” with a strongly 
outward-oriented economy, which specialises on the service sector. As opposed to an inward-
oriented economy which is about building and improving domestic industries this strategy 
advocated for the development of means that would make it easy for ‘foreign’ corporate business to 
grow their business in Johannesburg (ibid). This includes the Inner city renewal Urban Development 
Zone (UDZ) tax incentive scheme adopted in 2004 till 2014 as a way of attracting more private 
investment in the Inner city (Tissington 2009). This tax incentive provides generous tax breaks to 
those investing in new commercial, residential and retail developments in the Inner city (ibid). 
According to Malbert and Kain (2004) cited in Peyroux (2007) Joburg 2030 favours interventions 
directly supporting economic development and business interests. They further note that this 
strategy is too narrowly focused on economic growth without focusing or talking about how it 
interrelates with other dimensions of sustainable development, such as the environment and the 
needs of the urban poor (including street trader’s existence in the City).  
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Consequently in 2011 the City of Johannesburg developed the Growth and Development strategy 
(GDS) 2040, a long term strategy consolidating numerous strategies of the City of Johannesburg, 
each addressing different dimensions of the City’s development, into a single cross-city strategy (City 
of Johannesburg 2011). The GDS 2040 is an aspirational strategy that defines the type of society the 
city aspires to achieve, by 2040 (ibid). The GDS 2040 document notes that infrastructure, housing 
and transportation sectors are to use this document as a prerequisite in developing their medium-
term, strategic, spatially-oriented plans. Moreover, the document provides a set of defined strategic 
directions that frame the five-year IDP and other medium-term plans. This strategy is made of six 
tenets that provide the view of the city‘s approach to development. These tenets include “the 
eradication of poverty, building and growing an inclusive economy, building sustainable human 
settlements, ensuring resource security and environmental sustainability, achieving social inclusion 
through support – and enablement, promoting good governance”. This tenets amount into the 2040 
vision that state:  
 “Johannesburg – a World Class African City of the Future – a vibrant, equitable African city, 
strengthened through its diversity; a city that provides real quality of life; a city that provides 
sustainability for all its citizens; a resilient and adaptive society” (City of Johannesburg 2011: 3). 
Eradication of poverty and building and growing an inclusive economy are of greater relevance to 
street trading from the six principles. The principle on eradicating poverty suggests that “the City of 
Johannesburg will continually assist the poor to build capacity, thereby supporting them in accessing 
the City and stepping onto the ladder of prosperity” (City of Johannesburg 2011: 33). Here, the city 
commits itself on developing supportive and innovative informal trading regulatory approaches that 
will allow the poor to grow their business in the informal sector but also allow them the opportunity 
to graduate to the formal economy (ibid). The principle on building and growing inclusive economy 
argues that the City will work with marginalised groups as to promote economic inclusion that will 
ensure that poor people also benefit from the city’s economy (ibid). City of Johannesburg (2011) 
notes that to grow its economy that would be resilient and sustainable it needs a robust informal 
sector that will serve as an additional supporting pillar. Moreover, the GDS 2040 asks for “regulation 
and policy that manages informality, without destroying informal economic activities and the 
opportunities they present, serves as an additional support, growing resilience further within these 
economies” (City of Johannesburg 2011: 25). Notwithstanding the need to protect the rights of third 
parties the City further acknowledges that it “must also consider how it can use the informal sector 
as a lever for social upliftment” (City of Johannesburg 2011: 43).  
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2.3.9. Latest major developments on street trading management in the City of Johannesburg  
This development is taking place in the aftermath of Operation Clean Sweep (OCS). It is an attempt 
by the City to adhere to the procedures of the Business Act on restricting and designating new 
trading spaces. This order came from the Constitutional court which ruled that the City did not 
follow the Business Act in conducting OCS. The main objective of the engagement process as 
outlined in the 2014 Proclamation of Restricted Trading Areas and Designation of New Trading Areas 
in the Inner City of Johannesburg document is to: 
“Obtain authority from all affected stakeholders to declare restricted trading areas in the Inner city 
and to designate new areas for trading, in line with Town Planning Schemes and in terms of the 
Business Act No 71 of 1991 and the City’s Informal Trading Policy” (City of Johannesburg 2014: 32.1). 
The City of Johannesburg (2014) proposes short to medium term intervention in this process which 
they argue are guided by the Constitutional court on its ruling which found that the Business Act was 
not followed when the City was street trading in the Inner city. This engagement process is made of 
two phases, however at the time this paper was being written only phase one had commenced. This 
phase took place for nine days with different stakeholders such as Informal traders, Property 
owners, Public transport operators, Residents, Courts and Security cluster, Academics and 
Researchers attending on different days.  
The engagement process has received much criticism particularly from street traders, business 
stakeholders and academics. This includes critics by CUBES’s in a submission to the City on the 8th of 
August 2014 where they criticised the City for not providing sufficient information that would result 
in meaningful participation. CUBES (2014) have also raised concerns on the restrictive approach 
which the CoJ is taking towards accommodating all existing street traders. They have argued that 
this will require heavy and permanent police enforcement which will cost the City a far greater 
amount than that required for management of street trading on the site. Street trader organisations 
have also joined forces, in workshops facilitated by CUBES, in a joint submission handed to the CoJ 
on the 13th of August 2014 which included SANTRA, SAITF, One Voice, ATO, GIDA, NUT, JOWEDET, 
ETA, and ACHIB. In this submission traders criticised the process for lacking a ‘proper’ structure of 
engagement, with milestones agreed upon by all stakeholders around policy, demarcation and 
institutions relating to street trading. In their submission traders also use the Business Act Amended 
in 1993 to argue that the City should have provided the number of traders (licenced and unlicensed) 
to be affected by the new demarcation as stated by the Business Act, as  this information is a 
prerequisite to a street demarcation plan prior to it being published.  
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CJP have also criticised the process in its submission dated 27 August 2014. They argue that this 
participation process should have been done based on detailed proposals informing about the 
designation and promulgation of trading spaces. CJP (2014) argues that this should include a 
dedicated stakeholder consultation process around the numbers of traders to be accommodated. 
Furthermore, they noted that a dedicated stakeholder consultation process on areas that are to be 
promulgated and designated for trading in ensuring a sustainable solution was also required. They 
also made the argument made by both CUBES and other street trader organisations who suggest 
that there is a need for stakeholders to be offered the opportunity to hear each other’s views and 
responses to the CoJ’s plans in a joint stakeholder forum.  
2.4. City of Johannesburg: The case of Retail Improvement District 
The above section about Johannesburg policies and regulation with regard to street trading has 
highlighted, mostly, failures of both the private and public sector to progressively manage street 
trading. However, Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) notes that there exists a private sector led street trading 
management model in Johannesburg that appears to be progressive and this section attempts to 
discuss this management model.  
The Retail Improvement District (RID) offers a very interesting and unique type of management in 
Johannesburg. Bénit-Gbaffou (personal communication 2014) went as far to suggest that, based on 
the fact it is property owners’ levy which funds street trading management in the RID; this type of 
street trading management represents some form of redistribution. Edmund Elias cited in 
Malemagoba et al (2012), SANTRA spokesperson and also a trader in the RID precinct, acknowledges 
this type of management as a ‘true’ management that provides dedicated security, cleaning 
ambassadors to the area and the monitoring of hawkers. Based on his experience as a trader and a 
leader he criticises the management approach adopted by the City of Johannesburg and admires the 
RID as more progressive than the former approach. He argues that the CoJ has chosen the metro 
police route where police arrive to confiscate goods belonging to traders and leave, whilst a short 
while after the same or a different trader comes to establish a trading site in the same spot. 
The City of Johannesburg has been struggling for a very long time to provide adequate services such 
as cleaning and security, and according to Beall (2002) this played a significant role in private sector 
led management gaining political support in the council. In light of this, traders were inspired by the 
RID management approach which provides what the City is failing to provide and wished for this 
model to be extended around Park station. It is because of this reason amongst other reasons that 
the Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM) exists. The RID was established in 
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2005 in Johannesburg Inner city, boundaries are Jeppe Street to the north, Commissioner Street to 
the south, Von Brandis Street to the east and Harrison to the west as illustrated in the map 2.1 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 2.1 (above): taken from Bénit-Gbaffou (2014c) depicts the location of the RID in Johannesburg 
Inner city and two significant nodes connected by a mobility corridor, between Park Station and 
Gandhi Square 
This street trading management model, according to Bénit-Gbaffou (2014c), rests on cross 
subsidisation amongst other significant components; from property owners who pay a levy (as in any 
City Improvement District) additionally to their municipal rates and taxes, to be spent locally for 
additional street security, cleaning and other services. Malemagoba et al (2012) notes that the board 
of directors comprises of some of the financially contributing property owners that are located in the 
RID precinct as well as City of Johannesburg officials. However, this board is highly dominated by 
property owners with no street trader or tenant’s representation (ibid). This board then contracts a 
service provider to manage the precinct, Urban Genesis Management (UGM), in the case of the RID 
(Bénit-Gbaffou 2014c). This service provider communicates with traders by holding regular 
management meetings with block leaders and through these meetings a good relationship was 
established according to Director of CJP Steffny (interviewed on 22/04/2013).  
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This is one of the reasons SANTRA approached CJP to assist in ensuring that a pilot management 
model for street trading is developed and tested around Park station, where they have a lot of 
affiliated members. Bénit-Gbaffou (2014c) argues that the appointment of a grounded 
administration in the RID contributes significantly to management efficiency, particularly in conflict 
resolution and in maintenance. According to her, security agents who are grounded within the 
precinct are useful in attending to conflicts that arise within the precinct, whether conflicts between 
traders or pedestrians.  Moreover, Malemagoba et al (2012) further notes that for the security 
agents it becomes easy to identify street traders who are not permitted to trade in the area because 
of their stability within the precinct. Complaints within the RID precinct are easily attended to due to 
UGM’s regular monitoring which then allows them to talk with the CoJ on maintenance where it 
requires the City. Moreover, CJP is very important with regards to management efficiency with its 
strong lobbying power and networking with City officials & politicians (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014c). The 
overall role of CJP is to create platforms where the RID can share information with other 
Improvement Districts, follow and build on international trends and better work together with all 
levels of government (CJP 2014b). However, CJP experienced difficulties with the latter and hence 
decided to establish a joint venture (JV) with the Metropolitan trading Company, a municipal owned 
entity responsible for managing informal trading in the City of Johannesburg. This allowed UGM to 
administrate trading stalls, rental collection and administration. 
2.5. Concluding remarks 
The chapter has revealed that perceptions towards the informal economy, both within municipalities 
and of corporate businesses, have contributed to the regressive/progressive management 
approaches, developed. Progressive management approaches acknowledges the informal economy 
as a crucial component in economic development, amongst other significant imperatives, and that it 
offers significant job and income generation opportunities. Conversely, the regressive management 
approaches discussed in this paper understood the informal economy to be a ‘problem’ that needs 
to be dealt with by seeking for ways to take people out of this site of ‘marginalisation’ to the formal 
sector. In Johannesburg the financial crisis, coupled with the Inner City that was losing investment in 
a form of cooperate business, , might have reduced the capacity of the City to effectively manage 
street trading and caused  it to hand over its legislative management role to the private sector. The 
private sector, in its management of the CID has demonstrated a lack of sympathy towards street 
trading as it enforced regressive management. 
It might have been the case that both the City and the private sector have understood the source of 
the problem on management issues as being due to street trading, thus adopting management 
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approaches that aimed at eliminating the ‘source of the problem’.   If this is the case, there exists 
misdiagnose of the problem, as it is not sufficient to argue that street trading is the source of the 
problem. Rather, as was argued in the chapter, urban form and inadequate management contributes 
significantly to the urban management issues. Street trading management is a very complex and 
contested activity that needs a closer inspection for one to understand how it operates and for 
governments to develop progressive management solutions. It is necessary to diagnose or to 
completely understand the sector if you are to develop solutions that will fix the problems.  It hence 
becomes very difficult for the city to develop a good solution for the management problem if this 
understanding is not achieved. The eThekwini management approach from 1996 to 2004 
demonstrates that for management to respond to all traders needs it has to understand what is 
happening on the ground in terms of what works for different traders. This is something the CoJ and 
private sector, in the form of the CID, has paid less attention to as with the case where the City 
assumed Markets were good for every trader 
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Chapter three: Research methodology 
3.1. Introduction  
This research methodology chapter provides a research strategy that outlines the manner in which 
this research has been undertaken. This section, amongst other things, identifies the methods used 
in this research. These methods define the means through which data was collected. This chapter is 
important since it also allows one to analyse the reliability, breadth of the findings and it also 
outlines the limitations of the research. This chapter start with the context through which this 
research has emerged, as this has influenced the methodology used. The methodology to be 
discussed in this chapter is based on a qualitative approach that includes interviews, documentation, 
action research and observations. Moreover, a quantitative survey that was used to understand the 
character of the area of study in relation to street trading management will also be discussed. This 
chapter will go on to explain the reason why these specific methods were used and why they were 
the appropriate ways of acquiring information.   
3.2. The context or conditions through which this research has emerged  
One of the things that Operation Clean Sweep (OCS) managed to achieve was to ‘reintroduce’ a 
‘public’ debate around the legitimacy of street trading in the Inner city, Johannesburg and the failure 
of the City to effectively manage street trading. This debate dates back to November 2013 where it 
occupied various platforms including social networks, newspapers articles, and television interviews. 
Different street traders, government officials, pedestrians, and other street users were seen in these 
platforms explaining their positions in this debate. Interestingly, one of the dominant comments 
from this debate, which I observe was the question of who should be blamed on the city that is not 
managed effectively. The City in these platforms maintained its position, reflected in a report of the 
City written by Moyo (2013), of illegal trading as one of the main challenges hindering the vision of a 
clean, safe, healthy, vibrant city. One street trader organisation, SANTRA, while noting that the 
statement by the City is insufficient, admitted some of the wrong doings which the City accused 
them of. SANTRA cited in Business Report (2013) note that the City, however, has failed in the past 
10 years to manage public space in an effective ways and to suggest that the problem is a result of 
street trading alone is incorrect as the City is also part of the problem. 
The court case which started on the 27 November 2013 when SANTRA and SAITF approached the 
South Gauteng High Court asking for an urgent interdict to OCS was in parallel to a situation where 
the City begun to reserve its comments and engagement on street trading as they believe the matter 
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was sub judice (City of Johannesburg 2013). This made it difficult for traders to engage with the City 
in a constructive manner to negotiate how they can better solve the situation. The desire to be part 
of the solution by SANTRA as reflected in the Business Report (2013) article was also undermined by 
this process and attitude. This left the organisation (SANTRA) with no option but to turn to CJP, an 
organisation which in the past they have been very critical of, because it lobbied the City to 
prohibited street trading in City Improvement Districts (CID) (Elias, SANTRA spokesperson 
(interviewed on 24/03/2014), Tissington 2009). However, since the RID experience CJP and SANTRA 
have established a relationship that has convinced them that they can work together (Elias, SANTRA 
spokesperson (interviewed on 24/03/2014) and Steffny, CJP director (interviewed on 22/04/2014). 
This level of trust can be observe on SANTRA being relatively happy of CJP management in the RID as 
opposed to the City’s management approach and asking CJP to serve management duties in the 
PSSTMM, and SANTRA as the main organisation on the ground that is to also collect fees from 
traders (ibid).  
For CJP this was a business opportunity and an opportunity to respond to criticism towards the CID 
model where traders or anyone else who lives or work in the CID territory but not a property owner 
is excluded from decision making of that CID (CUBES 2014). Emails exchange between CJP, Hans 
Jooste from Specialised Area and Improvement Districts (SAID) and SANTRA about minutes of 
previous meetings reveal that there were meetings held to discuss the request by SANTRA prior to 
this research. SAID is a “management services company specialising in consulting, urban 
management and place management services”. Furthermore, a letter was sent to the City on the 03 
January 2014 as a proposal of the PSSTMM reflecting an urgent need to address security issues and 
cleanliness in the area of study (CJP 2014b). In this letter, UGM prepared a quotation, attached in 
the proposal, reflecting the number and amount to be required for public safety ambassadors (PSA), 
cleaning ambassadors and other necessary equipment for both cleaners and security ambassador. 
According to Elias, (interviewed on 24/03/2014) the response of the City to this proposal was that 
“they are not interested”. This might have been the case because the proposal asked the City to 
fund the management model by paying CJP, with the City being reimbursed with traders’ fees. 
Maybe this was the case because the City was still in court thus refusing to engage as highlighted 
above.      
In February 2014, CUBES was approached by SANTRA requesting for assistance in developing this 
management ‘plan’. This separate request made by SANTRA to CUBES is part of a broad request by 
SANTRA and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a trade union federation that was 
also trying to unite street traders, as discussed in chapter one. SANTRA approached CUBES talking 
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about this marvellous partnership initiative between them and CJP and this was the period when I 
said I want to study this pilot plan that appeared to be developing, in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Bachelor of Science with Honours in Urban and Regional. Access to the actual proposal, 
however, was a struggle, when CUBES asked SANTRA about it they said they do not have it. I had a 
meeting with Norman Maluleka (interviewed on 03/04/2014) also from SAID who I gained access to 
through Hans Jooste, where I also asked to be given the proposal. He refused talking about the 
sensitivity of this proposal, where he said these negotiations are still between them and the City and 
they are not prepared at the time to share them with anyone. Claire Bénit-Gbaffou, from CUBES 
eventually got angry and asked Edmund Elias, SANTRA spokesperson to make the proposals available 
if he really wants our support and he called Hans and requests that the proposal is sent to us. We 
read it at CUBES and we did not find much of a ‘partnership’ amongst other components that we felt 
were necessary for such a model as they are discussed in chapter five. 
With this research focus I had a privilege to be part of a research group that has been going on for 
several years on informal trading organised by CUBES through staff and students research projects in 
the School of Architecture and Planning, Wits University. Other research or projects that have been 
part of this group includes an honours thesis on foreign traders by Thoko Motaung, master’s thesis 
by Kwena Letsoalo on processes of decision making in the City of Johannesburg, on issue of street 
trading and media perception by Sifiso Dlamini. Third and second year Wits planning students were 
also conducting research on the topic, street trading. Some of their work was used in this research to 
compliment and this includes pictures taken by third year students. This work, including this 
research will then be available to support street traders on their engagement with CUBES. 
Furthermore, this context (the research group) has presented a window of opportunity to influence 
the AFTRAX project and this opportunity has also helped in framing the approach to this research. It 
is important to note that this research was not for AFRAX rather I saw an opportunity through the 
CUBES research group to write a report titled Reflection on the SANTRA-CJP Street Trading 
Management Model, which reflected initial findings of this research which were made available for 
the AFTRAX report in case they needed it. The deadline to the AFTRAX project was is in June 2014 
where I pushed myself to start with findings of my research before this date. 
The development of the PSSTMM needs to be understood as a stop and go process, where at times 
there was progress but also at other times the development of the PSSTMM experienced delays. 
One of these delays or stops to the PSSTMM has been talked about above, where it has been noted 
that the City rejected the PSSTMM when the first proposal was submitted in 03 January thus 
bringing a stop to progress that was already made. SANTRA’s request to CUBES in February 2014, 
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however, resulted into some progress being made as the PSSTMM was developed further with an 
attempt to make it more sustainable and progressive. This progress with regard to the development 
of the PSSTMM was affected by other political urgencies in the interaction between the City, CJP and 
SANTRA and CUBES which brought delays to the PSSTMM. For example, the consultation process by 
the City from 28 July until 6 August 2014 prevented an opportunity to submit the PSSTM proposal 
again. However, after this period the City begun to call for proposals to be submitted and progress 
was made with regards to the PSSTMM as it was submitted again. This had an impact on the 
progress of this research because delays experienced on the development of PSSTMM also brought 
delays in this research in terms of documenting how the PSSTMM was progressing.    
3.3. Interviews  
This was the first method used for findings on the PSSTMM as I felt the option to use other methods 
amongst the methods highlighted in the introduction section was not available when I started with 
this research. In the beginning of this research there were no documents about the PSSTMM that 
existed except the letters exchange between SANTRA, CJP and Hans, and that which was sent to the 
City as a proposal which I came to know about in an interview with Norman Maluleka. Although, 
there was evidence reflected in these emails, that some meetings were held to discuss the PSSTMM, 
these meetings were held prior to this research as a result I did not attend them to observe how the 
things reflected in the proposal were discussed.  
Before engaging with interviewees I prepared a list of things that I wanted to know about the 
PSSTMM as an interview guideline. This interview guideline, attached in annexure, included specific 
aspect which in chapter one have been identified as things which a street trading management 
model can be examined by. This includes things to be regulated, people/organisations or institutions 
to be involved, their specific roles and functions. In these interviews I have also proposed to 
interviewees to be helpful in the development of the PSSTMM by helping them, in any way where 
they felt my help would have been useful. This was done with expectations that it would lead to 
action research, however, it did not materialised as they suggested that at that moment there was 
nothing which they thought I could help with. I think this was the case as there was nothing much 
that was happening with regards to progress of the PSSTMM after the City rejected the proposal. 
Moreover, as identified elsewhere in this chapter the PSSTMM was regarded as something that is 
sensitivity by one of the stakeholders (Norman Maluleka) and it might have been difficult for them 
to involve someone new to them. 
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CUBES took advantage of this and suggested that I can be helpful by conducting research that was to 
help in developing the management model. In the research that I did with CUBES I made sure that it 
related to this research as a result some of that research has been used in this paper. This, as with 
the AFTRAX project, also influenced the methodology of this research because I was at times asked 
to conduct research, earlier than I would have done if it was not for the request. For example, I was 
asked to do a qualitative survey during the first semester of this year which I had planned to do 
during the second semester. 
The first interviewee was Edmund Elias, SANTRA spokesperson who I was introduced to by Claire 
Bénit-Gbaffou, my supervisor. Edmund and Claire worked together previously in the “Yeoville Studio, 
a research and learning initiative that was driven by a collaboration between the Wits School of 
Architecture and Planning and several community partners” according to the Wits University 
website10. Through this interview I became aware of the names of other people who are involved in 
the project. This includes Anne Steffny, CJP director and Hans Jooste, from Specialised Area and 
Improvement Districts (SAID) who introduced me to Norman Maluleka who I also interviewed with 
Anne Steffny. Norman was interviewed because he was involved at the time when the PSSTMM was 
first developed, as a service provider.  
CUBES also interviewed Urban Genesis Management (UGM), this was an attempt to understand the 
financial model, which is the amount spent on specific services, used in the RID as part of the 
research at CUBES about understanding different street trading management models. This was 
important for this research as to understand how UGM decide on the amount of different services 
they provide. The involvement of UGM replacing SAID came after a resolution in a meeting held on 
15 May 2014 between CJP, SANTRA and CUBES to renegotiate the financial model of the PSSTMM. 
This financial model was initially designed by Hans at UGM and moved with the project to SAID. 
Hans Jooste used to be at the core of both UGM and CJP and this created a strong relationship 
between him and CJP. This might have be one of the reasons he was approached first in the 
development of the PSSTMM, but he split from UGM, and now UGM is rebuilding itself and is still 
maintaining a relationship with CJP. The renegotiation of this financial model was an attempt to find 
ways of reducing the cost of the PSSTMM.  
3.4. Documentation   
This research has also used academic and policy documents, electronic mails, reports (including 
those that have been developed about PSSTM during the course of this research), newspaper 
                                                          
10
 http://www.wits.ac.za/academic/ebe/4876/interdisciplinary_engagement.html  
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articles, and websites for various reasons explained below. Library research and internet research 
were used to access both academic and policy documents. Library research provided books which 
helped in contextualising the research question by giving understanding of and insight into theories 
relating to the research topic, and particularly on the management of street trading, a literature that 
remains very limited (Mitullah 2003; Bénit-Gbaffou 2014a). Moreover, these books contributed in 
giving contextual insight into the Inner city, Johannesburg, they provided light on different initiatives 
undertaken in the Inner city and the various stakeholders involved in the process. It is through this 
library research where I have gained knowledge about some of the City of Johannesburg’s policy and 
policies of other cities in the South. Most policy documents used in this research which include 
Johannesburg’s policies on street trading were accessed through the internet research. The internet 
research has been helpful also in providing access to journal articles, the Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) website in particular. WIEGO according to their 
website11 is a “global action-research-policy network that seeks to improve the status of the working 
poor, especially women, in the informal economy”. Internet research also gave access to websites 
including that of the CoJ, CJP, SANTRA and UGM and this was important in contributing to 
understanding these organisations/Institutions.   
Emails that existed as a means of communication between SANTRA, CJP, SAID, the CoJ and CUBES 
were very useful as a source of information in this research. Some of these emails were written as 
minutes of previous meetings reminding stakeholders of what was discussed, written as follow up 
questions to what was discussed elsewhere or informing stakeholders about particular 
developments. This includes an email that was sent to stakeholders of the PSSTMM talking about 
UGM’s idea of waste recycling. Furthermore, it should be noted that I received the first proposal 
titled Informal Traders Amended Sustainable Management Proposal relating to some trading areas 
within the Johannesburg Inner City submitted to the City council by an email. Because of the action 
research method adopted in this research most emails shared amongst stakeholders were also sent 
to me, as a result some of that information is used in this research. The use of this kind of 
information, personal communication, has ethical implication as noted in chapter one. In this 
research some of the quotes which are used are made anonymous as to prevent prejudice. 
Newspaper articles have been another significant source of information especially with regards to 
information around the topic of street trading, however, not specifically on the PSSTMM. This 
includes newspaper articles written prior and after this.  
                                                          
11
 http://wiego.org/. accessed on 25 September 2014 
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3.5. Action research and observations 
Action research is done in different ways; this includes being part of the negotiating group with the 
aim of empowering participants. In this research this method has been used to empower 
participants in the development of the PSSTMM through research and not by only observing as a 
neutral person to negotiations that have arisen between CJP, SANTRA and CUBES. As a student I 
have decided to take the role of being an observer in these negotiations which allows me to learn. 
Claire Benit-Gbaffou, representing CUBES was directly involved in these negotiations with me 
participating by supporting her with research in this process. This include the interviews I did as 
talked about above in the section on interviews, these interviews provided her with some 
information of the initial proposal. Moreover, a quantitative survey that included the number of 
street traders in the area of study, the type of goods being sold by traders, stalls they use and their 
size which were used to help in the development of PSSTMM. This information challenged the 
‘legal’/’illegal’ divide which dominates the current planning approach of the CoJ as it allowed all 
traders to be seen as an important asset to the PSSTMM.  
This information made it possible to also test another method of management that starts from the 
ground to find a model, understanding how many people are to be affected, rather than imposing a 
model that lacks sufficient information on what is happening on the ground. This research method 
has made this research challenging as it provided less distance to critically examine everything, it 
gave me too much responsibility for change as well as for research which some of it might not even 
be recognised by an examiner. For example, I provided the information about the number of street 
traders to influence the PSSTMM at the same time I was expected to understand the role which this 
information play in influencing change to the PSSTMM. In dealing with this challenge I have tried all 
the time to make sure that collected data is interpret or analysed in a defensible way. I have also 
used an opportunity to discuss the collected information with my supervisor as to reflect and grasp 
what a second person thinks about the information. This has allowed me to be aware of certain 
things which I was not aware of as I tended, at times, to focus on attempting to perfect what I was 
doing in trying to affect change and losing awareness on other things that were happening around 
me.  
For example, as I was counting the number of traders, which it is was above the initial number 
provided by SANTRA in UGM quotation attached in CJP (2014a) as representing their members, it did 
not come to my mind that this might mean other traders might be from a different organisation and 
this could result to conflict amongst trader organisation. It was only when I talked with a second 
person, my supervisor, where I become conscious about this dynamic. Another challenge 
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experienced in this research has been the changes that have occurred which made it hard to predict 
or plan the trajectory of this research. As highlighted above the development of the PSSTMM is a 
stop and go process, which at times there was progress but also at other times it became stalled. In 
addition to the above reasons, this is also because of other political urgencies in the interaction 
between the City, CJP and SANTRA and CUBES. For example, the consultation process by the City 
from 28 July until 6 August 2014 made it impossible for proposals on street trading to be submitted 
to the City as the City was not prepared to take proposal at that time. However, this was followed by 
a period where the City called for proposals to be submitted and progress was made with regards to 
the PSSTMM as it was submitted again. This played a significant role in shifting the trajectory of the 
PSSTMM as it was envisioned in this research, where it was anticipated that it will also include an 
implementation process which did not take place during the course of this research. However, 
reflections on implementation have been part of the model making process and in this research I 
have reflected on this aspect instead of actual implementation process.        
The reason for action research method was because this research was exploring a management 
model in the making in its principles, its politics and implementation as a result interviews, 
documentation and observation were not sufficient alone. Particularly, in understanding how the 
principles of the PSSTMM were being negotiated. Consequently, action research allowed me to be 
part of the group developing the PSSTMM as a result I was informed of almost every development 
and asked to attend meetings where the PSSTMM was to be discussed.  Here, my observations were 
documented in a diary dedicated to this process where I have recorded all my thoughts and informal 
discussions.  
Negotiations on the PSSTMM included other groups such as the eThekwini expects who were asked 
to share their experience on precinct based street trading management and their comments on the 
PSSTMM. UGM has been also part of these negotiations bringing precinct administrative knowledge. 
I have attended all these negotiations, including those that were between CJP, SANTRA and CUBES in 
most cases as an observer and documenting my impressions. Part of UGM contribution in these 
negotiations was to estimate the cost of services in the precinct where PSSTMM is to be 
implemented. Here, I took a more active role as I went with them on the ground where I was also 
expected to explain some of the things they did not understand about the PSSTMM. This include 
briefing UGM staff about the PSSTMM as most of them appeared to be clueless about the project. 
This episode in this research highlights one of the moments where my role changed from being a 
passive observer to being an active observer. The visit to the area of study with UGM is one of the 
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two visits which I took. The first site visit is explained above where I have counted the number of 
traders amongst other things talked about elsewhere in this chapter.  
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Chapter four: Historic, Current and Future Perspectives: Three Layers of 
Development of the Johannesburg Park Station Precinct 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter discuss how Pak Station has developed along the years (historic perspective), the 
current state of affairs (current perspective) and how is going to develop according to the proposed 
projects of the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) (future perspective). This section contribute in allowing 
this research to respond to the research question. For example, by understanding the number of all 
existing traders in the area of study, this research can then evaluate if the PSSTMM is progressive or 
not, in terms of the number that it seeks to accommodate. Furthermore, this section of the report 
contributes in framing the PSSTMM as it gives an understanding of what needs to be challenged in 
existing plans and where the model could integrate nicely in them; how it would start providing 
responses to issues on the ground (at best). This chapter start by discussing the image of the area of 
study as of 02 May 2014, where land uses including the station itself, trading spaces, the park, 
markets and other major uses are discussed to give immediate sense of the place. In this part of the 
chapter, two research papers by Makhetha (2010) titled “Exploring the livelihood strategies 
employed by street traders selling vegetables and fruits along Noord Street”, and by Manoko (2012), 
titled “Understanding the micro spatial practices of street traders around major transportation 
nodes: a case of the Park Station precinct”, have been used. These two pieces of research have been 
complimented by observations and survey conducted in a site visits by the author on the 02 May 
2014.  
The second part of this chapter attempts to put the current image of the area of study in its 
historical perspective, where significant ‘moments’ in the history of the Park station precinct will be 
discussed. Here, the focus is on how the area has developed since the time it was declared as the 
mining camp, by firstly looking at what prompted the development of Park station and further 
unpacking major developments of the station since its establishment. Moreover, this part of the 
research also discusses the diverse land uses which found their location in the precinct at different 
times in the development of the station, and it explains how they came about. The third part of this 
chapter will present initiatives currently taking place and proposed by the City of Johannesburg. 
These initiatives are driven by the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA), an agency of the CoJ 
that functions as a project designer and facilitation units, structuring a range of urban environment 
upgrade and social and economic development projects (Nkokoto 2005).   
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4.2. Understanding the current character/image of the Park station precinct in relation to 
street trading in the area of study 
The Park station precinct is one of the busiest and most ‘chaotic’ areas in Johannesburg as it serves 
as a primary public transport interchange in the CoJ and a host to various other major activities (CJP 
2013). This station according to Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) has long been a place of new beginnings 
for travellers from across Southern Africa, that every year thousands and thousands of people 
entered the city for the first time using trains, buses, and taxis. In proximity to Park station, 
metropolitan functions such as the Joubert Park, the Hillbrow Health Precinct, Jack Mincer Park, 
Johannesburg Art Gallery, and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Centre are found. Furthermore, the 
National Health Laboratory Service, Wanderers Taxi Rank, Johannesburg Polytech Institute, Gautrain 
station also form part of major land uses/activities that are located proximity to the area of study as 
illustrated in map 4.1 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.1 (above): done by the author depict a zoomed version of the area of study and major land 
uses that are in proximity.  
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Joubert Park according to Johannesburg City Park’s website12 is one the “busiest and most vibrant 
parks in the city centre, with about 20 000 people using it each month”. Major features to this park 
include a community garden, playing ground for children and large-scale chessboards (ibid). 
Johannesburg Art Gallery which find its location south of the Joubert Park is one of the biggest 
galleries in the sub-Saharan Africa according to Gauteng tourism website13 as it “claims over 9,000 
works of art”, including sculptures, drawings, paintings, prints and lacework. The Hillbrow Health Precinct 
located north of the Park station offers medical assistant, research and training for health 
professionals. Both Wanderers Taxi Rank and Jack Mincer Park are taxi ranks with Wanderers Taxi 
Rank, serving as an international rank, whereas Jack Mincer Park only service within the boundaries 
of the CoJ. The Johannesburg Polytech Institute is a school offering basic education from grade 0 to 
12. Johannesburg Metropolitan Centre is headquarters of the City of Johannesburg where 
administration of the City take place. National Health Laboratory Service according to their website14 
is a “diagnostic pathology service in South Africa with the responsibility of supporting the national 
and provincial health departments in the delivery of healthcare”. Lastly, the Gautrain station is a 
rapid transit railway system linking the CoJ, specifically Park station, Pretoria, Ekurhuleni and OR 
Tambo International Airport.   
The area which is of interest in this research is highlighted red in map 4.1, specifically the study area 
include: Hoek Street between Park Station and De Villiers Street, Noord Street between Park Station 
and Wanderers Street., Wanderers Street between De Villiers Street and Wolmarans Street, see map 
4.1 below (CJP 2014a). The below sub-sections talk about this area in relation to street trading with a 
specific focus on tangible matters such as the number of traders operating in the area, as well as the 
goods being sold by traders. Furthermore, they also discuss intangible street traders’ matters such as 
the relationship amongst traders in the area of study.  
4.2.1. Makhetha’s (2010) Findings  
In her research, Makhetha (2010) decided to focus on 15 street traders engaging in the same income 
generating activity (selling vegetables and fruits) along Noord street. This characteristic was 
important to her research as to have some level of homogeneity amongst the participants while 
exploring difference in the strategies that they employ (Makhetha 2010). This was the main criteria 
                                                          
12http://www.jhbcityparks.com/index.php/our-parks-contents-28/find-a-park-contents-
64?task=view&id=41. Accessed 15 October 2014  
13http://www.gauteng.net/attractions/entry/johannesburg_art_gallery/. Accessed on the 15 
October 2014 
14
 http://www.nhls.ac.za/.  Accessed 15 October 2014 
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for choosing her participants. Furthermore, in her initial research she also focused on street traders 
who were selling within the areas that Metropolitan Trading Company, a municipal owned entity 
that used to be responsible for managing street trading in Johannesburg, demarcated as trading 
zone. However, her research revealed that there were traders who were trading in areas outside the 
demarcated spaces.  
Her definition of which traders were legal and which were illegal is very interesting as she 
understood legal traders as those who were trading in areas demarcated by the MTC and those 
which were not she considered them as illegal traders. One of the interesting things about this 
definition is that it requires a person to engage with the traders to validate it because it is difficult 
especially in her area of study to determine demarcated spaces as there were very few noticeable 
signs which I observe from my site visit on 02 May 2014. From the 15 street traders she interviewed 
7 were ‘legal’ traders and 8 of them were ‘illegal’ traders as they were trading in areas which were 
not demarcated as trading zones. Moreover 7 of the people she interviewed were women and 8 
were men and only 7 of them lived around Johannesburg in areas such as Yeoville and Hillbrow while 
the rest lived in different parts of Soweto such as Pimville and Dobsonville.  
Makhetha (2010) found that access to physical capital in the form of transport, enables street 
traders to be mobile and not be limited to living in close proximity to their places of work. Makhetha 
(2010) also note the attitude of dislike from legal traders around the area of study to illegal traders 
who also occupy the same space and she argues that this dislike is based on competition for 
customers. This is a battle for winning customers and is being won by illegal traders (ibid). This is the 
case because illegal traders around Park station do not wait for customers on demarcated sites 
rather they locate in areas where customers can see them and access them before getting to the 
legal traders who are fixed in their demarcated spaces. Another reason why they are winning this 
battle according to Makhetha (2010) is because of lower prices compared to those of legal traders 
for similar goods and they can afford to do this because, according to legal traders, illegal traders do 
not have to pay for the area which they occupy. Makhetha used the price of an apple which was 
R2.00 when you buy it to an illegal traders and R3.00 to legal traders 
This has created tensions between the two groups; however legal traders have a very warm 
relationship towards each other and this relationship also contribute to the success of their business 
(Makhetha 2010). For example, traders help each other by looking after each other’s stock when the 
owner is away, but these favours do not go as far as borrowing money from each other (Makhetha 
2010). Illegal traders do not have a warm relationship towards each other as in most case their 
relationships amongst themselves is based on disputes over space to trade due to the fact that they 
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operate in an environment where there is competition over trading spaces which are pavements. 
She found that most illegal traders have been force to used pavements as the equipment to display 
goods different from legal traders who some of them had access to form of infrastructure an 
designated space which they refuse to share with the illegal traders. She also found that most 
traders do not keep records of the money they make and this according to her could affect their 
businesses in a negative way as they cannot plan proper without this information. In conclusion she 
noted that trader’s status of being legal and illegal play a role in determining the strategy that 
traders employ and this has created tension in between these groups in Noord street.   
4.2.2. Manoko’s (2012) Findings 
Manoko (2012) used a similar methodology to the one used by Makhetha (2010) which was based 
on interviews and observations. However, his focus was different in that he looked at five different 
precincts in which different street trading practices were being conducted unlike Makhetha (2010) 
who looked at a single street and street traders who were selling similar products (vegetables and 
fruits). He identified five precincts which included a flea market located South exit of Park station 
labelled A in map  4.2, linear market across the South exit of Park station labelled B in map  4.2, the 
length of the pavement lining De Villiers Street on the North side between Joubert and Eloff street 
labelled C in map  4.2, the length of the pavement lining De Villiers Street on the South side between 
Eloff and Hoek street labelled D in map  4.2, and Noord street between Hoek street and Wanderers 
street labelled E in map  4.2. His interviews were based on a sampled portion of seven street traders 
which were different in many respects including how they access their trading spaces and the 
precincts in which they were selling their goods.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.2 (above): taken from Manoko (2012) showing the five precincts which Manoko focused his 
research on. From this map it can also be observed that only precinct E that seats within the area of 
study.   
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Table 4.1 below show the number of traders which were interviewed in specific precincts and it is 
important to note that he did not interview any trader in precinct C rather interviewed most traders 
located in precinct E which is the only precinct that seats in the area of study. His observations were 
primarily based on observing the spatial practices of traders in conducting their businesses and how 
their practices impact pedestrians, public space and urban planning. Overall his aim was to find how 
street traders in different precincts around Park station were displaying their goods, the type of 
trading stall they use and how they use the environment to the benefit of their businesses, how they 
access facilities such as storage and toilets. 
Table 4.1 (below): shows the number of traders which were interviewed in specific precincts by 
Manoko (2012)   
 Precinct A Precinct B Precinct C Precinct D Precinct E 
No. of traders 
interviewed 
2 1 0 1 3 
 
In the precincts which Manoko (2012) based his studies, he found that structures used by street 
traders to display their goods were all temporary including fold-up tables, makeshift structures, on 
top of a cloth placed on the pavement surface, cloth or plastic bag on pavement surface. He also 
found that out of five precincts only two had permanent overhead structures and in others traders 
used Gazebos and tents and trees for shade. He found that most traders use toilets available inside 
Park station. These are the same toilets that are used by commuters as a result traders have to wait 
in long queues to use the facility. It is important also to note that some traders have established a 
‘good’ relationship with shopkeepers as a result they used toilets inside these shops (Manoko 2012). 
He found that there was no storage facilities provided on site meaning that traders had to travel 
with their goods. During the day they use boxes and recycle bags to store their goods.  
His findings provide three ways which traders in the precincts he looked at access their trading stalls. 
This includes access through the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC) at the time, presumable, 
now they access them through Johannesburg Property Company as the MTC does not exist anymore, 
in precinct B, C, D, E. Traders in precinct A access their trading stalls by approaching Passenger Rail 
Agency of South Africa (PRASA) and others access their trading spaces ‘informally’, which means 
they do not approach anyone they just take which ever space that is available and trade. The impact 
of trader’s spatial practices on pedestrians, Manoko (2012) found that pedestrians in most of the 
precincts (B, C, E) were experiencing difficulties in moving on streets as a result they were forced to 
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walk on the road to avoid crowded pavements. He further observed that some of the equipment 
used to display goods such as makeshift structures was playing a significant role in disturbing 
pedestrian movement as some were overlapping designated trading spaces/ taking space beyond 
that which was given to them, creating limited space for pedestrians to move, some were not 
visually appealing according to his observations. Unmaintained road surface and pavements 
especially around precinct E were collecting litter and rain water making it worse for people to move 
Manoko (2014) observed.  
4.2.3. Findings from my research  
To give a precise number of street traders is a very difficult exercise simply because this is an 
informal economic activity where traders enter and leave the sector without notifying anyone 
(especially those who are not registered under any body) and few if any documents exists that 
record this process and various other aspect of this activity (Skinner 1999). Even the two existing 
pieces of research (Manoko (2012) and Makhetha (2010) do not provide the exact number of traders 
operating in the area consequently on the 02 May 2014 I had to go on the ground to collect this 
information. This also provided an opportunity for me to observe the type of goods being sold by 
traders, stalls they use and their size. The area was made up of 411 traders; 229 were in Wanderers 
Street, 114 were in Noord street and 68 were in Hoek street as located in map 4.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.3 (above): taken from Lande (2014) shows the number of street traders in each of the three 
streets that make up the study area. The reason for counting traders only in the three streets and 
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not in other streets is because they form the area in which the PSSTMM is set to be implemented. 
The numbers highlighted in yellow are to be read with the figure 4.1 to 4.5 below as it shows where 
these pictures have been taken.  
Table 4.2 illustrates the eight categories that I constructed under which the 411 traders sell their 
goods as of 02 May 2014 and this include traders selling (i) cigarettes, sweets and chips, CDS (ii) 
fruits and vegetables (iii) clothing (iv) Cooked food (v) salon (vi) Phone equipment (chargers, 
pouches, simcards) (vii) traditional medicine (viii) Blankets, pillows and cosmetics. The size of trading 
spaces that traders use is shown in table 4.4 and it has been categorised into medium and small, 
with medium being an estimate of three to two metres and small being one and less metre. 
Above/before table 4.4 is table 4.3 that shows the type of trading stalls in Park station Johannesburg 
which includes tents, tables, boxes and trolleys, traders trading within the Market, on the floor and 
using chairs. But first, below are pictures demonstrating some of the points made here.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 (top left) taken from Lande (2014), illustrates the display of goods (clothing) which is on 
the floor and it takes medium size. Figure 4.3 (top right) taken by the author illustrates a small size 
space taken by a trader who sells cigarettes.       
Figure 4.1 (left) taken from Lande (2014), 
demonstrates one of the trading stalls used 
by traders which are the use of a tent and 
the space taken by this trader is considered 
to be a medium size. These tents serve a 
cover to both the trader and goods that 
he/she sell from the sun. This figure also 
shows a trolley on the south part of the 
picture which is used to display goods and is 
considered as taking small space.  
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Figure 4.4 (top left) taken by the author, while figure 4.3 in Noord street illustrates that some traders 
are not operating within demarcated spaces, this figure taken in Hoek street illustrates that some 
traders are operating within demarcated trading spaces as shown by the yellow line. These traders 
are located adjacent to the Hoek street linear market discussed below and they sell vegetables and 
fruits and using tables to display their goods. Figure 4.5 (top right) taken by the author depicts the 
only market in the area of study which Tissington (2009) says was completed in 2008.  In this market 
all traders are selling cooked food, with tables and chairs within for people to enjoy while resting. 
South of this market is de Villiers street which is also a high trading street.   
Table 4.2: Street traders in park station – nature of goods being sold 
 Wanderers Noord Hoek Total 
Cigarettes, 
sweets and chips, 
CDS 
37 
16% 
10 
9% 
12 
18% 
59 
14% 
Fruits and 
vegetables 
52 
23% 
67 
59% 
13 
19% 
132 
32% 
Clothing 55 
24% 
20 
18% 
14 
21% 
89 
22% 
Cooked food 24 
10% 
0 
0% 
26 
38% 
50 
13% 
Salon 23 
10% 
0 
0% 
1 
1% 
24 
6% 
Phone equipment 
(chargers, 
25 
11% 
9 
8% 
2 
3% 
36 
9% 
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pouches, 
simcards) 
Traditional 
medicine 
1 
0.4% 
2 
2% 
0 3 
1% 
Blankets, pillows 
and cosmetics 
12 
5% 
6 
5% 
0 18 
4% 
Total 229 114 68 411 
Source: Lande 2014 
Table 4.3: Street traders in Park station – the type of trading stalls used by traders 
Trading stalls Wanderers Noord Hoek Total 
Boxes and trolleys 13 
5.68% 
0 0 13 
3.16% 
Tables 95 
41.48% 
41 
35.96% 
28 
41.18% 
164 
39.90% 
Tents 73 
31.88% 
28 
24.56% 
5 
7.35% 
106 
25.79% 
On the floor 32 
13.97% 
45 
39.48% 
6 
8.82% 
83 
20.19% 
Chair 16 
6.99% 
0 3 
4.41% 
19 
4.62% 
Within the linear 
market 
0 0 26 
38.24% 
26 
6.33% 
Total 229 114 68 411 
Source: Lande 2014 
 
Table 4.4: Street traders in Park station – the sizes which traders take 
Size Wanderers Noord Hoek Total 
Medium 145 
63% 
60 
52.63% 
44 
64.71% 
213 
60.58% 
Small 85 
37.1% 
54 
47.37% 
24 
35.30% 
164 
39.66% 
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Total 229 114 68 411 
Source: Lande 2014 
4.2.4. Comparative analysis 
This section will take a vertical and horizontal approach in analysing the data presented above, here 
vertical is referred to as an analysis of a street in relation to other streets and a horizontal approach 
is an analysis within the same street. Different streets will be characterised both vertical and 
horizontal in relation to the three elements presented above which is the nature of goods that are 
being sold, the type of trading stalls and the sizes which traders take in performing street trading 
related activities.  This is the case because from the data it appears that some streets have a distinct 
character in relation to other streets but this character is not prominent when analysing a street in 
relation to what is happening within. As a result a single dimension of the analysis for example a 
vertical approach will not capture the full character of a street. For example, Hoek street when 
analysed in comparison to other street can be analysed as a street that have 26 traders located in 
the market more than any other street (Wanderers and Noord street). On the other side when 
analysing Hoek street on its own it is evident that most traders do not sell inside the market rather 
they use tables adjacent to the market and these traders are 3% more than the traders within the 
market. This is to say Hoek street in the area of study is the single host of traders selling within a 
market but the market is not the dominant type of trading stalls used by traders when only looking 
on Hoek street and the dominant type of trading stalls in Hoek street is the use of tables with 28 
traders using tables.    
In Hoek street, when analysing the type of goods being sold the number of traders selling cooked 
food dominates within the street and in comparison to other street with 26 traders. This is the case 
even though this street has the lowest number of traders when compared to the other two streets 
(Wanderers and Noord street) which is 68 compared to 229 in Wanderers street and 114 in Noord 
street. As the number traders who use medium space is high (65%) in Hoek street compared to 
Noord (53%) and Wanderers street (63%) because most of the traders in the area of study who sell 
cooked food prepare it on site and this requires a much bigger. This for Hoek street is also the case 
because all the traders inside the market have reserve space for their customers to seat and eat, 
while this does not happen elsewhere in the area of study.   
In Noord street, the street is dominated by traders selling fruits and vegetables which are 59% of all 
traders in this street. This dominance is also evident in the whole area of study as Noord host 15 
more traders selling fruits and vegetables compared to Wanderers street and 54 more traders 
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compared to Hoek street. This type of products does not necessary requires a bigger space because 
it is not prepare on site unless a trader wants to expand his/her business by have more goods then 
he/she will require a medium space. The sizes of trading stalls in Noord street which are recorded as 
53% for medium and 47% for small also reveal that the number of traders using medium size is 
almost equal to the one of small size. This should not be understood as a suggestion to allocate small 
trading stalls but to acknowledge that these traders can use small trading site but in time they can 
increase their businesses and require bigger trading stalls. The latter should be read as a suggestion 
that the allocation of trading stalls should consider that these traders will at some point want to 
grow their businesses and require medium size trading stalls. Moreover the number of traders 
displaying their goods on the floor which is 39% is more than any other form of displaying of trading 
stall within Noord street. It is also more than any other form of displaying goods or trading stall in 
the area of study with 39 traders more than Hoek street and 13 more than Wanderers street.   
Wanderers street is diverse compared to the other streets in relation to the services and goods that 
are being sold which include cooked food and salon that are not available in Noord street, and 
traditional medicine and blankets, pillows and cosmetics which are not available in Hoek street. 
Clothing is the dominant item that is being sold by traders with 24% within Wanderers street. The 
number of traders who sell this item also dominate in the area of study, 35 more than traders selling 
it in Noord and 39 more than traders selling it in Hoek street. As with Hoek street the use of tables to 
display goods or as a trading stall is a dominant way to serve this purpose in Wanderers street with 
41% which is 9.2 % higher than the second most used way of displaying goods. Moreover unlike 
Hoek street it is also the dominant way of displaying goods or trading stall used in the entire area of 
study.  
4.3. History 
This section attempts to unpack the development of Johannesburg’s Park Station by highlighting the 
major ‘moments’ in the life of this Station. This is an attempt to put the current image, discussed 
above, of the area of study in its historical perspective. Here, although, this section does not 
necessary focus on the history of street trading in the area of study, there is evidence of trading in 
and around Park station which is found in the work of Tissington (2009). Tissington (2009: 25) note 
that despite a very restrictive approach by local officials and central government from the 1886 to 
the 1980s, against allowing black South Africans to earn a living in the city, “from the city’s early 
years street traders operated in the city”. Amongst the restrictive initiatives was the Urban Areas Act 
passed in 1923, aimed at enforcing residential segregation, where the permanence of black South 
African’s in urban areas was abolished with also “restrictions on the nature and location of 
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commercial activities” they conduct (Tissington 200: 25). Tissington (2009: 25) further state that 
“due to these restrictions, many black South Africans turned to informal trading, a loosely defined 
occupation permitted by the Act”. In 1922, the year of strike in the mining sector the Johannesburg 
Council selected a white only space of 23 street blocks in the CBD where few stands were given to 
black traders (mainly Indian) (ibid). Tissington (2009) write that this restricted area was expanded in 
1947 and again in 1953 to 192 blocks, which covered most parts of Johannesburg’s CBD and some 
parts around Joubert Park.  
Those trading in the white only restricted area were only allowed to do so between 7am and 6pm, 
with traders operating outside this area being forced to adhere to the move-on regulations which 
required them to move their terrain by 25m every 20 minutes (ibid). The late 1970s period according 
to Tissington (2009) saw a cluster of traders conglomerating both in the periphery of the Inner city 
and inside the restricted area (located close to the main exit and entrance point for black people).   
This includes Johannesburg Park station (Noord and Hoek Streets in particular), “the African bus 
terminus in Newtown and the secondary commuter railway station on the southwest of the CBD” 
(ibid: 25). The main goods that were being sold by traders at that time in these particular sites 
included fruit and vegetables, sandwiches, porridge and stews, which some of them were prepared 
at home/ on site by traders (ibid). Tissington (2009) note that these traders  were frequently 
harassed with possibilities of being arrested by the “nine-man hawker squad” that confiscated goods 
and destroyed their infrastructure a resource that is important to traders, for contravening by-laws, 
including not moving on every 20 minutes or operating in areas where they were not allowed to 
operate in them.  
4.3.1. The genesis of the Park station precinct 
The area now known as Park Station precinct developed in a land used to be known as Randjeslaagte 
which in the late 1880s found its location on the centre of eight farms (Driefontein, Elandsfontein, 
Doornfontein and Turffontein, Langlaagte, Roodepoort, Paardekrall and Vogelstruisfontein) 
proclaimed as public digging sites for gold (Beavon 2004). Moreover, Randjeslaagte was selected to 
be a site for a mining village or mining camp by the state which later laid out stands that were sold in 
1886 as illustrated in the map 4.4 below (ibid). Beavon (2004) note that the idea behind the selling of 
the stands was more inclined by revenue creation for the state as a result street blocks were made 
small so as to maximise the number of corner stands that were leased at a higher rental than others. 
Beavon (2004) argue that this decision contributed substantially to the traffic problems that 
characterised Johannesburg at the time it became a city of automobiles. Through such 
developments it soon became obvious that something better than wagons and animal power, which 
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were the dominant mode of transport, particular to farmers, would be needed to provide the 
essential transport services in and out of the Transvaal Republic, an independent Boer-ruled country 
in Southern Africa during the second half of the 19th century (ibid). In 1890 the first train arrived in 
Johannesburg as a result of pressure put on to the Kruger government, the government of Transvaal 
Republic, to allow construction of a light railway, known as a tramway, between Boksburg and 
Johannesburg (Bruwer and Bruwer 2006).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.4 (above) taken from Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) depicting Johannesburg Stands Surveyed by 
Jos. E. De Villiers Preferent Right and Sold By Joost Heystek in 1886. North of the stands is an 
approximate location of Park station indicated as Park Halt in the map by Bruwer and Bruwer (2006)   
In 1890 when the light railway commenced its operations, the Johannesburg station and marshalling 
yards were located north-west of Newtown (ibid). However, the station in proximity to the centre of 
Johannesburg was located at the northern end of Eloff street positioned north of the stands in the 
map 4.4 above and known as Park station (ibid). Despite the significance and success of the tramway 
for the general public and in bringing coal for mines, Randjeslaagte community in general and the 
mines in particular, continued putting pressure on government for a rail that would link 
Johannesburg with the ports of Durban and/ Cape Town (Beavon 2004). The Cape government was 
also put under pressure by the prince of the Cape through agreements with the Boer Republic of 
Orange Free state, to extend the railway line from Kimberley to the Vaal River via Bloemfontein 
(Ibid). The route from the Vaal was then direct to Germiston (the then called Elandsfontein) and 
from there the trains simply followed the route of the tramway westward to Johannesburg after the 
light track had been replaced with heavy rails (ibid). In 1892, the first train to arrive in Johannesburg 
from the Cape steamed into Park station (Bruwer and Bruwer 2006). The Natal line from Durban to 
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Johannesburg was completed three years later in 1895 (ibid). Through these developments 
Johannesburg was now connected to both the Indian and Atlantic Ocean by a railway line.  
4.3.2. Park station as a site of recreational facilities  
In 1888, the president Paul Kruger of the Transvaal Republic was approached by a number of 
Johannesburg sportsmen to discuss plans for a sports club (Bruwer and Bruwer 2006). A portion of 
empty piece of land north of Noord Street/Park station was allocated by the mining commissioner 
who was following the orders of Paul Kruger and that land was to become known as the Wanderers’ 
Ground (ibid). It did not take much time for the grounds to become the main centre for sporting and 
social activities for Johannesburg’s white inhabitants of all ages (ibid). Moreover, in proximity 
pavilions were constructed and the Wanderers’ Dance Hall which became a host of balls and 
performances by visiting musicians (ibid). The first south east square to Park Station in  map 4.4 
above, bounded by Rissik, De Villiers, Eloff and Plein Streets was being used by the Park Tennis Club 
and known as Lawn Tennis Square (ibid). However, in 1903 the Square was converted to a site that 
hosted municipal offices and later was used by the Transvaal Technical Institute (ibid). In 1887, 
Johannesburg’s earliest local government, the Diggers’ Committee approached the Kruger’s 
government requesting a public park or garden (Van der Waal 1987). In 1892, Joubert Park was laid 
north east of the site that hosted the Transvaal Technical Institute, by the Health Committee (ibid). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 (top left) taken from http://www.heritageportal.co.za/remember/old-wanderers.  
Accessed on 03/09/14 and Figure 4.7 (top right) taken from Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) 
demonstrates some of the sporting codes played in Wanderers grounds which include wrestling 
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shown in figure 4.6  and hockey shown in figure 4.7. Figure 4.6 also shows a pavilion located far 
north and figure 4.7 also shows a Gymnasium Hall.   
 
Figure 4.8 (above) taken from Van der Waal (1987) illustrates the Joubert Park, with its Indigenous 
trees and a centrally-placed ornamental fountain 
Following the establishment of Joubert Park, in 1910-1915 was the construction of Johannesburg Art 
Gallery situated north of the railway reserve, on the southern portion of Joubert Park (Van der Waal 
1987). Johannesburg Art Gallery was designed with ambitions that it could be linked up with both 
Joubert Park and Union grounds, located south of Jobert Park across the railway line as opposed to 
Johannesburg Art Gallery, through a formal garden (Bruwer and Bruwer 2006). The idea as 
illustrated by figure 4.9 below was that a garden would be laid around the Johannesburg Art Gallery 
to cover the railway line to link up Joubert Park with Union grounds. Union grounds, where both 
soccer and cricket games were played (ibid). Failing the extension, however, of the Park beyond the 
railway line, Union Grounds were donated to the citizens of Johannesburg as a playground for 
children (ibid). The urgent need for both regional and local transportation resulted in the area being 
altered to host the Park Central Taxi Rank which is now known as the Jack Mincer Park (ibid).  
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Figure 4.9 (above) taken from Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) depicting the plan to link Joubert Park, top 
right and the Union Ground on the bottom right through a garden that was to be laid on top of the 
railway line to link the two. 
4.3.3. Expanding Johannesburg prompting the extension of Park Station  
The period 1890 to 1900, saw the unprecedented development of Johannesburg from a mining 
camp to a mining town that had increase in its population, the services it provided, and expanded 
both in its vertical and horizontal density (Beavon 2004). This includes an increase in the quantity of 
pedestrians from Park Station into the retail core, which was the market square located south west 
of Park station (ibid). The population again increased following the economic upturn after the 1890 
collapse, and this, together with the success of the Rand tram with regard to the flow of pedestrians 
in the core of Johannesburg and the role of the horse-drawn tram in Commissioner Rissik and Bree 
street contributed to rapid growth of business in the downtown or centre of Johannesburg (ibid). 
Furthermore, the period 1900 to 1920 represented a transition of the fairly closed Johannesburg 
town core to the extended city area of 1920 and beyond, including the suburbs adjacent to the core 
(Bruwer and Bruwer 2006). This includes the establishments of formal locations for African people 
beyond the municipal boundary in 1904, which later were accommodated in municipal compounds 
or hostels with limited capacities, inside the boundaries of Johannesburg but still outside the core of 
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Johannesburg (Beavon 2004). This came after local government authorities began to recognise that 
African male labour were essential in the development of Johannesburg (Beavon 2014). 
In parallel to the creation of hostels for Africans in the south of the Johannesburg centre, there was 
by way of contrast in terms of living conditions, a rapid spread of low-density suburbs for white 
people in the northern part of the Johannesburg core (ibid). Before reaching these suburbs from the 
core of Johannesburg there were (immediately to the north of the railway lines) emerging higher-
density apartment blocks (ibid). Beavon (2004) note that this Included 10400 apartments which 
were built in the period of 1933 to 1939 located on the north-eastern edge of the CBD in the zone 
from Joubert Park to Hillbrow and the Berea, although some were in the northern suburbs in areas 
such as Killarney and Houghton (ibid). At Park Station, in the meantime, the daily rush of suburban 
and main-line passengers resulted into inadequacies of facilities to accommodate the increasing 
number of users (Bruwer and Bruwer 2006). Railway authorities responded by extending railway 
platforms, this was the start to the relocation of Wanderers sport ground, resulting into 
expropriation of a section of the adjacent grounds of the Wanderers Club in 1926 (ibid). Bruwer and 
Bruwer (2006: 109) note that “there was a time when the Wanderers’ Ground was on the edge of 
the town and quite suitable for sports. Fact is that the city had grown, and the grounds had become 
surrounded by large blocks of flats, shops, and encroached upon by much-needed railway 
extensions”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10 (above) taken from Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) depicts the grounds of the Wanderers 
Club and left of the white line was the land expropriated for the extension of railway in 1926 
The construction of a second Park Station building was also prompted by major changes which were 
happening which required facilities to be enhanced for the station to function adequately (Van der 
Waal 1987). In 1928, the start of construction of the new station building commenced and it was 
finished in 1932 (ibid). Chipkin cited in Bruwer and Bruwer (2006: 110) argues that this new station 
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of 1932 became a “textbook illustration of the country’s segregation laws”. Moreover, Chipkin 
continues to acknowledge that it was in this station where the white middle class population in 
particular had “sophisticated venue with their own Blue Room restaurant, leading off the (whites-
only) concourse, for New Year’s Eve dinners or for enjoying a night out on the town, while black 
commuters were relegated to a separate entrance and the most basic facilities” (Bruwer and Bruwer 
2006: 110). Furthermore, exclusion was not only limited here, it was experienced in many of the 
recreational facilities located in the precinct. Van Der Waal (1987) notes that, although the original 
intentions of the Wanderers grounds were that it should serve the entire community, the entire 
sports complex was fenced and had to be entered through a cast-iron gates. Moreover, Van Der 
Waal (1987) argues that this was a clear manifestation of exclusivism and the need to demarcate a 
private territory removed from public view.  
In 1932 when the new Johannesburg Station was opened it serviced 16 million people in a period of 
one year, however, in a space of ten years the number trebled to 50 million (Bruwer and Bruwer 
2006). Consequently the need for a bigger station became urgent and planning had to start in 1945 
as it was delayed due to the Second World War (ibid). The initial plan that emerged suggested that 
there should be a separation of suburban and main-line traffic by constructing two adjacent but 
independent stations (ibid). However, the best solution as decided by engineers involved in the 
planning of the development was to extend the old Park station site by incorporating the old 
Wanderers’ ground located north, which some of its territory had already been taken early (ibid). 
The project which started in 1946 entailed a programme that was to see a vast buildings being built 
over a period of twenty years (ibid). The first stage of this project was completed in 1951, which 
including the replication of the old station further north of Park station (ibid). Here, all trains were 
then diverted from the old to the new track and leaving the old station stranded north of Newtown 
as a mere historical feature (ibid). This meant that people were to access Johannesburg through the 
new station that was moved westwards.   
As the Park Station was growing, its railway lines expanded to an extent that it was difficult to access 
the CBD from surrounding suburbs, a series of major traffic bridges were built over the 
Johannesburg’s “steel river” to enhance access to the CBD (Van Der Waal 1987).  The Johan Rissik 
Bridge located west of the Park Station complex, constructed in 1952 is one of the bridges built to 
facilitate access as shown in figure 4.11 below (ibid). According to Van Der Waal (1987) these 
developments did play a significant role in creating access for traffic between the CBD and the 
surrounding areas but they did not soften the visual effect of the railway barrier. On the other hand, 
the second stage of the Park Station development, finished in 1954 entailed the construction of 
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more platforms and tracks that added to the converging main-line tracks that existed separating 
Braamfontein and the CBD (ibid). Moreover, the second and third stages of the Park station 
development involved the construction of a concrete cover over the platforms, with this 
development finally being completed in 1965 (Bruwer and Bruwer 2006). Efforts to soften the visual 
effect of the railway barrier identified by Van Der Waal (1987) we further promoted by the 
Johannesburg City Council in 1988 when its Planning Department released a report titled Guidelines: 
Proposed Decking of the Railway Line: End Street to Queen Elizabeth Bridge.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 (above) taken from Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) and edited by the author show an aerial 
view of Johannesburg Park Station in 1986 and three bridges hat were built to facilitate access to 
Johannesburg CBD from the northern part of the City. Number one in this figure depicts Park Station 
with number two showing Johan Rissik Bridge, number three illustrate Harrison Bridge and number 
four depicts Queen Elizabeth Bridge.     
Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) state that, in the report by the City’s Planning Department, guidelines for 
the redevelopment of the Park Station precinct and adjacent land were provided. These guidelines 
suggested that decked-over of railway tracks to the east and west of the Johannesburg Park Station 
between End Street and the Queen Elizabeth Bridge was a solution to the barrier formed by the 
“steel river” (ibid). Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) state that the report by the Council’s Planning 
Department divided the airspace on top of railway lines into individual parcels and map 4.5 below 
depicts these parcels with the Park station complex being labelled as parcel 8.  
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Map 4.5 (above) taken from Bruwer and Bruwer (2006) illustrates various parcels that were 
earmarked for redevelopment in the 1988 report by the Council’s Planning Department and it is 
evident that the aim  was to cover all the railway lines which today are still visible to Johannesburg 
residents and perpetuating that visual barrier observed by Van Der Waal (1987). 
In 1996, as the most parts of the Inner city were experiencing decay the Johannesburg Park Station 
was not different as some parts of it were being vandalized (ibid). For Park station, allegations 
suggested that this was a result of neglect from the South African Rail Commuter Corporation’s 
property division, the body responsible for providing services to passengers (ibid). Jack Prentice, 
Managing Director of Intersite, the South African Rail Commuter Corporation’s property division 
responded in 1996 to the allegations by mentioning that plans that were to refurbish the station 
building were underway (ibid). Through these plans Johannesburg Park Station was to undergo 
transformation into an inter-modal transport and retail facility that accommodates both local and 
international passengers aimed at turning the Park Station building into a public meeting place, 
comprising offices and fast-food outlets (ibid). Prentice noted that during the apartheid the station 
was exempted from municipal by-laws and planning, moreover the station was a monument to 
apartheid planning (ibid). With this being said he further noted that it was going to be difficult to 
turn a ‘symbol of white exclusivity’ in a short space of time (ibid). This mounted into a 
redevelopment of Park Station known as Park City redevelopment which entailed various phases, 
which included the construction of a long distance intercity terminal for coaches and main-line trains 
and two retail malls (ibid).  
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4.4. Proposed initiatives by the City of Johannesburg around the area of study  
“Transit-oriented development strategies are at the heart of the City of Johannesburg’s 2011 Growth 
and Development Strategy, Joburg 2040”, a long term plan for the City, “prompting the 
Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) to prioritise public transport in its development plans” 
according to the JDA website15. An intervention focus for JDA is the Park Station Precinct, the 
‘primary transit interchange in the City’ (ibid). “It is a busy and vibrant part of the Inner city, but it 
has significant problems” according to the JDA website16 and this includes congestion experienced 
by both pedestrians and by those who travel by vehicles, amounting to conflict amongst all street 
users (conflict between informal traders, pedestrians and retailers). JDA in this node/precinct is 
prioritising interventions that aim at “reducing crime, safe playing spaces for children, more green 
space, markets for informal traders, managed parking, more taxi facilities, public toilets, and safe 
walking space for pedestrians and cyclists” (ibid). There are three JDA projects being undertaken in 
the Park Station Precinct to give effect to the above vision: “Inner City Commuter Links, Metro 
Park/Transnet Land and African Food and Culture Hub”. This section of the chapter will first look at 
the concept of relocating street traders in Johannesburg into markets with a specific focus on the 
perception of corporate businesses and their influence to planning in the CoJ. This will be followed 
by a discussion of the three projects talked about above.  
4.4.1. Markets for informal traders: The influence and perception of corporate businesses in future 
and proposed projects in the Inner city, Johannesburg 
In 2006, the JDA commissioned an independent consultant to assess its performance and 
achievements in achieving their vision of urban renewal and development in the inner city, in line 
with indicators set in 2001. Interestingly, this success was to be measured based on a survey of 150 
formal businesses/corporate businesses in the Inner city and not of other urban stakeholders such as 
street traders. Corporate business’s perceptions were analysed in document titled Johannesburg 
Inner City Performance Indicators report written by Wessels (2006); crime and grime, unmanaged 
informal trading and congestion were on top of the most negative effect on their businesses in the 
Inner city (Wessels 2006). According to the 2006 Johannesburg Inner City Performance Indicators 
report, 45 percent of respondents supported the concept of informal trading in principle, with 18.6 
percent of respondents leaving the question blank. However, the report states that “more and more 
respondents cited hawkers as a big negative in the Inner city, with many blaming them for crime and 
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 http://www.jda.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1414&Itemid=219. Accessed on 13 
August 2014 
16
 http://www.jda.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1414&Itemid=219. Accessed on 13 
August 2014  
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grime problems” (Wessels 2006: 40). Over 59 percent of businesses believed the solution to the 
main problems affecting their business was the relocation of informal trading to designated areas 
(ibid). This according to them was to produce or result in cleaner pavements, freer walkways, less 
crime, more hygienic and cleaner environment, increased visibility and more attractive shop 
windows (ibid). 
The report acknowledges that the most frequent responses from businesses when asked about the 
positive development in the past years had been, “the removal of hawkers from Braamfontein,” 
Metro Mall and “Metro police more visible” (ibid: 48). The report goes on to outline the frequent 
responses on the most negative development in the past two years which are, “illegal traders,” 
“people cutting hair on the pavement,” and “crime and grime”. Many of the responses further 
suggested that JDA needed to address this urgently by “creating designated areas for informal 
trading” (ibid: 49). Tissington (2009: 37) note that the findings of this survey “clearly suggested that 
the elimination of unmanaged street trading and its formalisation”, through markets, “was a high 
priority for formal business in the Inner city”. This priority is also suggested by Skinner (2009) where 
she state that the Inner City Street Trading Management Strategy of the CoJ which advocated for the 
establishment of markets was announced by both members of the council and the private sector 
companies involve as a strategy which was to completely prevent street trading in the project area. 
Tissington (2009: 37) argued based on the findings commissioned by JDA, that street trading was to 
be “one of the City’s most urgent priorities to address, given the fact that the main focus of City’s 
Inner city regeneration strategy is to attract corporate business and private investment back into the 
Inner city”.  
Moreover, Tissington (2009: 37) state that the JDA, “while not directly involved in informal trading 
policy or management”, it does have “a powerful voice in Inner city regeneration and its focus on 
appealing to private investors and business heavily depends on ensuring that the issues of informal 
street trading are addressed urgently” (ibid).  
It has been noted in the literature review that while markets in Johannesburg clearly represent an 
improvement in the physical environment in spaces of trading, they are not sufficient alone in 
growing businesses of traders which in turn improve their livelihood based on local and international 
experience (Rice 2006). A number of issues have been raise in a research done by Evan Rice in 2006 
titled “Informal traders’ markets in Johannesburg: creating an enabling environment for 
development of micro-enterprise?” In this research he found that nearly 65 percent of his 
interviewees who traded on the street before moving into the market confirmed that few people 
pass their trading site compare to when they were on streets. Moreover, they confirmed that 
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markets provide no flexibility in terms of movement by traders as to ensure that they reach to 
potential customers, where as in the street, traders were able to reach out to potential customers 
and advertise their goods or services. His findings demonstrate the negative impact replacing street 
trading would have to some traders whose business require flexibility to access potential customers.   
4.4.2. Inner City Commuter Links project 
According to the JDA website17 the Inner City Commuter Links project is being implemented in 
different phases and the first phase out four was implemented in the 2010/11 financial year where 
paving of sidewalks, lighting, street benches and sidewalk extension were conducted in many streets 
around Park station including Wolmarans Street. These interventions form part of the broader aim 
to upgrade the public environment for pedestrian and vehicle traffic, as well as for informal traders 
in the Park station precinct. Moreover, the 2012 JDA annual report note that the purpose of this 
project is to create a pedestrian friendly and walkable urban environment and this is to be done by 
setting up a network of public spaces, actively encouragement easy circulation by pedestrians and 
vehicles. JDA (2012) identified that the Park station precinct experiences high levels of physical and 
social disorder, including dilapidated buildings and criminal activities, which are “exacerbated” by 
the high volumes of pedestrians, informal traders, and vehicles. Furthermore, the JDA (2012) argues 
that their intention is to turn this kind of environment by building an inner city that is functional and 
liveable. This will be achieved by “optimising the use of existing facilities, improve the quality of the 
public realm, contributing to enhanced safety and perceptions of safety, and complement urban 
management initiatives to clean up and maintain the inner city” (JDA 2012: 24). This is an attempt to 
give a message to investors that the Inner city is a viable investment location in which profits or 
future value returns are not at risk (JDA 2012). 
According to the 2013 JDA annual report this is a 6-years budget allocation project in which detailed 
design of the area and implementation of identified upgrade initiatives are to be undertaken in 
phases. The 2012 JCSP Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) Report cited in JDA 
(2013) note that the second phase was completed in 2011/12 and it included the continuation of 
environmental upgrade similar to that in phase one, however, in different parts of the precinct. The 
third phase according to the (CPTED) document cited in JDA (2013) was to be implemented in 
2012/13 and to focus on repairs and improvements of the urban environment including paving and 
lighting with also a focus on formalising street trading spaces where a linear market was to be built 
in Noord street, between Klein and Wanderers streets. The fourth phase of work was being designed 
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 http://www.jda.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1414&Itemid=219. Accessed on 13 
August 2014 
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for 2013/14 at the moment the 2012 CPTED Report was written. According to this document it will 
include the continuation of the public environment upgrade along Noord Street between Twist and 
Klein streets, and from Wanderers to Park Station. In addition, a linear market will be created along 
King George Street between Noord and De Villiers streets.  
These upgrades, although, they are pushing for the widening and paving of sidewalks which might be 
good to allow both street trading and pedestrians to use the streets, there is evidence that the City is 
taking the route of moving some of the street traders to markets, specifically in Noord street. Map 
4.6 below taken from JDA (2013b) depicts a markets, streets prioritized for street trading and linear 
markets which are also observed in the area of study, in Noord street.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.6 (above) taken from JDA (2013b) illustrate the Inner City Traffic and Transport Study 2010 
which also reflected on the areas which they believe are suitable for trading 
Furthermore, a report by JDA (2010) titled Johannesburg Inner City Traffic & Transportation Study 
suggested that the City must consider implementing  a City Improvement District or similar special 
purpose vehicle in the precinct, which in its original form had a zero tolerance to street trading. In 
this study detailed designs/intervention have developed for the Park station precinct that also 
emphasis on environment upgrade in a form of improving sidewalks and public parks in the area, but 
there exist a notable absence of street trading facilities from these interventions. This illustrates less 
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desire to develop street traders trading on the street with attempts to move traders to markets. It 
should be noted that if the observe markets shown in map 4.6 are implemented this would mean in 
the area of study we would have two out of the three streets with traders being moved to a market.     
4.4.4. Transnet Land/Metro Park project 
Report prepared by GIBB Engineering & Science in association with ASM Architects & Urban 
Designers (2009) identifies the lack of ranking space for international buses and taxi’s arriving from 
the Southern African region as a significant problem in the inner city of Johannesburg. This 
document acknowledges that the traditional ranking site, Park Station is struggling to cater for 
national and international buses as it does not provide enough spaces for ranking. Consequently, a 
significant number of buses are now ranking informally as they are not adhering to the by-laws of 
the City, both in Braamfontein and in the CBD (JDA 2011). This includes the then overspill of taxis in 
the Metro mall rank to the Transnet Land immediately to the north of Metro mall taxi rank, prior to 
the development of that area, see figure 4.12 below (ibid).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 (above) taken from a report prepared by GIBB Engineering & Science in association with 
ASM Architects & Urban Designers (2009) depicts the overspill of taxis from the Metro mall rank 
directly opposite to this site. 
The Metro mall was estimated to cater for only 50% of the demand, and the development of a 
temporary holding site was seen as a priority (ibid).  The land is known as Portion 61 of the Farm 
Johannesburg 91 and is owned by Transnet Properties. It is situated to the North of Metro Mall 
(Gwigwi Mrwebi), South of the railway tracks and between Queen Elizabeth Bridge and Ntembi Piliso 
Street.    
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The Transnet Land/Metro Park project which started in 2011 involves the development of a large-
scale park along the railway line in the Inner city, north of the Metro mall rank, through a phased 
approach (JDA 2012). This was done to service residents and children living in the Brickfields 
development (ibid). Additional to the development of the park this project also include the 
development of temporary international transit holding space and shopping centre near Park Station 
that is assembled from properties owned by the CoJ, Transnet and the South African Post Office (JDA 
2013). A report prepared by GIBB Engineering & Science in association with ASM Architects & Urban 
Designers in 2009 acknowledges that these are to temporarily house the taxi’s which were and 
currently are at the Harrison holding area (Kaserne Parkade) and adjacent to Transnet property 
(above, figure 4.12). The precinct development is intended to further the objectives of regenerating 
the Inner city and reinforcing its role as a key transit node in the Gauteng City Region (JDA 2012). 
More specifically, the aims and objectives for the redevelopment of the Kazerne Parkade according 
to JDA (2012: 26) are to:  
 “To develop an integrated Long distance Taxi Facility on the Kazerne site, including all 
vehicular and pedestrian movements”. 
 “To cater for significant pedestrian movements across and alongside the site”. 
 “To capitalise on footfall to generate commercial uses”. 
 “To explore the viability of a mixed-use and Transit Orientated Development proposal” 
 “Improve inter-modal interchange integration” 
In 2011/12, through this project, a park was in its final stage of being complete, north of the Metro 
mall rank as illustrated in map 4.7 below (JDA 2012). Moreover, temporary taxi holding facility in the 
Transnet land for the long distance taxis that were using the Kazerne 2 Parking Garage as a holding 
area and rank at the Park Station Taxi Rank on Wanderers Street in Joubert Park was completed 
(ibid). However, the Transnet Land that was identified for this purpose was not sufficient. Additional 
land, the Post Office Land known as Kaseme Parkade was identified opposite the newly constructed 
holding area in as a way of accommodating taxis which were not accommodated in the Transnet 
land (ibid). This facility will provide approximately 350 additional parking bays for long distance taxis 
as a holding facility (ibid). This property will also be incorporated into the long term vision for the 
area as an International Intermodal facility to be developed with the private sector as a Public 
Private Partnership (ibid). The map 4.7 below depicts the two areas where taxis are to be and 
currently moved to. 
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Map 4.7 (above) demonstrating two sites that have been selected as ranking space and for the park. 
To the right of these sites is a Park station and from this map it can be observed the proximity of 
these two sites to Park station. 
Both holding areas include the installation of paving, lights and water points and permanent braai-
stands for a cooking facility for traders which were to be managed by the MTC and greening through 
grass planted with a two-year maintenance agreement (JDA 2013). The cooking facility, however, are 
only provided in the first taxi holding area not in the second. There is a possibility according to the 
JDA annual report (2012) that they might also be roll-out at other taxi and holding sites.  
4.4.5. African Food and Culture Hub project 
African Food and Culture Hub project is the latest project of the three, and according to the JDA 
website18 “plans are under way to turn Park Station into a gateway to Africa, with a welcoming 
public place that is a celebration of African food and culture, as well as a safe night-time activity 
zone around a public square or along a street in the precinct”. JDA (2013a) note that the African 
Food and Culture Hub project emerged from the 2013 business plan consultations when the 
executive Mayor of Johannesburg Parks Tau identified the need to capture the public imagination 
through JDA’s development work in the inner city. According to the JDA (2013) the mayor expressed 
a need to capitalize on the role of Park Station as a gateway to Africa by creating a welcoming public 
place that is a celebration of African food and culture. This project add to the fairly long term 
commitment of JDA of creating a precinct with a safe play space for children, additional green 
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 http://www.jda.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1436:park-station-precinct-
african-food-and-culture-hub&catid=137:projects&Itemid=159 
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spaces, markets for informal traders, parking, taxi facilities, public amenities, and safe walking 
spaces for cyclists and pedestrians as discussed above from other projects.   
The purpose of this project is to identify, brand and facilitate the development of a new public 
spaces that are surrounded by appropriate restaurants and shops which will reflect a range of 
African cultures (JDA 2013). In 2013/14 the JDA intended to spend on detailed designs, community 
participation processes, stakeholder negotiations and initial construction to upgrade the public 
environment (ibid). According to Sharon Lewis, executive manager of planning and strategy at JDA in 
a discussion on redesigning Park station hosted by Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research 
(WISER) on the 07 October 2014, designs for this project do not exists yet. However, she noted that 
the intention is to develop the vision of an African food and culture hub within the Park Station 
Precinct. According to the JDA website this will start by a temporary Park Station Pavilion that is to 
be designed by David Adjaye, working with, Urban Works. The detailed designs of this pavilion, on 
the discussion talked about above, Zahira Asmal, director at Designing South Africa, said details and 
designs of this pavilion are still something that is being discussed ‘internally’ which will be realised at 
some point. However, David Adjaye mentioned that the main objective of this temporary pavilion is 
to serve as a mark that changes the use of the site, Park station, activating the development of a 
much larger and permanent Food & Culture Hub.  
David further mentioned that attempts will be made to open up the blue room, old Park station 
room located directly west of the new park station, to create linkages between it and the pavilion 
that is to be located on the intersection between Rissik and Wolmarans street. The temporary 
pavilion which will also offer cultural food is seen as the first gesture of the larger project in the Park 
Station precinct (JDA 2013a). The year 2014/15, at JDA is marked as the year which intensive public 
environment will commence, along with a series of events including exhibitions and events in the 
African design pavilion (ibid). Public environment upgrades will be the continuation of the work that 
has been done through the Inner City Commuter Links project which include installation of lighting, 
landscaping, paving, street furniture and branding to create a safe night-time activity zone around a 
public square or along a street in the Park Station Precinct (ibid). This public environment upgrade 
work is scheduled to be completed by 2014/15. Despite these attempts it is concerning to observe in 
the presentation by Zahira Asmal done in the WISER discussions and in documents that talk about 
this project to note that the project appears to be mainly focusing on people arriving in 
Johannesburg without giving attention to people who work in the area such as street traders. This 
project attempts to brand the Park station precinct as a cultural precinct  with African restaurants, 
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the blind eye to street trading, as it does mention how they will fit in the area threatens the 
existence of traders.    
4.4.6. Concluding remarks  
In Johannesburg, there is some degree of consensus on reasons why street trading should be 
managed and most official and research often argue it should be the case “as to ensure the needs of 
other street users are not affected negatively”. Thus management should be an endeavour to 
balance these needs rather than prioritising other needs or interests over others. Both these 
statements from a certain angle moves away from the apartheid logic of managing as a way to 
eliminate the craft all together. Both they do not prevent the existence of street trading in the inner 
city and this position has been extensively documented by both the municipality and JDA. However, 
it becomes a concern when needs or interests of other street users are prioritised over the interests 
of others when there is conflict of interests, rather than balancing. The JDA is not different from this 
and what it has done in the projects around the area of concern was to acknowledge the need to 
give space to traders in the Inner city and persistently provided trading spaces in a way which was 
suggested by corporate business. Around Park Station especially at Noord street, JDA is relocating 
traders to markets as demonstrated particularly in the Inner City Commuter Links project. These 
markets are where a majority of traders fail to grow their business as argued by Rice (2006). In 
conclusion, it can be argued that priorities of other street users’ particular property owners or 
corporate business are prioritised over and above those of traders and there is no balance in their 
interests.   
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Chapter five: Principles and Principle renegotiations of the Park Station 
Street trading management Pilot model 
5.1. Introduction 
The Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM) came in the aftermath of Operation 
Clean Sweep (OCS), where the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) in October 2013 unilaterally (and 
unconstitutionally) decided to chase about 6000 street traders from the CBD, as a reaction to its 
incapacity to manage the sector (Constitutional court 2014). This was a time where there was an 
urgent need to propose alternative forms of street trading management or re-establish a dialogue 
for a sustainable solution as management at that time was threating the livelihood of about 6000 
people. However, it was hard for both traders and the City to engage in a constructive manner to 
negotiate how they can better solve the situation partly because of the court case that placed both 
the City and traders in positions where they are ‘enemies’ of each other (Anonymous 2014). 
Furthermore, the court case was in parallel to a situation where the City decided to reserve its 
engagement on street trading as they believe the matter was sub judice (City of Johannesburg 2013). 
This left the organisation (SANTRA) with no option but to turn to CJP, an organisation which they 
managed to establish a ‘good’ relationship with in the Retail Improvement District (RID) (Elias, 
SANTRA spokesperson (interviewed on 24/03/2014) and Steffny, CJP director (interviewed on 
22/04/2014).  
In the RID, Steffny (interviewed on 22/04/2014) says CJP tried most of the time to inform traders 
about new developments in the precinct and organised meetings to listen to their concerns amongst 
other things. Furthermore, according to Ryan Mathew (interviewed on 15/08/2014) by CUBES, head 
of finance at UGM, they always make sure that traders in the RID are invited to activities that take 
place in the precinct to participate and trade. This relationship amounted to SANTRA requesting CJP 
to extend this form of management to the area of study where they have a lot of affiliated members 
(Elias interviewed on 24/03/2014). A management ‘plan’ was drafted by CJP and Hans Jooste for the 
area of study and submitted to the City, but according to Elias, (interviewed on 24/03/2014) it was 
rejected by the City for possible reasons explained above and in chapter three. In February 2014, 
CUBES was approached by SANTRA requesting for assistance in developing this management ‘plan’. 
This separate request made by SANTRA to CUBES is part of a broad request by SANTRA and Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to assist street traders in preparing a more informed 
position from which to negotiate with City authorities. Since then more and more street trader 
organisations as discussed in chapter three have joined the engagement. Two key issues were 
considered:  
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• “Where should traders trade in the Inner city (and where should they not?” 
• “What are models of street trading management that work?” 
The separate request to CUBES by SANTRA was for us to help in refining the PSSTMM to be more 
progressive and sustainable. The role that is being played by CUBES with regards to the PSSTMM is 
to provide its research expertise to propose ideas for discussion aiming at improving the model to be 
more progressive and sustainable. Furthermore, CUBES have played the role of facilitating the 
renegotiations of the PSSTMM that aim at improving this pilot model. These negotiations have 
resulted in other groupings being involved in the development of this model. This include the 
eThekwini expects who were asked to share their experience on precinct based street trading 
management and their comments on the PSSTMM. Urban Genesis Management (UGM) has also 
been involved as a possible service provider, although, initially SAID was more involve as a service 
provider. This ongoing involvement of different service providers was motivated by a resolution, 
amongst other reasons, taken in a meeting held on the 15 May 2014 between SANTRA, CJP and 
CUBES to find the most affordable service providers. This is to say the involvement of UGM is part of 
an attempt to understand how affordable is this service provider, and also comparing it to other 
service providers. The second section of this chapter goes on to reflect on these 
negotiations/principle reconstruction process of the PSSTMM; on the stakes, what is negotiated and 
the challenges that were experienced in these negotiations.  
This pilot model is an interesting initiative to observe and study in the context of Johannesburg, 
considering the failures of the CoJ to adequately manage street trading in a progressive manner and 
criticism around privatisation of street trading management. It is important to note that prior to the 
principle renegotiation process of the PSSTMM this model was something that people (SANTRA and 
CJP) talk about which was never presented in full. Moreover, it must be noted that this model is 
work in progress because of the negotiations (which involve CUBES, CJP, and SANTRA for now: 
CUBES with a specific position in this process) that have commenced. Consequently, this chapter is 
structured in a way that initial findings on what the management model entailed will be discussed 
first followed by a section that discusses the renegotiation of this management model. This prevents 
the author to make conclusions on the management model based on the initial findings only, rather 
to also understand the product of these negotiations. This is one of the significant elements in 
understanding whether this management model is progressive or not because the judgement will 
also be informed by the knowledge gained in understanding compromises taken for specific 
principles through negotiation.   
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5.2. Underlying Principles: What did the Park Station Street trading Management Model 
(PSSTMM) entail, in its initial form? 
The underlying principles of the PSSTMM are derived from a proposal titled Informal traders 
amended sustainable management proposal relating to some trading areas within the Johannesburg 
inner city, sent via electronic mail to the CoJ on 03 January 2014 by Hans Jooste from SAID on behalf 
of Anne Steffny. Furthermore, these principles are derived from interviews with Edmund Elias, 
SANTRA spokesperson (interviewed on 24/03/2014), Anne Steffny, CJP director (interviewed on 
22/04/2014) and Norman Maluleke from SAID (interviewed on 03/04/2014). In this section, the 
initial proposal of the PSSTMM and the above interviews were examined to understand key 
principles which are identified as constituting or involve in a management model. This includes 
understanding the structure of the management model and lines of accountability amongst other 
elements provided in the interview guideline attached in the annexure. The PSSTMM principles were 
important as a foundation, a base, through which development that followed had its reference to. 
This includes the suggestions made by CUBES (2014) as an attempt to make the PSSTMM more 
progressive, which used these principles as a reference. It is important to note that information 
presented in this section only reflect the thinking behind the initial model as a result it does talk 
about the changes that have happened after that period or stakeholders that have come to be 
involved (or who have left) as a result of the principle renegotiation process amongst other reasons, 
or CUBES which was asked to assist in refining the PSSTMM.  
5.2.1. Stakeholders involved/anticipated to be involved in the PSSTMM, in its initial form  
Although, the initiators/establishers of the PSSTMM are SANTRA and CJP, in its initial form, the 
PSSTMM involved or it was anticipated that it will involve various other actors and figure 5.1 below 
demonstrates their roles or anticipated roles. Shown in figure 5.1, includes the CoJ, a stakeholder 
which Hans Jooste on behalf of Anne Steffyn sent the initial proposal to, via electronic mail. In this 
electronic mail it was “proposed that the City pays the amount” reflected in a quotation by UGM of 
the cost to manage the area of study, “if approved, to CJP”. The anticipated role of the CoJ in the 
model has been shifting since the principle reconstruction process, however, initially CJP wanted the 
City to subcontract and pay them to manage the model with the City being reimbursed by traders’ 
fee. In addition to the funds which were required from the City, the buy in of the City, which they did 
not, at that stage, was important since the City hold legislative powers, based on the Business Act of 
1991, to manage street trading in Johannesburg.  
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Other important stakeholders, that the PSSTMM in its initial form would have find difficulties to start 
without them, were there 221 SANTRA members who were expected to finance the PSSTMM by 
repaying the City, unless a source of finance was established elsewhere. CJP (2014a) note that the 
area of study is made up of 221 street traders that are SANTRA member which will be 
accommodated in the PSSTMM, and will finance the model. This means those who were not SANTRA 
members were to be excluded.  Elias (interviewed on 24/03/2014) mentioned that one of their plans 
with regard to financing the PSSTMM were to ask JDA to cross-subsidise the PSSTMM Pilot model 
and this made JDA a possible stakeholder in the implementation process of the PSSTMM at that 
stage.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviews with Edmund (interviewed on 24/03/2014), Anne (interviewed on 22/04/2014) and 
Norman (interviewed on 03/04/2014) revealed that both CJP and SANTRA are involved in the 
PSSTMM, CJP as a manager, SANTRA as the main organisation on the ground, and relatively happy of 
Figure 5.1. (above) produced by the author based on the information obtained through interviews 
and analysing the initial PSSTMM proposal illustrates stakeholders involved and their roles.  
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CJP management as opposed to the City’s management approach. Furthermore, when conducting 
these interviews it was not clear which company will take the responsibilities of being a service 
provider. Both Edmund and Anne talked about UGM and in the initial proposal it was suggested that 
the fee to be paid by the City will go to CJP and they “will release to UGM on completion of work and 
if work has been done satisfactory”. However, Norman introduced me to SAID, a new service 
provider company led by him and Hans Jooste who used to be at UGM. This created possibilities that 
maybe the initial proposal was developed while Hans was still at UGM and moved with the project 
to SAID without both Edmund and Anne knowing. This is a reason why service provider in figure 5.1 
is referred to two providers because at this stage there was some level of uncertainty because CJP 
and SANTRA relied on Hans for this service who they thought he was still at UGM.   
5.2.2. What were the services the PSSTMM attempted to provide in its initial form?   
The initial proposal of the PSSTMM by CJP (2014a) begins by presenting what they refer to as 
“matters of concern relating to the pilot project area”. This includes the acknowledgement that the 
“placing done of informal traders is not logical”, with a suggestion that a possible solution would be 
for CJP to arrange interactions between themselves, Johannesburg Property Company (JPC), an 
agency of the CoJ also responsible for managing street trading located on markets, the property of 
the CoJ, Department of Economic Development (DED) and Johannesburg Metropolitan Police 
Department (JMPD) to demarcate stands for traders to operate from. Furthermore, CJP (2014a) 
acknowledges that the infrastructure of the CoJ in the area of study is of poor standard, coupled by 
the infrastructure used by informal traders which is also of poor standard and creating an impression 
of an unmanaged, unhealthy environment. The CJP (2014a) further suggest that a solution would be 
for JPC, DED, JMPD, Environmental Health department of the CoJ, responsible for all municipal 
health services and CJP to revisit previous work done regarding practical, aesthetical acceptance 
structures. Nonetheless, CJP (2014a) expected these issues not to be addressed in a short run as 
they state, for now the pilot project should focus on implementing the matters identified in the 
quotation provided by UGM.  
This is to say some of the issues including the ones talked about above were not going to be 
addressed at the beginning of the PSSTMM but they were to be part of a long term plan of the 
PSSTMM. It is important to note that Anne (interviewed on 22/04/2014) was quite reluctant to talk 
about this long term plan in the beginning of her engagement with CUBES, however, as time goes on 
she started opening about it in the PSSTMM negotiations. This is further discussed below under the 
arrangement of the partnership of this management model section. At this stage of the PSSTMM 
development, she mentioned that the overall aim of this long term plan is to see traders managing 
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themselves in the future and their (CJP) role is to teach them how to manage and engage with 
different related entities on management (ibid). She never went beyond this in giving information 
about this long term plan in terms of explicitly explaining how is this going to happen.   
Based on the estimations provided by UGM in CJP (2014a) the PSSTMM attempted to provide two 
different services in the area of study which is cleaning and security. Furthermore, the estimations 
provided by UGM in CJP (2014a) highlight that five cleaning ambassadors who are to work from 
07h00 to 16h00 from Monday to Sunday are to be deployed to ensure that the area is clean. 
Moreover, this document proposes that weekly reporting should be done on process and quantity of 
refuse removed. These urban cleaners are to be supervised by one person who will also supervise six 
security ambassadors who are to be deployed to operate from 07h00 to 19h00, Monday to Sunday 
(ibid). The security ambassadors or Public Safety Ambassadors (PSA) are to draft weekly reports that 
reflect on process and incidents that have taken place (ibid). On site PSA were expected, according 
to CJP (2014a), to inter act with traders who had a responsibility to report problems they were 
experiencing on the ground to PSA. PSA were to be responsible for reporting to the South African 
Police Service incidents of crime, however, attend to those that need their attention (ibid).  The 
PSA’s roles also extend to ensuring that the number of street traders that was to be permitted to 
trade according to UGM in CJP (2014a) in the area of study was regulated. The number of traders 
that are considered by UGM in CJP (2014a) document is 221 street traders who are all affiliated to 
SANTRA as members. Moreover, these traders are all ‘licenced traders’, as SANTRA asserts they all 
hold permits (smartcards) to trade in the area.  
5.2.3. How much did it cost for the PSSTMM to operate in its initial form?  
The costs of management, based on the estimations provided by UGM in CJP (2014a) are based on 
the number of urban cleaners to operate in the area of study, public safety ambassador and 
equipment that relates to their daily operations. It is important to note, as CJP (2014a) state “the 
work to be done by the CJP has not been costed and is not included in the attached UGM quotes, if 
the proposal is accepted the CJP will meet with the City to discuss its cost”. The cost provided in the 
UGM estimations do not include the cost for CJP as mentioned above, the costs of a service 
provider, a possible levy to be paid to the City, for the use of public space, as noted by Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2014b). This means when these additional fees are added the total cost for management will 
increase from the one provided in table 5.1. Consequently, the fee to be paid by traders will also 
increase. Based on the cost provided in table 5.1 each trader from the 221 street traders that were 
to be permitted to trade in the area of study according UGM in CJP (2014a) was to pay a monthly fee 
of R450.00 that would have amounted to R 9,9372.83 which is required to sustain the management 
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plan. This is a monthly levy to be collected by SANTRA to traders with assistance by CJP to ensure 
that this comply with applicable legislation (CJP 2014a).  
Table 5.1 (below) taken from CJP (2014a) illustrates the initial costs to the Park Station Street 
Trading Management model which were estimated by UGM  
5.2.4. The task team that was to give oversight on the PSSTMM 
The PSSTMM according to Norman (interviewed on 03/04/2014) was to also have a task team which 
was to be appointed and briefed by CJP board. Norman said that “the responsibility of this task team 
was to draw up and ensure the implementation of rules for trading that comply with by-laws, to set 
time frames,  define responsibilities/authorities, clarify how rules get revised and tighten up, give 
clear guidance on dispute resolution”. This task team was to be a structure where most structures of 
the PSSTMM were to be accountable to (ibid). For example, the service provider was to draft a 
weekly report for both security and cleaning and present it to this task team, and the collection of 
levies from street traders was to be annually audited and reported to this task team (ibid).  The task 
team was to include representative from SANTRA, Department of economic 
Development/Metropolitan Trading Company staff, representative from Central Johannesburg 
Partnership, and Hans Jooste (from Specialised Area and Improvement Districts) (ibid). This task 
team was to also form part of platforms that were to serve as laboratories where street traders were 
Security Personnel Work days Number of 
people 
Monthly salary Cost per year 
Control room 
operator (supervisor)  
Monday-Sunday 1 R9, 850.00 R118, 200.00 
Security ambassadors Monday-Sunday 6 R9, 550.00 R687.600.00 
Total   7 R67, 150.00 R805, 800.00 
Cleaning Personnel Work days Number of 
people 
Monthly salary Cost per year 
Urban cleaners Monday- Sunday  5 R4, 000.00 R240, 000.00 
Cleaning Truck and 
crewmen  
Monday- Sunday 1 R3, 750.00 R45, 000.00 
Total  6 R23, 750.00 R285,000.00 
Equipment   R8, 472.83 R101674.00 
FINAL total   R 9,9372.83 R1, 192,473.96 
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expected to learn on management matters (Anne interviewed on 22/04/2014). This was to be an 
attempt to contribute to the long term vision of the PSSTMM to empower traders to manage 
themselves in future. Although, in the task team SANTRA is envisioned to be an independent 
stakeholder, in an email sent to SANTRA by CJP (2013) it is noted that to give effect to the PSSTMM 
SANTRA have to become a member of CJP. This makes it confusing to understand the role of each 
and an explicit explanation of how traders are to be empowered (CUBES (2014).  
5.3. Principle ‘renegotiation’ of the PSSTMM: How is the PSSTMM being negotiated?  
This section of the paper documents the ‘renegotiation’ or principle reconstruction process of the 
PSSTMM, which has come to include additional groups to CJP, Hans (who presented his contribution 
as a member of UGM initially but moved with the project to his new company SAID which I was 
introduced to) and SANTRA. These additional groups are Centre for Urbanism and Built Environment 
Studies (CUBES), the eThekwini expects and Urban Genesis Management (UGM). This part is 
interesting since it brings a person closer to policy formulation process. The main aim here is to 
reveal main decisions taken and unpack the reasons why they were taken with illustration on what 
were the different stakes of participants. The first ‘renegotiations’ of the PSSTMM were between 
SANTRA, CJP and CUBES with two meetings, which I attended, held to discuss the PSSTMM. The first 
part of this section discusses these negotiations. Here, after some period of research on progressive 
models around the world and understanding the PSSTMM, CUBES who was asked to help refine the 
initial proposal discussed in the previous section have pushed for three elements for discussion 
(CUBES (2014): financial sustainability of the model, the nature of the partnership between SANTRA 
and CJP and the process of implementation. These elements were identified as to bring clarity to 
some of the initial principles, discussed in the above section, which were identified as 
missing/lacking clarity/ and which can be improved to make the model sustainable and progressive.   
Interestingly, the discussions between SANTRA, CJP and CUBES as a way of responding to the 
elements by CUBES, although some very significant agreements were reached, are responsible for 
negotiations, discussed in this paper, that have opened elsewhere. This section which is discussed 
further below will go on to reveal why this is the case.  
The second engagement on the PSSTMM separate from that between SANTRA, CJP and CUBES was 
for the eThekwini expects to share their experience on precinct based street trading management 
and their comments on the PSSTMM. The eThekwini (Durban) experts on street trading included Pat 
Horn, StreetNet International coordinator, Richard Dobson co-founder and Project Leader of Asiye 
eTafuleni and Patrick Ndlovu who is also a co-founder of Asiye eTafuleni. According to the Asiye 
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eTafuleni website19 they are “a non-profit organisation focused on promoting and developing good 
practice and process around inclusive urban planning and design”. Moreover, both Patrick and 
Richard were heavily involved in the eThekwini street trading management initiative which 
according to Skinner (2008b) was particularly adopted in the Inner-city, in Warwick Junction. This 
initiative happened from 1995 to 2004 and in Africa is widely acknowledged as one the most 
progressive “moment” to street trading management (Skinner 2008a). Pat in a meeting held on 13 
August 2014 argue that this experience was just a “moment” and since 2004 management of street 
trading in eThekwini has went back to being oppressive towards street traders. These experts were 
in Johannesburg invited by CUBES to unpack their experience on street trading in eThekwini with the 
aim of providing lessons for Johannesburg. Their visit was also taken as an advantage to advice of 
the PSSTMM.    
The third engagement about the PSSTMM was for Urban Genesis Management (UGM) to contribute 
with administrative knowledge. This group according to Ryan Mathew (head of finance at UGM) in a 
meeting held on the 15 August 2014 exists to fill the gap between “good” City policies and poor 
implementation. The main job for UGM with regards to street trading and urban management in 
general is to provide services over and above those provided by the City, but in cooperation and 
coordination with the City services (ibid). It should be noted that, although, UGM claims an 
‘autonomous’ status, however, one can argue this company forms part of CJP. In 1997 when CJP 
decide to establish 'Partnerships for Urban Renewal' (PUR) it changed its position to focus on urban 
issues not only in the traditional CJP operating area of the Johannesburg Inner City rather in 
Johannesburg as whole and throughout the African continent (CJP 2014b). The main aim of PUR 
according to the CJP website20 was to provide a consulting and urban management services 
throughout the Johannesburg Metropolitan area and an urban consulting service throughout Africa. 
Here CJP initially had its own staff concerned with lobbying for, administrative of CIDs until 2003 
(ibid). The establishment of Kagiso Urban Management (KUM), which was to become UGM, in 2003 
resulted in the PUR being combined into KUM whilst the CJP remains to be a lobby group to the City 
for CIDs and administration provided under contract to KUM (ibid). According Tiiso Masipa, from 
UGM (electronic mail communication) KUM was bought approximately four years ago thus there 
was a change from KUM to UGM. 
Furthermore, the staff/workers that belonged to CJP which were concerned with administration of 
CIDs were transferred to KUM (ibid). In a way UGM was formed to take the administrative role from 
CJP and to be a for profit company, as service provider. It is under this relationship and history that it 
                                                          
19
 http://aet.org.za.www12.flk1.host-h.net/about-asiye-etafuleni/.  Accessed on 19 September 2014 
20
http://www.cjp.co.za/background.php.  Accessed on 05 August 2014 
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is hard to separate CJP and UGM in the management of CIDs as they need each to do their 
respective work. This history and relationship between the organisations proves the trust and the 
reason UGM was called by CJP to contribute with administrative knowledge formed in other CIDs 
across the city, and in particular in the RID which deals with street traders management, in the 
negotiations. This part of the paper will start by presenting the engagement between CJP, SANTRA 
and CUBES and this will be followed by a discussion on the comments by eThekwini experts and 
lastly the input of UGM will be discussed.  
5.3.1 Negotiations between SANTRA, CJP and CUBES 
This section is divided into three key questions which the negotiations between SANTRA, CJP and 
CUBES have attempted to find answers to. This includes the question; how many traders should the 
pilot model accommodate? Is the fee affordable to traders? And how the partnership of the 
management model is to be arranged? These are the questions which took centre stage after the 
three elements, for consideration, (financial sustainability of the model, the nature of the 
partnership between SANTRA and CJP and process of implementation) were proposed by CUBES. It is 
important to note that, although the PSSTMM has not been implemented yet, the implementation 
process is reflected in a proposal of the PSSTMM which came after the negotiation by Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2014b). This part of the paper will reflect on this process after the questions talked about above 
have been discussed. In addition it should be noted that SANTRA leadership and members have also 
started talking ‘informal’ and very brief about street trading management and what will be required 
for this to happen. This part of the paper also reflects on this ‘informal’ talk.  
5.3.2.1. How many traders should the PSSTMM accommodate? 
This element was brought into attention and proposed in the negotiations held on the 15 May 2014 
to be discussed by CUBES with SANTRA and CJP. The concern by CUBES was on the number of 
traders which were to be pushed out of business (CUBES 2014). According to the UGM in CJP 
(2014a), the area of study is made of 221 registered street traders under the CoJ to trade in the 
Inner city and these traders are also SANTRA members. This is one of the reasons why this site was 
chosen as an area to roll out the pilot model because it is where SANTRA, who initiated the project, 
have a lot of affiliated members (ibid). The 190 other street traders that also form part of the traders 
operating in the area of study are not considered by the initial model – either because they are not 
SANTRA members or because they don’t have smart cards (it is not clear) (ibid). It is important to 
note that, if they are not considered because they are not SANTRA members, the elimination of 
those traders might provoke conflict amongst street trader organisations. This is the case because 
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some of the unlicensed traders in the area of study belong to One Voice of All Hawkers Association 
(OVOAHA) and perhaps to South African Informal Traders Forum (SAITF) (Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b). If it 
is the case that they were excluded because they do not have smartcards, then SANTRA, SAITF and 
OVOAHA will face a crisis because it is their responsibility to protect their members who will be 
prevented to work by the PSSTMM.   
Initially to these negotiations, CJP was very supportive of the idea to accommodate only SANTRA 
members, 221 traders identified by UGM in CJP (2014a). Anne said she was “concern about the 
negative impact 411 traders would have on the urban environment”.  The statement made by Anne 
above demonstrates that she believe the presence of ‘many’ traders on the urban environment is 
one of the causes to the urban management issues experience in the Inner city and by reducing this 
number it will be easy for them to manage the area of study. Moreover, this interest for CJP might 
have arisen from their long time desire for the area of study to be regulated because of its proximity 
to RID territory and affecting it (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014d). This is to say she might have believed that by 
reducing the number of traders in the area of study this will contribute in the solving some of the 
problems they experience in the RID. SANTRA in this principle was in between, with evidence that its 
leadership is split, Livingston Mantanga was supporting that the model should allow only their 
members by saying “traders who do not have permission to trade in the area must not be allowed in 
this management”, while on the other hand Edmund SANTRA spokesperson was pushing to 
accommodate as many traders as possible regardless of their membership. Edmund was on a view 
that the management model “should go beyond the 221 traders, however, this need to be carefully 
considered as to ensure that it does not affect public space badly”. 
The organisation, SANTRA, was caught between protecting the interests of its members that is to 
eliminate competition brought by unlicensed traders (an interest of the organisation to grow its 
members) and interests of street trading as a sector which is to fight for all traders to be 
accommodated. This is one of the things which I have paid a very close attention to in the meetings 
attended on the 25 May and 10 August 2014. These meetings were between SANTRA members and 
their leadership and it became evident that some SANTRA member are pushing for management 
that will accommodated licensed traders only as they complained that it would be unfair to them to 
pay while others are enjoying the same services without paying for them. Lastly, CUBES (who 
initiated this discussion through the elements discussed above) was pushing for all traders to be 
accommodated. This interest for CUBES exists because of our commitment to issues of social justice.  
Social justice is understood in this research as being the protection of equal access to opportunities, 
as well as siding or defending the least advantaged members of society, particularly the urban poor 
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who at most times receive a weaker ‘voice’ in society. Rawls (1971) in his book A Theory of Justice 
writing at the rise of modern reform liberalism state that it is important that everyone is made equal 
in the “original position”. He argues that people from this position will choose equal access to 
opportunities unless an unequal access makes everyone better off.  
Sen (2005) on the other side argues that equal access to opportunities in our societies cannot be 
achieved by only using the model provided by Rawls because our societies are not homogeneous as 
some people are more capable than others. If we only concern ourselves about starting everyone in 
an equal position as Rawls suggest we will have societies that protect equal access only at the 
beginning but ending up having societies that provide unequal access. To obtain social justice we 
need to ensure that the deficit in capabilities of other people is enhanced by taking care of those 
who are least advantaged in a form of capabilities. In a meeting held on the 15 May 2014 with 
SANTRA, CJP and CUBES there was a consensus among the participants on the need to change the 
initial proposed number of traders to be accommodated. This came after CUBES first argued that by 
increasing the number of traders in the area would render the model more financially sustainable, as 
it will decrease the individual fee each trader would have to pay; and make the pilot plan more 
implementable, as it would not lead to chasing away half of the traders. Before, this consensus, 
however, the argument pushed by CUBES was contested by both CJP and SANTRA in a meeting held 
on the 26 May 2014, who argued that traders in the area of study do make a lot of turnover thus 
they can afford to pay for the PSSTMM. This started another debate, which is discussed further 
below, around the question; is the fee asked from the 221 traders which according the initial 
proposal of the PSSTMM were only going to be accommodated.    
The consensus was reached when all participants finally decided to compromise when CUBES 
proposed that there should be, at least, an urban designer who is to look at how many traders can 
the area accommodate without infringing the rights of other users to use the street. This conclusion 
meant that discussions with urban designers were to commence for the pilot to move forward.  
5.3.2.2. Is the fee affordable to traders? 
This question was also raised by CUBES (2014) under the financial sustainability element with 
concerns that 221 traders cannot sustain R1, 192, 473.96 per year which is the amount that was 
initially required to sustain the Park Station Street trading Management Plan  as reflected in CJP 
(2014a). Based on this amount each trader that was to be permitted to trade in the area of study 
according UGM in CJP (2014a) was to pay a monthly fee of R450.00 that would have amounted to 
R9, 9372.83 required to sustain the management plan monthly. 
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Anne Steffny in a meeting held on the 15 May 2014 said she expected the City to pay for the first few 
months and after this period traders are to pay the costs. Furthermore, an email sent by Hans Jooste 
to Helen Botes, managing director at JPC noted that Gerald Dumas, the chief operations officer in 
the office of the city manager, acknowledged that the “City would maybe fund to give SANTRA a 
month to start getting monthly levies from their members”. On the other side Edmund (interviewed 
on 24/03/2014) said that there is also a possibility that they might also ask JDA to subsidise but in 
the absence of this traders will have to pay for the management model to work. These statements 
did not erase the concern by CUBES (2014) as they did not guarantee sustainable payment. 
However, both SANTRA and CJP in the meeting held on the 26 May 2014, as talked about in the 
above section, were convinced that traders especial in the area of study were capable to pay this 
amount because the area accommodate a lot of potential customers and traders in this area do 
make a lot of turnover. This is not an easy task to discuss simply because ‘no one’ knows about the 
street trader’s monthly or weekly turnover as most traders do not keep records of the money which 
they make and in some cases they use some of it as it arrive to them (Mitullah 2003).    
Makhetha (2010) in her research conducted around Park station also lament on the findings by 
Mitullah (2003) and she warns that this lack of recording can have a negative impact on the progress 
of street trading as it can make it hard for traders to do proper planning without knowing what they 
make. Her warning is what CJP, SANTRA and CUBES are struggling with at the moment as they 
consolidate a plan based on assumptions with no accurate figures. In an interviewed on 03/04/2014 
with Norman Maluleke I asked him how do traders feel about financing this management plan as I 
was told by Edmund in the first interview I did for this research that this management plan was to be 
financed by traders. His (Norman) response was that “traders with smartcards approve paying as this 
will be accompanied by the elimination of traders with no smartcards”, which according to them 
serves as a very serious competition. Livingstone Mantanga (in a meeting held on 15 May 2014) also 
acknowledge that ‘informal’ negotiations between SANTRA leadership and members, which later I 
attended some of them, have begun and traders are willing to pay the monthly fee as long as people 
who are not paying will be prevented from selling. 
The first SANTRA meeting which I managed to attend was a launch of the organisation held on the 
25 May 2014. This was themed; a ‘meeting for the leadership to be given a mandate by members’ 
but the leadership also talked about what they believe the organisation should be doing. This 
includes a brief discussion on the need for street trading management which traders will have a 
direct influence to, and the members were reminded by their leadership that they will be required 
to pay for this management. Traders were then told to ask question, although very few traders 
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asked about the management, with most expressing their grievances about the City who they claim 
is harassing them. The few that did talk on this management agreed with their leadership that this is 
overdue, but as talked about above they noted that one of the conditions to this was that there 
need to be an assurance that people who will not be paying will not be allowed to trade in the 
specific area. Here, those who talked about this management were not clear of who or how many 
traders should be allowed to trade and it appeared to me as if they were only concerned about 
fairness, to ensure that everyone is put in the same level field opposed to allowing people who do 
not pay to trade.    
The second meeting I attended on the 10 August 2014 which came immediately after the City’s 
consultation process was mainly about reflecting on this process. In this meeting the SANTRA 
leadership and traders did not talk about the management plan which in the first meeting I attended 
their leadership remanded members about it. In this meeting the SANTRA leadership talked about 
the disappointment they had with the consultation process with the City, especially with the process 
that was followed. This includes the unavailability of precise information to talk about and they 
suggested that this continues to cause mistrust between them and the City as they believe there was 
a secrecy going on from the side of the City.  
In a meeting held on 15 May 2014 between CUBES, SANTRA and CJP, there were attempts to lower 
the fee for each trader and this include an uncontested suggestion made by CUBES that property 
owners in future could be asked to contribute as they will also benefit from this model through 
improved safety, and cleanliness. Furthermore, it was also suggested by SANTRA that the size of 
trading stalls should also be used to measure or determine the amount which each trader pay. This 
means those traders who will be privilege to access greater capital in a form of trading space are not 
going to pay a similar amount to those who will go for lesser trading space. For example, a trader can 
be charged based on metres which she/he occupies, for instance R10.00 a day for six square meters 
and R5.00 for four square metres. The idea to charge traders based on how much they make or 
according to the space they take can also contribute in making sure that some traders are not 
pushed out of business by imposing a fee which they cannot afford and which can only be afforded 
by those who make lager turnovers. Apart from these suggestions CUBES maintained the position, 
discussed in the previous section, which suggested that by increasing the number of traders in the 
area this would mean the individual fee will also decrease. For example, by allowing the 411 existing 
traders the fee required from each trader will drop to R242.00 per month.  
For CJP, although they did not have a problem with attempts that seek to lower individual fee 
required from traders but the argument by CUBES had implications on their interest talked about in 
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the previous section. CJP was more interested in making sure that it becomes easy for them to 
manage the area of study as they believe by reducing the number of traders this is possible as it will 
not infringe the rights of other street users to use the area of study. For SANTRA, it was interesting 
to observe how the split in leadership mentioned above about this plays out in this principle. 
Edmund become very supportive of this principle as it was going to allow all traders to be 
accommodated which was an interest he expressed when the principle of how many traders should 
be accommodated was discussed. On the other side Livingstone’s reluctance to the idea of 
accommodating all traders, even though it was justified that it will decrease individual fee of traders, 
made me think that maybe he was attempting to protect only members that belong to SANTRA so 
that other traders, those who are chased away, can see that SANTRA is doing something for their 
members and develop a desire to join SANTRA resulting to the organisation growing in its members. 
There was no consensus about this aspect of the principle, about the fee expected from traders, as it 
was decided that there should be an urban designer who is to look at how many traders can the area 
accommodate without infringing the rights of other users to use the street, as discussed in the 
previous section.    
5.3.2.3. How the partnership of the management model is to be arranged?  
This question in the negotiations between SANTRA, CJP and CUBES came as result of concerns raised 
by CUBES on the lack of clarity in how the partnership between SANTRA and CJP is expressed in CJP 
(2014a). At CUBES we first knew about this ‘partnership’ when both SANTRA told us about this 
“marvellous partnership initiative”. This created hope for CUBES in the aftermath of Operation Clean 
Sweep where there were no alternative solutions. A document by CUBES (2014) start by 
acknowledging that CJP’s partnering with SANTRA is beneficiary to both of them as this responds to 
a criticism around CIDs, of excluding traders in decision making process. Moreover, SANTRA on the 
other hand aim to responding to international and national criticism towards a trader led 
management model that usually lead to corruption and enrichment of leaders at the expanse of 
traders on the ground (ibid). In an interview on 22/04/2014 with Anne Steffyn, she said “as part of a 
long term plan to see traders managing themselves one day”, as already talked about elsewhere in 
this paper, the partnership between them and SANTRA has an empowerment component. This was 
discussed in a meeting held on 15 May 2014 as result of a request from CUBES that this 
empowerment should be made explicit with clarification on the roles of each and who should be 
part of it. 
Anne Steffny in attempting to explain the empowerment component to this management plan she 
said the role of CJP in this partnership is to “incubate the pilot model and hand it over to traders 
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when institution, capacity, skills are sustainable”. She further acknowledges that at the moment, 
because traders are not aware of various procedures involve, they will stand next to CJP and learn 
different things involve in management. In this meeting she explained their experience as CJP in 
CIDs, which excluded traders, suggesting that it should form a foundation for discussion. She said, in 
the CIDs the management of street traders came as result of difficulties experienced to manage 
urban environments without getting involved in informal trading management, a responsibility of 
the City. This according her led to a joint venture with the City to manage informal trading. She said 
the purpose of the joint venture was for “CJP to administrate rental agreements between traders 
and the Metropolitan Trading Company (MTC), including rent collection on all trading stalls in the 
CoJ”. To do this according to her a management board is required that is not for profit, which in 
most CIDs it is predominantly dominated by property owners with also City representation included. 
In a meeting held on 26 May 2014 there was an agreement that the pilot should also have a precinct 
management committee/management board, however, different in terms of its composition. Bénit-
Gbaffou (2014b) argues that the latter need not to be rushed and a careful thought on who is on this 
committee is necessary. This issue during the course of this research was not entirely resolved and in 
the negotiations it was agreed that it needs further discussions, advice, and understanding of the 
political, organizational dynamics of the three streets in the precinct (ibid). This came after CUBES, 
who demonstrated earlier on the principles discussed prior to this one that its interest is to protect 
all traders as this is our commitment to issues of social justice in society, noted that some of the 
traders in the area of study belong to OVOAHA, perhaps to SAITF and it might be possible that some 
traders do not belong to any organisation. This for CUBES was to ensure that all traders are 
represented as to avoid hegemony of one street trader organisation. However, it was agreed in a 
meeting held on the 26 May 2014 that the participation of both SANTRA and CJP in this committee, 
but also other forms of traders representation that accommodate traders on the ground, still to be 
determined, was necessary as co-piloting the project together.    
In a draft proposal by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b) the name of the project was change to Park Station 
Street Trading Management Pilot instead of the initial name SANTRA-CJP Street Trading 
Management pilot. This was an attempt to absorb everyone affected by the model which will not 
only be SANTRA and CJP but other organisations or people and to make it more welcoming to people 
using the space as for them to feel that they own the model. The proposal calls for a survey of 
traders and their organizational affiliation to be done in the area of study to better understand 
which organisations traders trading in the area of study belong to (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014b). 
Furthermore, the proposal acknowledges that it is not clear if there is a shop keeper organization, or 
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major property owners interested in the pilot (ibid). In this proposal it is suggested that if there are 
such organizations, they probably should be asked for a financial contribution to the pilot, as they 
also would benefit from managed streets. The committee will need to accommodate both statutory 
representatives (of CJP, SANTRA but also perhaps other organizations and local stakeholders), and 
elected traders representatives (street of block leaders to be elected). This committee would meet 
regularly (once a month), with reports from the service provider, to monitor and manage the pilot 
project. It should also regularly provide feedback to the community of traders working in the 
precinct (once a quarter or a trimester?). 
5.3.2.3 A proposed implementation process and expected support from the City  
In a proposal by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b) written after the negotiations between SANTRA, CJP and 
CUBES, the final section start by talking about the expected support from the City before discussing 
the implementation process as a suggestion.  In this proposal it is noted that there is a need for the 
City to commit to the principle of allowing “all existing street traders to trade in the precinct, once a 
design plan has been developed and trading sites are demarcated” (5). Furthermore, Bénit-Gbaffou 
(2014b) suggest that the City should also support by giving the PSSTMM precinct committee some 
delegated powers such as raising traders’ fee and demarcating trading spaces and this could be in a 
form of a memorandum of understanding. Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b) further suggests that the City can 
also support by accepting to be one of the bodies which the precinct committee will account to by 
presenting an annual report that is to evaluate the progress of the PSSTMM. The City is also 
expected to support by ensuring that this initiatives talk to other urban regeneration initiatives that 
are taking place around Park Station (ibid). Lastly, the proposal asks the City to support by 
suspending the fees that traders are to paying to them, as traders will be paying the fee to the 
precinct committee. For this to happen and for the implementation of the PSSTMM, the proposal 
suggests that there need to be a presentation of the pilot to CoJ where it can be debated and 
refined. 
In a meeting held on the 26 May 2014 it was suggested by both CUBES and CJP that SANTRA must 
present this management model to their members, in the meantime, in a way that avoids creating 
hopes that if it fails, will result to major disappointments. The proposal by Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b) 
suggests that SANTRA should wait for the City to endorse the model first with its principles agreed 
upon/clarified/consolidated by SANTRA, CJP and the City. Then after this Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b) 
suggest that a general meeting with all traders, chaired by CJP and SANTRA, can be called to present 
the pilot with an objective to get traders buy-in. This, if the buy in of traders happens, should be 
followed by elections of block leaders, who are also going to form part of the precinct management 
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committee (ibid). Shop keepers and property owners, Bénit-Gbaffou (2014b: 6), suggest that they 
should also be “approached, to get their buy in and voluntary contribution to the costs of street 
management” and if they accept this “they should also be represented in the precinct management 
committee”. The role of CUBES at this stage would be to support by helping consolidate the pilot in 
an advisory capacity through research and possibly drafting an urban design plan for trading sites 
and designs (ibid).    
5.3.3. EThekwini expects and their advice on the PSSTMM 
The eThekwini (Durban) expects, Pat Horn, Richard Dobson and Patrick Ndlovu, in a meeting held on 
the 13 August 2014,  were all concerned about the ‘privatisation’ of street trading management 
through the PSSTMM, taking it away from where it belong as legislated by the Business Act of 1991.  
They said that they have never been involved in such management and they prefer that the 
responsibility to manage street traders should remain where it belongs. They further noted that 
their experience in Durban is one where the local state, the eThekwini municipality, was very 
supportive and in fact led progressive street trading management by launching an area-based urban 
renewal initiative in Warwick Junction in 1996. Coming in this discussion this was the kind of 
experience which the eThekwini expects were exposed to which is very different to the experience 
of Johannesburg where the private sector is so intensively involved and gaining trust from traders 
(SANTRA) as a result of the RID experience. In Johannesburg this is in parallel to a situation where 
mistrust between traders and the City is becoming very strong. It is important to note that the 
private sector in Johannesburg is also trusted by the City as they, at times, give their responsibility of 
managing street trading to the private sector. Peyroux (2008) says this is partly because the City was 
failing to provide adequate management because of its continuing fiscal crisis through which private 
funding of public services was seen as a solution going forward.  
Although, the eThekwini experts did not explicitly suggest, but it was clear with their arguments that 
the right to trade and that of creating livelihood/life by traders should never be bought. They 
express their disappointment after it came to their attention that traders are paying an amount of 
R120.00 to the City, as opposed to rents amounting to R40-R60 in the City of eThekwini which they 
thought was also ridiculous. Moreover, they were also disappointed by the principle that requires 
traders to pay in the PSSTMM. Pat went further to suggest that “we must not concern ourselves 
about revenue generation through street traders levies as this is not what should be happening”. If 
the eThekwini experts indeed believed that traders should not contribute in financing street trading 
management then I disagree with them as I think traders should, for the most, take the 
responsibility to cover the costs of some of the services they benefit from especially in a context 
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where the local state is not responsive to this matter (services that will benefit traders). Moreover, I 
strongly believe that this should not be for profit rather it should be an attempt to cover costs 
incurred  because once it becomes an activity to make profit we run a risk to have a situation where 
desires to make profit supersede the desire to provide services which are to grow businesses of 
traders.   
Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a: 43) state that MTC, was “initially supposed to have made enough profit to 
cover its costs but in fact largely subsidised by state funding and eventually by the CoJ through the 
transfer of operating funds”. Moreover, although, the fees required in the PSSTMM from traders are 
aimed at covering the cost of cleaners and security, companies which are for profit such as UGM or 
SAID are involve to the PSSTMM to make profit. In this aspect of the PSSTMM and the management 
of street trading by the City through the MTC I agree with the eThekwini experts. The eThekwini 
expects also advised that in a project such as this it is very important to have someone who will be 
actively involved on the ground driving the project, a person who is to have daily contact with issues 
on the ground whether they affect traders, management and who can link this knowledge with 
management. This is a person who is to be very dedicated to this initiative, as opposed to an 
employee that at times might restrict her/himself to only issues that he/she is required to do base 
on his/her contract with the service provider. These remarks might have been based on their 
experience where specific leadership/activists were dedicated in the success of the Durban street 
trading management approach and it demonstrated that they were not well informed about UGM 
ways of doing things especially in the RID.  
What was also concerning, which I thought was driving this advice was the absence of both SANTRA 
and CJP in the meeting held on the 13 August 2014 to discuss the PSSTMM. For someone who is a 
‘foreign’ to this management model their absence can give him/her a message that there is no 
sufficient commitment to this initiative. They warned that the success of the model can never be an 
absolute solution. The City can at any time demonstrate its power like in eThekwini where after a 
certain period of time of progressive management the City decided to adopt a restrictive approach 
to street trading.    
The eThekwini expert also talked about the role played by CUBES on street trading, in a meeting held 
12 August 2014, a day before that of the PSSTMM, separate from that which was held to discuss the 
PSSTMM.  Here they suggested that at CUBES we need to decide which side are we taking, between 
working with the City (this came after they became aware of the AFTRAX project) and with traders. It 
was noted by Sarah Charlton, CUBES director that, although, CUBES is very committed to supporting 
street traders we battle with issues of funding which at times force CUBES to work with the City and 
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this makes it impossible to separate between working with the City and traders. The eThekwini 
experts further suggests that if CUBES commits working with traders we need to ensure that in 
mediating the diversity of traders and trades organisations on the ground a right process is found 
and this includes finding a professional conflict resolution facilitator to assist.  Another point talked 
about by the eThekwini experts about the PSSTMM was the fact that, in spite of all these difficulties 
and challenges, we should continue as one only learns with experimenting and pilots are great ways 
of experimenting. They understood that in JHB the private management model is perhaps the only 
counter model that one can envisage for now (in the context of OCS), unless this context changes. 
They advised that this should be made very clear in the preamble of the project, and also to clarify 
what CUBES was seeing as the positives of the model (starting from an assessment of traders on the 
ground, pushing for the principle of accommodating all, setting up accountable precinct institutions) 
5.3.4. The role of UGM   
Urban Genesis Management (UGM) in this management model was introduced to CUBES and 
SANTRA by CJP as a possible service provider which was to provide an estimate on the financial cost 
of management based on their experience in particular in the RID in Johannesburg. The 
management of street trading by UGM according to Ryan Mathew (head of finance at UGM) in a 
meeting held on the 15 August 2014 happens not from a legislate point of view as street trading 
management is legislated to be managed by the City, however, the City was not offering efficient 
management with regards to street trading management. This was affecting their work on CIDs and 
this led to them also managing street trading. He noted that UGM is changing to adopt new ways of 
managing street trading and this include respecting traders with their knowledge on which spaces 
are good to trade and other challenges which are only best known by traders. This is to say they are 
beginning to involve traders in management; they have created platforms where they can meet with 
traders to inform them about new developments listen to their concerns in the RID precinct. 
Moreover, UGM also proposed that waste recycling should also be an option as a way of developing 
a financial model for the Park Station Management Model that could be cost effective.  
According to Ryan in a meeting held on the 15 August 2014, “in respecting the street traders 
expertise with regard to management of street trading they have made sure that they maintain 
strong relations with appointed block leaders”, and built strong lines of communication, that include 
inviting them to their events to participate and trade. They have even attempted to hire someone 
with knowledge on the challenges faced by street traders, Abdul Abed who have completed his 
master in urban design on design for integrated trading in Yeoville high street, and who have spent 
three months as trader (ibid). As noted elsewhere in the paper the desire developing from the 
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private sector to involve traders in management, which is happening in parallel to the deteriorate 
desire to tolerate traders by the City is one of the reasons traders are beginning to work with the 
private sector. Through these relations with the private sector, traders, specifically in the RID 
precinct are directly report to UGM about some of the problems they experience in the area. This 
shifts the traditional precedent where citizens were reporting to their politicians and hold them 
accountable, rather than report to people who they have not elected. Furthermore, this phenomena 
is a shift from depending to people they have elected for services to depending to people they have 
not, whose mandate is to run a business for profit. 
Table 5.2 and 5.3 below are taken from Bénit-Gbaffou (2014c) and they shows the figures which 
were given by UGM as a financial model used in the Retail Improvement District precinct. It is 
important to note that table 5.2 and 5.3 do not reflect the financial model to be used in the PSSTMM 
rather they are used to demonstrate how UGM estimates the total amount required to manage. 
Table 5.1 was developed by UGM as reflected in CJP (2014a) but during Hans Jooste’s tenure and the 
SANTRA, CJP and CUBES negotiations have come with a resolution that UGM must be asked to redo 
the financial model for PSSTM and to incorporate the waste recycling idea which they proposed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 (above) and table 5.3 (below table 5.2) taken from Bénit-Gbaffou (2014c) demonstrates 
how UGM estimates the cost of management and the first table, 5.2 illustrates the costs of 
management in the RID precinct while the second table illustrates the cost per 100 traders. Although 
table 5.3 unpack the cost given in table 5.2 based on the number of traders, Ryan, said in an 
For 716 traders in the RID (2011 figure) OR 22 blocks 
Table 5.3 
Table 5.2 
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interview with CUBES on the 15 August 2014 that the number of traders does not have an influence 
in the cost of management and costs are rather estimated by blocks instead of the number of 
traders. Furthermore, levels of costs and services are also adapted to the affordability level of the 
area (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014c). Another important point to consider about table 5.2 and 5.3 is that the 
cost of management provided excludes capital investment in roads, pavements, streets’ 
maintenance, as well as capital and operational expenditure for facilities and infrastructures for 
traders (ibid). But what is included is the overall street management expenditure which is not 
focused or limited to the extra cost caused by street traders’ presence but reflecting the cost of 
management as a whole (ibid).    
The proposed idea by UGM to use waste recycling as a way of making the model cost effective is an 
attempt to create a source of revenue out of the waste created in the area. This was proposed with 
hope that it will help in making the area of study clean but at the same time creating revenue 
through which the PSSTMM can be financed. In a site visit on the 27 August 2014 with UGM 
deployment and waste management experts (Bilal Patel and Greg Baptist respectively), it was 
mentioned that for waste recycling they are looking for waste that is recyclable which includes 
cardboards, plastic bags and bottles. With regards to waste collection it was observed most waste 
that is generated in the area is in form of organic waste, which is waste that comes from plants or 
animals that is capable of being decomposed by bacteria or other living organisms. This kind of 
waste was not of any significance to what they were looking for which was cardboards, plastic bags 
and bottles and the conclusion was that very limited funds can be raised from the recyclable waste 
that was present on that day. From what I observed early in this same day this type of waste was 
collected by people who looked like street adults driving trolleys. I would suggest, instead of only 
trying to creating funds, which is understandable for UGM as a business, traders should be 
concerned about developing innovative ways to make the model more cost effective. This includes 
asking traders to clean their place of trade with the benefit of getting a discount on fee that is 
expected from them.  
With regard to the deployment of urban cleaners and security ambassadors it became evident that 
UGM when it comes to this aspect give much value to service level agreements (SLA), an agreement 
stating what level of services the City/the private provider will each provide respectively, which is 
negotiated by CJP in all CIDs in Johannesburg according to CJP (2014). In a site visit taken with UGM 
on 27 August 2014 to the area of study the UGM deployment expert noted that the deployment 
cannot be done until the role of JMPD and Pikitup, a municipal entity responsible for waste 
management, in the management model is understood. For example, UGM wanted to know 
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whether UGM security ambassadors and urban cleaners were to work in cooperation with JMPD and 
Pikitup. If this is the case then they noted that there is a need to know the number of JMPD officers 
who will visit the area on a daily basis. Furthermore, they noted that there is also a need to 
understand the extent to which they will go with their work (these are their responsibilities so as to 
ensure that UGM security ambassadors do not duplicate work that has been done). This was a 
disappointment to us as it meant a SLA had to be done first before estimations were to be done and 
this resulted to misunderstandings as UGM thought it was a responsibility of CUBES to do this, as a 
result asking CUBES to provide this information.  
5.4. Concluding remarks  
This chapter has demonstrated the changing roles of different stakeholders in the model as 
negotiations progress, this includes a situation where initially CJP wanted the City to subcontract and 
pay CJP to manage the model. Then after the first round of negotiations it was traders not the City 
who were expected to pay, and the role of the City shifted to that which the City is expected to 
support by tolerating the PSSTMM and accepting that the PSSTMM will ‘legalise’ all existing traders, 
if it happens that a design plan allow this to happen. The latter principle is also a result of shifts that 
have happened over time, initially PSSTMM started with SANTRA legal members only. Furthermore, 
the composition of the precinct management committee has also shifted; where initially it started 
with only SANTRA from the side of traders but continued later to acknowledge that are also 
OVOAHA and perhaps that some traders on the ground belong to SAITF or are not registered. 
Consequently, this changed the very definition of stakeholders’, as the process goes, as knowledge is 
built. Another principle that has shifted is that of the amount of the fee required from traders as 
there were attempts to reduce the cost of management and this include the argument by CUBES to 
accommodate all existing traders as to reduce the fee required from each trader, waste recycling as 
an initiative by UGM to make the PSSTMM more cost effective, is another attempt.       
The principle renegotiation process of the PSSTMM has demonstrates very clear that all the 
stakeholders involved in the negotiations come from very different background with different 
interests. CUBES as a platform for academic learning, is concerned with issues of social justice as this 
is our commitment to society. This has made us side with the most vulnerable in society and in this 
case traders. The same applies to the eThekwini experts, who come from organisations concerned 
with protecting street traders. CJP, although it is not for Profit Company, it works with businesses 
which are concerned about making profit and in the literature review it has been highlighted that 
the initiatives by this group in the past did not show any sympathy to street trading. UGM is a 
business concerned with sustaining itself by making profit. In these negotiations compromises for 
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the sake of progress were required from each stakeholder.  It is imperative to note that in most 
forms of management or negotiations for them to progress  compromises are important and 
through these compromises, although people lose from their original positions but the gain of what 
could have been lost if other actors decided not to compromise I believe in the PSSTMM are above 
to what could have been lost.  
CUBES which is not really sympathetic to private management of street trading or to supporting CIDs 
and CJP as central broker between traders and the state compromised this position. But In this 
context where there was no alternative in sight, CJP being recognised as progressive by traders 
compared to the City; the growing restrictive stance of the City on pavement trading, this model was 
seen as an opportunity by CUBES to push some principles and exploring ideas. This include the idea 
of starting from the ground (accommodating all traders) and designing models of street trading 
management (design, structure) – rather than the reverse. Moreover, this model was seen by CUBES 
as an initiative to build a precinct based committee that is inclusive and perhaps even centred on 
street traders, and doing away with restrictive approach. As noted in the literature review CJP have 
in the past adopted a zero tolerance position towards street trading. In this position they have not 
only prevented street traders from participating in management of CIDs but also they have lobbied 
the City Council to extend street trading prohibition to the City Improvement Districts (Bénit-
Gbaffou 2014a). Moreover, Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) notes that the CJP have supported the City’s 
intentions of locating all street traders in markets (or later linear market) and prohibit other 
pavement for trading. 
In the PSSTMM negotiations, CJP was compromising on their position and Bénit-Gbaffou (2014a) 
note that its members might have possibly been divided on this issue. As noted elsewhere in this 
paper CJP saw this as an opportunity to respond to criticism around CIDs, of excluding traders in 
decision making process and allowing them to trade in CID territories. Furthermore, this for CJP is an 
attempt to obtain both academic and street trader’s legitimacy as traders, apart, from the RID are 
very critical of CJP’’s management approach. SANTRA in the PSSTMM is compromising to include CJP 
so as it will teach them to manage, something which they can use in the future without CJP. But also 
they want to respond to international and national criticism towards a trader led management 
model that usually lead to corruption and enrichment of leaders at the expanse of traders on the 
ground (ibid). In this pilot project these stakeholders have placed themselves in a possible 
uncomfortable position to embrace something which they do not support.  
The understanding of the stakes of different stakeholders and the principles of the PSSTMM with 
shifts to them allows this research to answer the research question but first I want  to remind the 
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reader about the key question that need to be considered to determine if the PSSTMM is 
progressive or not. This paper considers whether the PSSTMM supports street traders in their 
endeavours to make a living by accommodating or giving permission to majority, if not all, existing 
street traders to trade and giving support to traders in a form of services. Here we need to look at 
the proportion of existing traders that a management model has given permission to trade and, at 
principles that prevents traders an opportunity to trade. For example, the amount of the fee (if any) 
requested for trading, to tell  if a management is inclusive or not.  The PSSTMM has shifted from 
only accommodating SANTRA members to attempts to accommodate all existing traders, if it 
happens that a design plan allow this to happen. The PSSTMM also provide support in a form 
cleaning and security, this is good for their businesses as it means more potential customers will visit 
the area because of improved safety and cleanliness.  
However, despite that I feel it is necessary for traders to at most contribute financially or in any 
other form to services that support them in context where the City is not being responsive to this 
matter. I feel the contribution asked in the PSSTMM is too high and it might result to other traders 
being prevented to trade. Based on these perspectives it can be argued that the PSSTMM is 
progressive in providing support in the form of providing services talked about above, and in making 
it clear that its intention is to try and accommodate every trader. Moreover, it is progressive in 
allowing traders, amongst other stakeholders, to be part of the policy formulation process. In this 
process, involved stakeholders through compromises have developed a plan agreed to by all. But 
this is undermined by the fee asked from traders and I suggest that to further make the PSSTMM 
progressive, participants of the PSSTMM need to focus on improving this principle. I have suggested 
elsewhere in this paper that instead of only focussing on waste recycle in a form of cardboard, 
plastic bottles and increasing the number of traders to try to lower this fee traders need to be asked 
to clean their place of trade with the benefit of getting a discount on fee that is expected from them. 
This will lower the cost as there will be few money spent on hiring cleaners but at the sometime 
allowing traders who cannot afford to access trading spaces by dedicating themselves to cleaning. 
Furthermore, if traders are very eager about being part of management they should volunteer to 
participate in cleaning amongst others, to compliment the efforts of the City or of the private sector.  
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Chapter six: The role of a planner (CUBES) in intervening to facilitate the Park 
Station Street Trading Management Model principle renegotiation process 
6.1. Introduction  
One of the important themes that dominates in the planning literature about state organised 
participatory processes on public affairs is that there is a qualitative difference between “genuine, 
bottom-up public engagement that informs a planning process, and the mere façade of participation 
in the face of continued top-down decision-making” (Sokol 2012: 16). The engagement about the 
Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM) does not fall within the above range 
because the council has not started a process of genuine consultation with regard to this initiative. 
Consequently, the PSSTMM is understood to be an invented space of participation, an initiative 
taken by SANTRA and CJP that might (or might not) be taken into consideration by the City. The 
position of the PSSTMM is to try and contest (in polite and constructive ways) the way the Council 
has managed street trading so far. Thus this form of planning has been identified as an invented 
space of participation because it is challenging the status quo. In light of this, it is important to note 
that when people come together to negotiate, in whatever context, there will be varying interests 
presented and everyone will push for his/her interests to prevail. This could lead to increased levels 
of contestation and conflict, however, facilitation is necessary to ensure that everyone is heard and 
some needs are met through compromise. This chapter adopts the details discussed in this research 
on the role played by CUBES, as a planner that facilitated the negotiations between stakeholders 
involved in the PSSTMM principle construction process, to understand how this role fit to planning. 
This chapter start by unpacking the notion of invented spaces of participation, understanding how it 
is different to invited spaces of participation where non state actors are afforded space by the state 
to voice their needs. This is followed by a discussion that attempts to unpack how the PSSTMM 
renegotiation process relates to planning. One of the noticeable relations to planning in this process 
is collaboration that exists between SANTRA and CJP, which might be collaborative planning 
between these two groups, perhaps with also the CoJ in future. This planning approach, 
collaborative planning, is discussed in this chapter from its theoretical perspective, where its main 
tenets are used to evaluate the extent to which the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process can be 
said to be collaborative planning. My interest in this chapter are inspired by J.A. Throgmorton’s cases 
study “On the Virtues of Skillful Meandering” (2000) cited in  (Sokol 2012) who writes about a 
contradictory role he experienced while promoting communicative and advocacy planning. This case 
study is discussed in this chapter and I find it being similar to some of the actions by CUBES on the 
PSSTMM. In particular, the contradictory role which CUBES also faced in the PSSTMM principle 
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renegotiation process. Lastly this chapter will discuss and look at how CUBES has navigated this 
contradictory role.  
6.2. Unravelling the notion of invented spaces of participation 
Miraftab (2009) notes that there exist spaces which are claimed by disadvantaged/marginalised 
members of society from or against the power holders/authorities, or created more autonomously 
by them. She further states that these spaces are different from those which are created or made 
available to non-state actors to voice out their interests, “invited” spaces of participation. According 
to Miraftab (2004: 1), “invited” spaces of participation are spaces occupied by “grassroots and their 
allied non-governmental organizations that are legitimised by donors and government 
interventions”. Miraftab (2009) believes that the ineffectiveness or lack of positive outcomes in 
invited spaces to those that participate is a consequence or a result in participants creating 
“invented” spaces of participation as a response. Miraftab (2004: 1) defines invented spaces of 
participation as being participatory spaces that are “occupied by the grassroots and claimed by their 
collective action which directly confront the authorities and the status quo” as opposed to invited 
spaces. Gaventa (2006) says invented spaces range from those which are created by members of 
society who meet to debate, discuss and resist the status quo outside the institutionalised policy 
arenas, to spaces created by social movements and community associations.   
Miraftab (2004) argue that the two spaces of participation discussed above are not “mutually 
exclusive” because at times grassroots in advancing their course move between the two spaces 
trying to take advantage of different aspects presented in both spaces. Miraftab (2004: 3) further 
note that in most cases such practices “follow no blueprint, but are situated in their specific 
contexts” as grassroots make use of what is appropriate and effective for them in a specific time and 
place. For example, grassroots might use ‘formal’ cooperative space such as attending consultation 
meetings organised by authorities where they feel they will obtain a positive response to their 
demands. Where they feel their demands can be meet through the use of ‘informal’ 
oppositional/antagonistic forms such as rallies, demonstrations they use them. Consequently, 
invented spaces of participation according to Miraftab (2004) cannot necessarily be distinguished 
from invited based on their affiliation with fixed groups as grassroots may move across or occupy 
both kinds of spaces. However, disobedience to institutionalised procedures of the state by 
grassroots actions experienced on invented spaces of participation which directly challenges the 
status quo is what distinguishes this space from invited space of participation.  
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6.3. Park Station Street Trading Management Model (PSSTMM) principle 
renegotiation process as collaborative planning    
Healy (1996) argues that the discourse in the planning literature on alternative models of public 
participation/engagement reflects the “communicative turn” in planning theory towards a 
collaborative consensus building approach. The essence of this change in direction is understood as 
a reorientation towards an interactive planning process where societies, citizens assemble to 
engage, before coming up with a collective consensus on their affairs, as opposed to competitive 
interest bargaining (Healey 2003 in Sokol 2012). Harris in Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2002: 24) 
notes that, although, advocates of collaborative planning, “have not presented it as a theory rather 
as a form of practice, this approach is a product of the complex interweaving together of two distinct 
bodies of theoretical work”. This is communicative approach to planning theory and institutionalist 
sociology and regional economic geography (ibid). However, it is “communicative planning theory 
that provides the essential foundations and underlying principles to collaborative planning in the 
sense of devising preferred styles and approaches to planning” (bid: 24).  
The main theoretical resource behind communicative planning theory is the theory of 
communicative action, presented by Jürgen Habermas in his 1984 publication, The Theory of 
Communicative Action. Huxley (2000) writes that Habermas in his publication connects 
communicative action to the lifeworld. This is “the world of everyday life outside the system, the 
formal economy, and the state-and free from the media of money and politics” (Huxley 2000: 370). 
In contrast, Habermas identifies the other space of engagement separated from the lifeworld, as 
comprising of business interests, power, media, and the state where decisions are taken on bases of 
technical and purposive calculations (ibid). The position of planners in his theory is understood to be 
limited as a “state-organised” activity which supports the status quo and forces of capital and thus 
whose penetration into the lifeworld is seen as an invasion (Mkhize 2012).  
Ideally then, for Habermas, communicative rationality is when all those who are concerned take part 
freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth where nothing coerces anyone except the force 
of better argument (ibid). He further suggests that the search for the truth and better argument will 
lead to the rational decision being made (ibid). This is one of the main focuses of communicative 
theory, an attempt to ensure that the process of reaching consensus and a rational decision is fair, 
by making sure that it is not influenced by things existing outside the ‘lifeworld’. This includes power, 
which can prevent an opportunity for people to participate equally. Some of these elements are 
noticeable in the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process, for example, that which advocates for 
inclusiveness of all those who are concerned. The process, although it was between SANTRA and 
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CJP, there was consensus that going forward other street traders organisation who are also affected 
and the CoJ should be brought to this development.   
Although, this theory (communicative action) has played a significant role in the development of 
communicative planning theory, it has received criticism in planning and some of the arguments 
debunking this theory are presented below. Communicative planning has been criticised for failing 
to address issues of power in spaces of citizenry participation (Huxley 2000, Innes and Booher 2002). 
Another critic directed to Habermas’s theory of communicative action, is its denial and suppression 
of difference in favour of unity” (Harris in Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002). Figure 6.1 below 
illustrates the key dimensions to communicative planning theory. It is important to note that 
communicative planning theory in practice manifest itself in different forms and collaborative 
planning is one of those, however, the key dimensions provided in figure 6.1 represent those 
elements which are common to all practices which manifest as a result of communicative planning 
(ibid).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 (above) original coined by Healy 1997, taken from Harris in Allmendinger and Tewdwr-
Jones (2002: 26) illustrates key dimensions to communicative planning theory.  
Innes and Booher (2004) made observations which were also made during the PSSTMM principle 
renegotiation process. They note that one of the key underpinnings of the collaborative process of 
planning, which derives from communicative planning, is that it empowers participants through 
mutual learning. The PSSTMM principle renegotiation process has given different stakeholders an 
opportunity to learn from each other. One example to this is that participants in the PSSTMM 
principle renegotiation process had an opportunity to learn about some of the management models 
 “Recognition of the social construction of knowledge and the exercise of both practical 
reason and scientific knowledge”. 
 “Internal within social contexts acknowledged as of importance”. 
 “Identification of diverse interests and the subordination of interests through relations of 
power”. 
 “The concept of stakeholding, spreading ownership and the range of knowledge and 
reasoning”. 
 “A shift from competitive interest bargaining to collaborative consensus building”. 
 “Recognition of planning activity as being embedded in day-to-day relations; the linking 
of practice and context”. 
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used elsewhere in the world as CUBES provided this information, including inviting the Durban 
experts to share their experience on street trading management. In return, CUBES and other 
participants were presented with an opportunity to learn about the contextual intelligence that only 
street traders knew about. This includes their ability to identify areas which are profitable for street 
trading. The area of study was identified as one of the most profitable areas in Johannesburg for 
SANTRA members; this area is identified by SANTRA as an area that host traders who might be 
capable to pay for their own management.   
Corburn (2003) cited in Sokol (2012) argues that the concept of mutual learning or two-way 
education amounts to co-production of community knowledge. This tenet forms part of the 
underpinning principles of collaborative planning derived from communicative planning. Corburn 
(2003) in Sokol (2012) suggests that the co-production model of community knowledge is a result of 
combining expertise of professional practitioners with the contextual intelligence that only local 
residents possess. The professional practitioners on management in the PSSTMM principle 
construction process have been identified as CJP with street traders being identified as possessing 
contextual intelligence. In Johannesburg, the coming together of private sector business coalition, 
academic platform CUBES, and a street trader organisation to attempt developing a solution in a 
consensus manner is something rare, which generates knowledge at least for planning.  
This knowledge can be characterised as a mixture of expert understanding of management and local 
knowledge or understanding of the local context through which traders work in. Furthermore, this 
knowledge can also be understood as being shaped by different interests, world view and practical 
compromises. CJP focused its research into the North American experience of curbing Inner city 
decay as noted in the literature review and the entire CID package was imported to Johannesburg 
with less consideration of contextual knowledge especially of street traders as they were prevented 
a voice in decision making. The combination of the CJP management approach which in this research 
is labelled as ‘expertise of professional practitioners’ with street traders contextual intelligence is a 
generation of new knowledge in the context of private sector led urban management.    
Healey (1997) identifies the concept of stake-holding as one of the important concepts in the model 
of collaborative planning which is also identified in figure 6.1 as forming one of the key dimensions 
to communicative planning. Harris in Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (2002) explains that this 
concept is interpreted in the work of Healey (1997) as simply referring to all those who have a 
stake/interest in a particular place. Moreover, the nature of these stakes/interests is acknowledged 
by Healey (1997) as being diverse and because of diversity these interests conflict with each other at 
times. This requires stakeholders to compromise to reach a consensus for the sake of progress. It is 
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important to note that the concept of diversity in collaborative planning does not extend to an 
extent of ‘radically’ giving  ‘voice’ to poor and marginalised groups as advocated by Sandercock, 
(1995), rather, it is more concerned about giving the ‘voice’ to diverse groups. The tenet of diverse 
stakeholders in collaborative planning is also evident in the PSSTMM principle construction process 
where all stakeholder involved had a stake/interest different from the other. However, through 
compromises, the following discussion briefly demonstrates how a consensus was reached in one of 
the principles discussed in the PSSTMM renegotiation process.  
In the negotiations between SANTRA, CJP and CUBES, CJP believed that the area of study is not 
properly managed and this contributes in creating some of the urban management issues 
experienced in the RID precinct an area which they manage. Their interests in the PSSTMM principle 
renegotiation process included getting the area of study under adequate management and 
decreasing the number of traders that are currently trading in the area.  As noted in CUBES (2014) 
CJP has been calling for the study area to be regulated because of its proximity to the RID territory 
shown in Map 1.1 and affecting it. In a meeting held on the 26 May 2014 CJP expressed its 
concerned about the negative urban environment impact accommodating all traders will have in the 
precinct. On the other side CUBES was concerned about protecting all traders, with SANTRA being 
divided between protecting their members and all traders (this is discussed in chapter five in detail). 
CUBES, which its role and interest is discussed further in the section that follows, proposed that an 
urban designer should be asked to investigate the number of traders that can be accommodated in 
the area without infringing the rights of other users to use the street and this resulted in 
compromises being made to reach a consensus allowing such study to occur before the number to 
be accommodated is decided.    
The institutionalist and regional dimensions identified above are regarded by Harris as an analytic 
complement to the normative framework provided by communicative planning theory, and they 
draw heavily on Giddens’ theory of structuration (Healey 1997).  Giddens's theory of structuration 
argues that social life is more than random individual acts; moreover, it is not merely determined by 
social forces (ibid). Instead, according to Giddens, human agency and social structure are in a 
relationship with each other, and it is the repetition of these acts, which are influenced by social 
structures, which reproduces social structures (ibid). Healey (1998) cited in Harris note that one of 
the significant concepts of institutionalist and regional dimensions to collaborative planning is that 
of “place”, which is understood as a social construct (Harris in Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 
2002). This means places are no longer simply assumed to have the same meaning of just being a 
physical space; as a result places have become subjected to competing definitions between different 
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groups (ibid). In addition, Healey (1998) notes that places are becoming the product of competing 
and collaborating groupings in space, and “may sustain multiple meanings and references 
contemporaneously” (ibid: 34). 
The PSSTMM principle renegotiation process also demonstrates the above observation and 
argument about the concept of place. In this process the varying definitions coming from different 
participants of what should the area of study look like were very obvious. One example amongst 
many was that of defining the number of street traders which should be accommodated as different 
participants had different ideas and justification on how the place should look like with regards to 
accommodating street traders. CJP was very concerned about the negative impact 411 street traders 
will have on the environment and advocating that only half of this number should be 
accommodated. Whereas CUBES argued that if everything can be done in a correct way 411 traders 
can be accommodated in the area. SANTRA’s leadership was divided between accommodating all 
traders and only accommodating half of them.     
6.4. The contradictory role of a planner: the communicative and advocate planner   
Forester (1999) cited in Sokol (2012) adopts the process-oriented focus of communicative theory, as 
also adopted by Healey (1997) on collaborative planning, by arguing that planners are “deliberative 
practitioners”. Forester meant that, planners as deliberative practitioners, their work revolves 
around attempts taken collaboratively to investigate how participants can live together (ibid). 
Furthermore, Forester (1999) cited in Sokol (2012) argues that the primary goal of a deliberative 
practitioner should be about  ensuring that the ideals attached to communicative planning theory 
becomes a pragmatic reality rather than an empty promise. Communicative planning theory is 
criticised by Beauregard (1984) cited in Sokol (2012: 18) for focusing too much on the process of 
engaging and “the corresponding understatement of substance and outcome”. For example, 
Beauregard notes that communicative planning theory is “devoid of any substantive consideration of 
the actual consequences that planners produce through their work” (ibid). Moreover, similar 
comments are made by Fainstein (2000) in Sokol (2012: 19) who writes that communicative planning 
is “a procedural ethic without substantive content”. Healey (2003) cited in (Sokol 2012: 18) response 
to this criticism by arguing that substance and process should not be seen as separated, as criticism 
assume the latter, rather, “substance and process are co-constituted”.  
A cases study by J.A. Throgmorton “On the Virtues of Skillful Meandering” (2000) where he talks 
about his experience while serving his first term on the Iowa City Council, United States of America 
demonstrates the integration of process and substance (Sokol 2012). Throgmorton, a planning 
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professor and local politician in Iowa shares both procedural and substantive lessons he learned 
from 1993 to 1995 where he had to advocate for compact, mixed-use development in the suburb of 
Long Island through a communicative planning approach. In his article, Throgmoton blends new 
urbanism and communicative planning theories, as he “combines a discussion of his goals to 
promote compact, mixed-use development, with recognition of contestable meanings of key 
concepts, such as residential density, among members of the public” (Sokol 2012: 19). Throgmorton 
talks about the difficulties he experienced in trying to convince the public that “there is a qualitative 
difference between simply “packing more dwelling units together” and promoting the new urbanist 
vision of pedestrian-friendly neighbourhoods. The difficulties from the public were driven by the 
NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard) attitude amongst the people of Long Island who wanted to 
preserve the status quo by rejecting this development. This attitude in the case of Long Island was 
driven by scepticism based on knowledge obtained from past experiences, where some people in 
the suburb were displaced in their previous homes because of urban renewal. The process of 
communication, transparency over the compact, mixed-use development became important for 
both officials and citizens in minimise negatives as it managed to alter some of the pre-conceptions 
and fears.  
Sokol (2012) argue that this case study demonstrates a conflict between the desire to advocate for 
mixed - compact development, and communicative theories regarding the appropriate role to be 
played by professional planners. Forester (1999) cited in Sokol (2012: 19) explains that  the role of a 
communicative planer is to “act as both a negotiator seeking to maintain a fair process and 
mediators managing the conflictual planning or design process itself…interestedness of a negotiating 
role threatens the independence and presumed neutrality of a mediating role”.  Here, Forester 
suggests that instead of planners setting the terms of debate or monitoring a course of action, 
planners now should be comfortable as facilitators to a process that promotes inclusiveness with 
regard to those who are concern to take part freely and equally (ibid). Planners should be “mere 
absorbers of public opinion, waiting for consensus to build” [Sokol 2012: 20). Forester (1999) cited in 
Sokol (2012: 20) note that, from this approach, communicative “mediator-facilitators” are “allegedly, 
at least in theory, have no interests of their own, no commitments to anything but the processes” of 
finding rational decisions though collective engagement as opposed to decisions taken on bases of 
technical and purposive calculations (ibid 20).  
The role of the new urbanist planner in the case of Long Island, however, invokes the thoughts of 
Paul Davidoff, who argues that an, “appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a 
position of value neutrality, for prescriptions are based on desired objectives” (Sokol 2012: 20). 
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Davidoff (1965) argues that a planner is not solely a “value-neutral” technician; but instead, the 
planner’s values are part of every planning process. He further notes that the role of an advocate 
planner is to be a representative for the marginalised groups and to advocate on their behalf. 
Moreover, Davidoff (1965) suggests that advocate planners are providers of information and 
analysts of current trends that are taking place to better inform the groups they represent. This is to 
say advocate planners are simulators of future conditions and they are responsible for expressing 
the interests of their ‘clients’. Most often, Davidoff (1965) argues that advocate planners should 
attempt to merge their values with that of their clients (marginalised groups).  
This conflict (neutral/impartial mediator/facilitator and advocating for certain interests) between the 
two theories when applied simultaneously exposes a planning process that attempts to build 
consensus to possible acts that undermines the consensus building process. For example, planners 
might use their positions as facilitators to ‘strategically’ supress interests of other stakeholders over 
those that they advocate for. The following section seeks to understand how CUBES have navigated 
this conflict. It is important to note that it might be possible that CUBES’s action in the PSSTMM 
principle renegotiation process have taken other forms of planning approaches but in this chapter I 
am interested in the two discussed above. CUBES was a communicative planners as our role was to 
mediate/facilitate the collaboration between SANTRA and CJP to maintain a fair process where 
participants equally treat each other. On the other hand CUBES also feed in information in a form of 
conducting research (including that of provide the number of traders on the ground) to be used in 
the negotiations. Furthermore, CUBES was more than a neutral mediator/impartial as we 
demonstrated our interests in the negotiations which one of them is discussed in detail in the 
section below.       
6.5. The collaborative-advocate planner in the Park Station Street Trading Management 
Model (PSSTMM)  
The role played by CUBES in the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process was to facilitate-mediate 
between different interests to ensure that consensus is achieved, however, as highlighted in chapter 
five CUBES was more than a neutral mediator/facilitator in this processes. CUBES was also 
advocating for certain interests, discussed in chapter five, as with the other groups that were involve 
in the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process. Furthermore, it should be noted that CUBES’s stakes 
which were advocated in the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process go beyond the area of study. 
They exist to test principles of action and demonstrate to the City and to also CJP that this bottom 
up approach, negotiating plans based on what is happening on the ground, could work (including 
design-wise). The interest held by CUBES, amongst many interest discussed in chapter five, was to 
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see all street traders who are currently trading in the area of study being accommodated. It has 
been noted in chapter five that this interest by CUBES exists because of our commitment to issues of 
social justice. Here, social justice is understood as being the protection of equal access to 
opportunities, as well as siding or defending the least advantaged members of society, particularly 
the urban poor who at most times receive a weaker ‘voice’ in society.  
This interest held by CUBES is also evident in many of the engagement platforms where CUBES was 
given a privilege to express its interest on street trading management/issues in Johannesburg. This 
includes the invitation by the CoJ, amongst many other stakeholders (informal traders, corporate 
business/formal traders, residents, public transport operators, courts and security cluster, NGOs and 
academics) to participate on consultation about the “Inner city promulgation and designation of 
trading areas”. Here, CUBES (2014) in a submission to the CoJ, made it clear that the restrictive 
approach taken by the CoJ towards the number of traders it accommodate will cost the City more,  
opposed to developing innovative ways of managing all traders.  
Another platform where the above interest was expressed by CUBES is in a workshop held on the 25 
September 2014. This workshop forms a series of workshops organised by CUBES as a way of 
providing research support to street traders’ organisations as asked by SANTRA, but with all other 
street traders being invited to discuss various issues affecting the sector. In this workshop on the 25 
September 2014, SANTRA mentioned that they want to take the CoJ to court because of harassment 
and eviction done by City officials. SANTRA argued that these actions are contradicting the ruling of 
the Constitutional court which asked the City to allow traders to trade while the City was still 
developing a management plan based on the Business Act of 1991. CUBES advised that SANTRA 
should not rush into taking the CoJ to court because such legal actions against the City might be 
helpful in protecting traders which are registered to trade in the City but these actions are not 
helpful to those who are not registered. However, CUBES noted that such a legal action against the 
City can be used to threaten the City as a way of forcing them into entering to negotiations that 
might result into every street trader being accommodated. This advice clearly shows the interest by 
CUBES of accommodating all street traders in Johannesburg. 
The interest of accommodating all current traders in Johannesburg by CUBES also became evident 
when CUBES was expressing its concern about the amount of payment required from traders during 
the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process. Especially the initial amount as it was argued that this 
amount will push traders out of business. As an advocate, CUBES pushed for the above argument to 
be negotiated, putting forward an argument suggesting that by accommodating all traders the 
financial burden to traders will decrease, as the total required money to sustain the model will be 
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shared by many people resulting in a decrease of a fee to be required from individual traders. CUBES 
also advised that the precinct management committee/management board should not only be made 
up by SANTRA from the side of traders rather other organisations who might have members in the 
area of study should also be involved. This further demonstrates the interest of inclusiveness by 
CUBES. The ‘dual’ role by CUBES begs the questions, how did CUBES managed to balance advocacy 
interests with their mandate to facilitate impartial a collaborative planning process?  
Firstly I want to argue that if parochial interests are put ahead of broader public interests there are 
limited chances that social justice is to be achieved. The support for the broader public interest by 
CUBES that aims at protecting every street trader to be accommodated in the PSSTMM is viewed as 
a commitment to issues of social justice. It has been suggested in this research that the move as 
noted in CJP (2014a) to accommodate only SANTRA members which are licenced traders in the area 
of study which is supported by these traders according to Norman Maluleka (interviewed on 
03/04/2014) could be driven by motives of protecting parochial interests. The licenced traders 
according to Makhetha (2010) are losing the competition of attracting customers to unlicensed 
traders. In such cases where the general debate is dominated by parochial local interests it is 
important for the planner to advocate principles that are based on social justice to ensure ‘good’ 
planning. However, the dangers of this is that the planner can be immersed in the negotiations to an 
extent where he/she might end up using his/her position of facilitating to further his/her interest 
and forget that the collaborative process is about compromises. CUBES, although advocating for 
certain interests, managed to allow the process to build a consensus as with the principle discussed 
above where it was agree that the number of traders to be accommodated need to be determined 
after an urban designer has investigated how many traders in the area of study can be 
accommodated without infringing on other street users right to use the street. CUBES navigated the 
contradictory role by understanding different contexts - in cases where narrow/unjust interests were 
prevailing CUBES intervene to protect the idea of social justice – once this is achieve CUBES took a 
step back to be impartial.  
6.6. Concluding remarks  
The planning approach adopted in the PSSTMM principle renegotiation process espouses some 
tenets of collaborative planning approach; as a result, it has been argued that the renegotiation 
process can be understood as collaborative planning. In addition, the case of PSSTMM has been used 
as a laboratory to investigate the role of a planner in collaborative planning. This chapter has talked 
about the tension between communicative planning’s idea that position the planner as a neutral 
mediator and advocate planner that have certain interest in a planning process. I want to argue that 
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it is possible to reconcile this tension in practice. This is to say, although, these two planning theories 
seemingly offer competing views of the appropriate role for professional planners, in practice, 
facilitation or mediating and advocacy are not mutually exclusive. These two theories if used for the 
purpose of social justice to achieve public interest they can yield to pleasing consensus agreements.  
However, this chapter has also talked about the dangers of facilitating-mediating and advocating at 
the same time, where in cases if this is not done correct it can impact the progress of building a 
consensus amongst stakeholders. Planners as facilitators can be tempted to use their position to 
cheat the process which requires compromises and advance their interests. In addition, the interests 
held by different planners will not always be about deliberately or undeliberate advocating for social 
justice or public interest; at times planners can see themselves advocating narrow interests because 
of various reasons. This requires a strong system that would install and enforces ethical behaviour 
amongst planners, planners that are to serve with integrity.   
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Interview guideline 
These questions serve as a guideline that extends to my research sub questions and they attempt to 
guide a conversation between the interviewer and interviewee with the aim of answering my 
research question. The aim here is to ask a question labelled 1-5 below. The answer to be provided 
by the respondents will be shaped to answer the sub questions of the questions below. This is to say 
I will only interfere to the respondents answer only in cases where her or his answer diverts from 
these questions.  
1) Can you please talk with me about the stakeholders involved in the ‘model’ how they have 
come together including how often they meet? 
a. Who,  
b. The type of relationship (personal, professional)  
c. Meetings 
d. Role of each 
e. Issues 
2) What is the model regulating or entailing? 
a. Cleanliness 
b. Security 
c. Traders issues (conflict / relationship with city) 
d. The provision of Infrastructure and what kind? 
e. Training? 
3) Financing the model- How is the model going to financially sustain itself? 
a. Costs of regulation/ service provision expected 
b. Who is expected to contribute 
c. Traders fees – how is it determined? Affordable? Sufficient? Flat rate? 
4) Can you kindly talk about the structure of accountability  
a. Who report to whom for what purpose 
b. How and what happens if people do not ‘comply’? 
c. The place of traders in the model – elections? 
d. Allocation of trading spaces- how does it work 
e. Sanctions if non payment 
5) What are processes in place for implementing the model and what are challenges affecting 
these processes?  
a. The way forward and targets which are aimed to be achieved in what time?  
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b. The challenges that have been faced with and the projected challenge? 
c. How do you convince traders? 
d. City's openness to this 
Parktown Street Trading Management Pilot 
Draft 20 June 2014 
 
This pilot is proposed by Central Johannesburg and SANTRA, in alliance with the City of 
Johannesburg. It is a development of the proposal sent by CJP to CoJ (CJP 2014), further refined by 
discussions between CJP and SANTRA representatives, facilitated by CUBES (Bénit-Gbaffou 2014). 
Why Park Station? 
The choice of Park Station as a pilot area for street trading management makes sense for both 
leading organizations, CJP and SANTRA. CJP has been trying for some time to have Hoek street 
traders managed, in the vicinity of the well managed RID (CJP 2006). A number of SANTRA members 
trade around the station – and it therefore seemed a good space to try and implement the model for 
the trader organisation.  
Furthermore, the City is involved in a major redevelopment of Park station since the mid 2000s (JDA 
2006). The 2010 City Traffic and Transportation Study (JDA 2010: 16) has been calling for the 
establishment of a CID or management precinct around Park Station to manage public space and the 
diverse and intense flows of pedestrians and goods. Current design plans for Park Stations however 
show limited interest and attention to the issue of street trading (Ikemeleng 2011) 
Both CJP and SANTRA stated that if the management model could work in an area as busy and 
‘chaotic’ as Park Station, there would be scope for expanding the model in less congested areas. This 
argument makes sense in attempting to manage a busy and congested area – where traders 
congregate (in what Indian legislation would call a ‘natural market’), should be allowed to trade 
conditional to an extra management effort to be provided. 
The pilot model covers three streets surrounding Park Station: Wanderers, Noord and Hoek. It 
currently comprises about 410 street traders, 221 of which are legal traders (Lande 2104). 
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Source: Lande 2014. 
 
© Benit-Gbaffou 2014. A View from Hoek Street. Lack 
of municipal maintenance of pavements in this dense 
thoroughfare seems a bigger impediment to a good 
street life and easy pedestrian flow, than the presence 
of street traders. 
The management model 
The proposed model relies on similar principles to the RID model (Benit-Gbaffou 2014): 
 A precinct management board or committee (in the RID, this is CJP/ RID property owners 
board) frames the model and monitors its implementation in the precinct. 
 It raises a monthly levy from private users (in the RID, property owners), that funds extra 
street management capacity – mainly cleaning and security personnel, and a precinct 
coordinator. 
 This fund is used to hire a service provider (in the RID case, Urban Genesis), that manages 
these extra services on a daily basis, and coordinate these with municipal services (Pikitup 
and JMPD in particular). Its grounded administration capacity guarantees a quick and flexible 
response to issues arising from everyday activities, as well as the capacity to alert relevant 
city departments in case of longer standing, structural or capital investment-related issues. 
 The precinct management board or committee receives reports from the service provider; 
works as a link with City officials at a more strategic level (or in case the service provider is 
unable to get a response from the City); and works towards the institutionalization of the 
model with relevant city departments (such as through the Joint Venture between CJP and 
MTC, 2005-2007 in the RID). 
 Traders are secure in their trading sites (a variety of which is provided to accommodate 
different types of trades and traders). They are eyes on the street (avoiding for instance the 
coming of additional street traders) and report issues to the service provider, with which 
they meet regularly. Both security agents and the service provider are a first call to solve 
traders conflicts or issues – if not solved JMPD will be called. 
 
© Bénit-Gbaffou 2104. Lack of designated 
trading sites renders public space difficult to 
navigate – perhaps more than the sheer 
number of traders. 
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 Newcomers wishing to trade in the area need to apply to a database of traders, 
administered by the service provider. Allocation of trading spaces (in case a trader ceases to 
use his/her trading site) is supervised by the precinct management committee on a regular 
basis. 
The main difference between Park Station pilot and the RID street trading management model, is 
that the Park station pilot operates outside of a CID – therefore, without the levy raised on property 
owners. This has financial implications: the cost of the extra services is to be borne by traders 
through a regular fee. It has also political implications. The traders might be able to be more 
implicated in the management of their own space. 
Financial sustainability of the model 
One quote from Urban Genesis (2014) unfolds as follows: 
Security Personnel Work days Number of 
people 
Monthly cost Cost per year 
Control room 
operator (supervisor)  
Monday-Sunday 1 R9, 850.00 R118, 200.00 
Security ambassadors Monday-Sunday 6 R9, 550.00 R687.600.00 
Total   7 R67, 150.00 R805, 800.00 
Cleaning Personnel Work days Number of 
people 
Monthly cost Cost per year 
Urban cleaners Monday- Sunday  5 R4, 000.00 R240, 000.00 
Cleaning Truck and 
crewmen  
Monday- Sunday 1 R3, 750.00 R45, 000.00 
Total  6 R23, 750.00 R285,000.00 
Equipment   R8, 472.83 R101674.00 
FINAL total   R 99, 372.83 R1, 192,473.96 
Source: CJP 2014 
This quote does not include a precinct coordinator; nor does it include the service provider’s fee; nor 
does it include a possible levy to be paid to the City (for the use of public space / to help fund the 
extra cost of waste removal for instance). Perhaps this levy to the City could be suspended in the 
first year of implementation of the model, and could be incorporated gradually. 
But this quote also had not explored ways of reducing the costs of cleaning, for instance by offering 
traders the possibility of participating in the cleaning of their area, in exchange for instance for a 
reduced trading fee – which might lower the overall cost. An alternative quote from another service 
provider (SAID) is to be seeked. 
The pilot may only be sustainable if 
- Traders are asked for an affordable fee. If the fee requested is too high, the likelihood of default 
increases. If the fee is too low compared to the level of business around Park station, it still can be 
increased to provide for a higher level of services or other types of services (storage space, ablution 
facilities, crèche, other social services). 
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- There is proper enforcement of the precinct rule – traders not paying the fee on a regular basis will 
lose their trading space. The existence of a grounded administrative personnel (who can follow up 
on payment levels), as well as traders mutual surveillance, can in our view make enforcement 
implementable. What is needed though is a set of very clear and simple rules, ways of curbing risks 
of corruption21, and official backing from the City22. 
The case for trying to accommodate all existing street traders 
Currently it seems only half of the street traders have a legal right to trade. Allocation of smart cards 
has been suspended, in the context of Operation Clean Sweep and the new resolution passed by 
Council (CoJ 2014).  
►The pilot model intends, provided the City agrees to this experiment, to try and accommodate 
(legalise) all existing traders23, for the following reasons: 
- the model can only work if there is traders buy-in. Whilst some traders certainly would welcome a 
limitation of the number of traders (seen as competition), starting the process of interaction with 
traders on the basis that almost half of them would be removed is not a very positive beginning. 
Starting with an all inclusive approach (provided respect for other street uses is guaranteed) seems a 
better idea. 
- the model is financially sustainable if it relies on affordable fees for traders. A monthly cost of 
R100.000 for the management of the 3 streets requires traders to pay R500 per month if the streets 
only accommodate 200 traders. If the 400 street traders are accommodated, the individual fee per 
traders is at R250 per month (more affordable, even if still significantly higher than the average fee 
claimed by MTC, R120). 
- the pilot model also wants to test what spatial arrangements, urban designs and local negotiation 
can lead to, if one attempts at adopting an all inclusive approach. The condition for this inclusive 
attempt is not to jeopardize pedestrian flows and other competing uses of the street. A team of 
urban designers (related to CUBES) is committed to look for design solutions to try and 
accommodate all street traders in the managed precinct. 
► In a similar way as the RID, the Park Station pilot needs to accommodate the traders in their 
diversity (with different levels of capital and entrepreneurship). One can elaborate a number of 
different types of trading sites, with different amenities, different sizes, different locations – with 
differences in the trading fee, to be debated locally (what are the best locations; the adapted sizes 
and types of stalls). 
                                                          
21
 For instance, cash circulation might be avoided through traders’ fees being paid directly into a bank account 
on a weekly basis; service provider administrator to monitor payment on a weekly basis. 
22
 Traders’ payment of fees has been erratic in the RID. It has been explained by two factors. CJP argues that 
the lack of official recognition from the City (with the non-renewal of the Joint Venture in 2007) led to 
fuzziness in the rules, where CJP was no longer officially endorsed with the right to collect traders’ fees. 
SANTRA argues that an additional factor has been the financial sustainability of the RID without traders’ fees – 
as it relied on property owners levy. Hence the limited incentive to track payment and carry out traders fees 
collection. 
23
 Except those selling counterfeit or illegal goods – an issue that should be dealt with by SAPS. 
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For instance, traders with a bigger trading site will pay and afford a higher fee. One could imagine a 
minimum fee of R10/day per square meter (R50 a week, R200 a month) in the less congested areas.  
The model intends to include shop and property owners. Shop owners might for instance hire a 
street stall at higher price – but cannot take precedence over existing traders. Or they could be 
asked for a voluntary contribution to managed street trading – when levels of trusts have been 
estabslihed and visible efficiency has been demonstrated. 
Governance of the Park Station Precinct Management Committee 
The composition of the precinct management committee, driving the conception and 
implementation of the street management pilot around Park Station, needs to be carefully thought 
through. It is not yet entirely resolved, and requires further discussions, advice, and understanding 
of the political, organizational dynamics of the three streets in the precinct. 
The participation of CJP and SANTRA in the committee is essential – as co-piloting the project 
together. The presence of CJP serves both a watchdog (against traders organization corruption or 
hegemony), as a mentor (training traders organizations in corporate governance principles), and as a 
lobby support –due to its long standing relationship with / knowledge of local government). SANTRA 
is equally essential as the driver of the pilot. 
A proper survey of traders and their organizational affiliation needs to be carried, once engagement 
with traders has started. Although SANTRA is clearly dominant, there is evidence of the presence of 
members of One Voice, and perhaps of SAITF. It is also possible many traders are not affiliated to 
any organizations.  
It is not clear if there is a shop keeper organization, or major property owners interested in the pilot. 
If there are such organizations, they probably should be asked for a financial contribution to the 
pilot, as they also would benefit from managed streets. 
The committee will need to accommodate both statutory representatives (of CJP, SANTRA but also 
perhaps other organizations and local stakeholders), and elected traders representatives (street of 
block leaders to be elected).  
This committee would meet regularly (once a month), with reports from the service provider, to 
monitor and manage the pilot project. It should also regularly provide feedback to the community of 
traders working in the precinct (once a quarter or a trimester?). 
What support is needed from the City 
- An acceptance that all existing street traders are allowed to trade in the precinct, once a design 
plan has been developed and trading sites are demarcated. This means no harassment of street 
traders in the precinct by JMPD – unless called by the precinct management committee in case of an 
unsolvable issue. 
- A formal endorsement of the pilot project by the City. This can take the form of a memorandum of 
understanding, giving the precinct committee some delegated powers (or formalizing a partnership 
for the precinct committee to participate in specific municipal prerogatives): raising traders fee (en 
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lieu of MTC fee?); demarcating trading stalls (along a process of professional design and local 
negotiations); coordinating service provision with the relevant MoEs. 
- Financial initial support in the form of suspending the fees traders are to pay to MTC for trading 
spaces, as traders will be paying the fee to the precinct committee. In the medium term, and along 
international experience, a proportion of the fees raised by the precinct committee could be paid to 
the City – depending on its financial sustainability. It might also be that the City needs to indirectly 
subsidise precinct based management by lifting the trading fee completely. 
- It is not clear at this stage how the pilot can / should be integrated in the designs and plans for 
urban regeneration around Park Station. The City could help ensuring that the two initiatives (of 
different scales) talk to one another, and perhaps that the committee is included in discussions on 
public investment and refurbishment of the area. 
- Monitoring and evaluation. The pilot should be evaluated annually, where the precinct 
management committee presents a report to the CoJ/ DED, and incrementally adapts its features, 
principles and regulations to emerging issues, through a trial and error process. After three years 
lessons on the success or failure of the model should be consolidated. 
Proposed process 
- Presentation of the pilot to CoJ/ DED: debating and refining the pilot model. 
- If the City/DED endorses the model and once principles are agreed upon/ clarified/ consolidated, a 
general meeting with all traders, chaired by CJP and SANTRA, should be called to present the pilot, 
its principles, and debate some of its features. The objective is to get traders buy-in, and agreement 
on a number of house rules. 
 - Elections of block leaders should be organized (on a different day), to establish the precinct 
management committee. 
- Other local stakeholders (shop keepers and property owners) should be approached, to get their 
buy in and voluntary contribution to the costs of street management. Depending on this (?) they 
should have representation in the precinct management committee. 
- CUBES support: facilitating discussions between CJP and SANTRA; helping consolidate the pilot in 
an advisory capacity; conducting some (limited) research on existing stakeholders and conditions; 
possibly drafting an urban design plan for trading sites and designs. 
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